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Any Academic Ever

Abstract
The advent of inverter-interfaced, decentralised generation has incited a paradigm shift
in distribution network design philosophy. Accordingly, the effects of decentralised generation on distribution network power quality, stability and protection have become important topics within research. Whilst the focus of this Thesis is protection design philosophy
amidst increasing decentralised generation, protection efficacy is indelibly linked to power
quality and stability. Ergo, it is prudent that all three areas of research interest are
examined.
The motivation for this Thesis is to overcome some of the technical constraints that prevent the continued proliferation of decentralised energy resources. Further, this Thesis
provides simulation tools that will aid in understanding the effects of decentralised generation on the protection adequacy of distribution networks. Generally speaking, there
exists no consensus on how much embedded generation is permissible before traditional
distribution network design philosophy becomes ineffective in maintaining protection, stability and power quality adequacy. Hence, the work conducted in this Thesis will provide
utilities with the knowledge and tools required to cope with the continued proliferation of
decentralised generation.
Currently, the embedded generation penetration levels in Australia reportedly cause instances of over voltage compromising the power quality in distribution networks. This
Thesis proposes an over voltage mitigation scheme, which utilises a controller capable of
indirectly regulating the voltage magnitude at the terminals of an embedded generator
through reactive power absorption and apparent power curtailment. The scheme maximises the remuneration received by the embedded generator proprietor whilst adhering to
voltage standards and does not require an off-line sensitivity analysis or communications
infrastructure. The results indicate a proof of concept; however, there exists many concerns regarding how such a scheme could be incentivised – or, if necessary, enforced. The
scheme operates best when all decentralised generators employ the proposed controller.
Instances of protection failure due to decentralised generation are non-existent in Australian distribution networks and requires a much more significant penetration of embedded generation than present. A small-signal analysis tool is required to determine whether
the connection of an embedded generator will cause fault discrimination issues. Smallsignal analysis is time-intensive and requires a large amount of information to accurately
model the fault response of an embedded generator. This Thesis provides an alternative
to small-signal analysis via an iterative solver that predicts the prefault, fault-instant and

steady-state fault data. Utilisation of the proposed solver allows a thorough protection
analysis study of a distribution network for every fault type and location. A report is
then generated containing the specific information relevant to a protection engineer. The
strengths and limitations of the proposed solver are detailed and compared with smallsignal analysis. The proposed solver is capable of greatly improving the productivity of
protection engineers when dealing with large penetrations of embedded generation.
This Thesis extends into the natural evolution of embedded generation proliferation,
namely, the microgrid concept. Some alterations to contemporaneous microgrid design
philosophies are proffered with the intention of improving the ability of islanded embedded generation protection devices to discern the presence of high impedance single-phase
to earth fault. An iterative solver is also developed to calculate the fault response of
islanded embedded generation when employing conventional droop control developed for
microgrid applications. The solver is capable of identifying the prefault, fault-instant and
steady-state fault data including the island frequency. A key contribution of this Thesis
is the introduction of a voltage sequence protection scheme. Results indicate that the
voltage sequence protection scheme possesses excellent fault discrimination capabilities
for islanded networks rich in inverter-interfaced generators.
The findings of this Thesis contain conceptual significance with numerous possible applications in future networks should the proliferation of inverter-interfaced generation be
sustained. The ability to easily discern the impacts of increased decentralised generation on protection adequacy is a major strength of this Thesis. Furthermore, the over
voltage mitigation scheme and microgrid design philosophy, including voltage sequence
protection, represent new techniques that address obstacles in perpetual energy resource
decentralisation: over voltage in grid-connected applications and protection discrimination
in intentional islanding applications.
All contributions within this Thesis have been simulated within the MATLAB environment using an innovative simulation platform. Verification of simulation results are presented where validation against other published results has been possible. However, in
order to fully examine the performance of the contributions developed in this Thesis, further research is required to prototype and rigorously test the concepts that have been
developed using real-world networks.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1

Background

Since the Industrial Revolution, carbon dioxide concentrations have increased to be 26%
higher than the maximum carbon dioxide concentrations over the previous 650 000 years
[5]. The causal link between human behaviour since the early 19th century and the rise in
carbon concentrations is a topic of some debate and is often heavily politicised. According
to a study conducted by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), about as many Australians believe that humans are causing climate change
as those who believe climate change is occurring naturally [6]. However, within Australia
there exists a general consensus that it is our population’s responsibility to curtail carbon
emissions where possible, despite relatively little being done of late in Australian politics.
The Renewable Energy Target (RET) scheme introduced by the Australian government
in 2001 is still in effect. The RET scheme was designed to ensure 20% of Australia’s
electricity is generated by renewable energy resources (henceforth known as renewables)
by 2020. The CSIRO found that most Australians agree that “responding to climate
change will cost a lot of money” [6]. However, a RET policy analysis undertaken by
ROAM Consulting in 2014 found that repealing the RET would increase electricity prices
in the medium to long term [7]. Hence, it is likely that the RET scheme will not be
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repealed despite the prevalence of climate change scepticism within the Australian Federal
Government and population [8].
The RET scheme provides financial incentives for both large-scale and small-scale renewables. State governments have developed various schemes to encourage industrial,
commercial and residential proprietors to invest in renewables, particularly solar photovoltaics (PV). It is well established that PV cells are carbon negative over their lifespan
and PV systems are becoming increasingly affordable [9]. Contemporaneously, electricity
prices have increased dramatically within Australia. An international comparison found
that Australia’s electricity prices were some of the highest in the world in 2012 and prices
had grown by more than 40% between 2007 and 2012 [10]. The coupling of increased
electricity prices and financial incentives provided by the RET scheme has led to a significant increase in small-scale generation investment; the Australian PV Institute reports
an exponential growth in PV installations since 2010 [11].
While PV is popular, technical concerns over the widespread use of grid-connected renewables have risen. Instances of over voltage (OV) have reportedly caused nuisance trips
of grid-connected energy resources which represents a loss of income for the proprietor
[12]. Several utilities have reacted by imposing limits on renewable energy resource size or
penetration within a feeder or substation. However, the limits imposed by utilities in Australia are non-uniform, suggesting that renewable energy connection policy is based more
on empirical evidence than definitive analysis and the application of Australian Standards
[13]. The potential impacts of increasingly high penetrations of grid-connected renewable
energy resources on distribution systems are poorly understood and are a topic of increasing amounts of research. Through a better understanding of the impacts of grid-connected
renewables, measures may be developed that allow the proliferation of small-scale renewables to continue at the distribution level, reducing carbon emissions and permitting an
increased investment in small-scale generation in Australia and abroad.
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Embedded Generation

Renewable embedded generation (EG) manifests in various forms. There are a wide variety of energy resource types, including solar PV, solar thermal, wind, hydroelectric,
geothermal, tidal, fuel cells and biofuels. However, there are only three types of interfaces used in grid-connected EG: synchronous machines, induction machines and power
electronic devices, most commonly, inverters. Often, there is also a transformer providing
galvanic isolation from the mains supply. A transformer can provide a series inductance
capable of filtering the voltage waveform provided by power electronic devices.
The advantages of EG include:

• reduced transmission and distribution losses.
• the ability for utilities to defer infrastructure upgrades.
• peak shaving.
• the possibility of intentional islanding to increase reliability.
• providing reactive power and/or voltage support [14].
• in some cases, improved fault ride-through [15].
• cogeneration applications (the ability to harness wasted energy available at the customer level where available).

EG has many distinct advantages over conventional large-scale generation. However, a
large penetration of EG can impact the normal operation of contemporary distribution
networks (DNs) significantly. Issues associated with the connection of small-scale EG (¡30
kW) to Australian DNs are minimised through the application of Australian Standards
[16]. Applications for small-scale EG generally require only a very basic technical analysis
before connection approval can be granted. Medium-scale EG (¡5 MW) requires a far
more in-depth technical analysis before connection can be granted. Some potential issues
include:
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• Voltage fluctuations.
• Poor regulation of the steady state voltage magnitude.
• Changes to DN fault current characteristics.
• Generator stability [17].
Problems that may arise with EG connection are case dependent. The location of an EG
site may have a significant impact on the severity of encountered problems. Hence, a custom detailed analysis of each prospective connection is vital in ensuring a new installation
shall not compromise the expected operation of the grid.
There exists no universal standard for medium-scale EG integration in Australia; various
utilities employ separate guidelines and a wide list of technical standards. However, all
standards require protection coordination with DN devices. Anti-islanding protection is
fundamental for protection coordination, which will be explored in more detail in Chapter 2.
The scope of the work contained within this Thesis is predicated on the continued proliferation of inverters as the most common energy resource to grid interface. There are many
reasons why inverters are preferable to synchronous and induction machines in small-scale
grid-connected generation applications, including:
• Many renewables produce direct current (DC) electricity which requires an inverter
interface in order to be converted into an appropriate alternating current (AC)
waveform, an operation that cannot be achieved efficiently using other interfaces.
• From a control perspective, inverters are the most flexible grid interface.
• Inverters have no moving parts and require little maintenance.
• Inverters are becoming increasingly affordable.
• Inverter interfaces enable the separation of the dynamics of the energy resource
from the grid [18]. This means that the transient response of an embedded generator connected through an inverter to the grid is not dependent on the physical
characteristics of the energy source.
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Inverters are ubiquitous and increasing in popularity [13]. Inverters are a well established
technology with which consumers are familiar; hence, the assumption of the continued
proliferation of inverter-interfaced embedded generation (IIEG) is not unfounded. For
these reasons, inverters are chosen to be the dominant EG interface and indeed the only
acceptable interface as the shift toward autonomous grids becomes realisable.

1.3

Protection

The protection schemes implemented in Australian DNs employ over current (OC), earth
fault (EF) and sensitive earth fault (SEF) techniques for fault detection. DN protection
devices include reclosers, sectionalisers and fuses. Protection settings are chosen such that
adequate protection discrimination and selectivity can be achieved across all protection
devices.
The key objective of a DN protection scheme philosophy is to minimise customer disconnection within the scope of ensuring all faulted segments of a network are promptly
isolated. Fast and effective fault detection is pivotal to reducing the risk of the electrocution of civilians and utility personnel, as well as minimising network infrastructure
damage. The correct operation and coordination of protection devices is a critically important characteristic of any DN. Hence, the accurate selection of protection settings is
crucial.
DN protection settings are determined through analysing the normal load behaviour and
fault behaviour of the DN, both of which are impacted by the connection of EG. The ability
to discern the anticipated effects of EG connection in DNs in a core focus of this Thesis
and an important contribution to the field assuming the proliferation of EG continues.

1.4

The Microgrid Concept

There exists no unified definition of a microgrid; indeed, the definition and constitution
of a microgrid has evolved in recent years. However, there are many similarities amongst
contemporary definitions. A microgrid is modular composite of a larger power network. A
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microgrid contains clusters of grid-connected energy resources and loads that are controlled
and protected such that a microgrid can operate as a segment of a larger network or
autonomously as an intentionally island. Historically, microgrids have been much simpler
systems, often with a single back-up generator and one customer. However, these archaic
designs, whilst they still exist, have been superseded from the microgrid label; they have
specifically been excluded from the modern microgrid definition [19]. The IEEE Guide
[20] introduces a new term, distributed resources island systems, in order to further abate
the confusion that is presently, inextricably linked with the term microgrid. Distributed
resources island systems are defined as electric power systems that:

• contain EG and load.
• can disconnect and reconnect to the grid.
• include low voltage segments and can possibly extend to medium voltage segments
of the grid.
• are intentionally planned [20].

This definition is consistent with the scope of the microgrid covered within this Thesis.
Within the scope of contemporary definition of microgrids, each embedded generator
should operate in a plug-and-play fashion and ideally not require the use of communications infrastructure. Autonomous operation of segments within DNs is currently prohibited by IEEE and Australian Standards [16, 21]. There are various technical obstacles preventing microgrid operation, which can be broadly categorised into four different
groups: power quality, control, stability and protection. There has been a considerable
amount of research investigating the plausibility of the microgrid concept, but there is no
consensus on microgrid protection design philosophy.

1.5

The Problem Statement

At the core of DN design philosophy is the premise of radial power flow [22–26]. Within
the context of DNs, radial power flow implies that the flow of electricity can be sourced
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only from upstream of the zone substation. The connection of EG to DNs directly violates
the premise of radial power flow and compromises the efficaciousness of DN protection,
stability and power quality regulation. Instances of poor power quality, especially OV,
have reportedly already occurred [12]; yet envisaged errors in protective response and
stability have not yet become a problem in Australian DNs, as well as other DNs abroad.
For issues of stability or poor protective response to arise, the EG would have to constitute
a significant portion of the total available generation. A search through extensive literature
suggests that there is no evidence that significant stability or OC protection issues have
occurred in Australian DNs on account of EG. However, the inclusion of EG in DNs does
have an effect on the how OC protective devices respond to faults. The determination of
the necessary penetration levels of EG before existing protection failure becomes a strong
likelihood is still an unsolved problem. The variability of the structure and composition
of Australian DNs suggests that a generalised penetration level where protection failure
shall occur is non-deterministic and a tool that can analyse DNs on a case-by-case basis
would be more useful. The development of such a tool is an important contribution of
this Thesis and is a topic of increasing importance for power distribution utilities as the
growth of EG continues.
A hierarchical view of the research problem explored within this Thesis is illustrated in
Fig. 1.1. The research problem can be considered in two key sections: grid-connected
only and the microgrid concept. While these sections are often explored independently, it
is essential to recognise that the protection philosophy applied to the microgrid in gridconnected mode should be equivalent to the protection philosophy applied in any DN with
a very high EG penetration.

1.5.1

Impacts of a High EG Penetration on OC Protection Schemes

EG can provide a fault current, which implies that EG can contribute to the fault current measured by protective devices. The extra fault current could cause the ratings of
a circuit breaker (CB) to be exceeded which can damage the CB and also potentially
prevent the CB from extinguishing the fault current. Hence, the inclusion of EG might
require an expensive upgrade of protection devices, unless a fault current limiting device
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Figure 1.1: Problem Statement Diagram

is implemented [24]. In some circumstances, the extra fault current supplied from EG will
increase the apparent fault impedance from the perspective of an OC protection device.
The increased apparent impedance will reduce the fault current measured by the OC protection device which can cause fault under-reach. The inclusion of EG can complicate fault
discrimination, particularly in segments of a network with a high short circuit impedance.
EG units might also cause unnecessary tripping when a fault occurs in adjacent feeders.
Furthermore, the grading process of inverse definite minimum time (IDMT) curves across
protection devices is predicated on radial power flow in DNs. The introduction of multiple
sources will have an effect on the selectivity in OC protection schemes designed for DNs
[24].
Some DNs contain fuses which are coordinated with reclosers to prevent the fuse from
blowing during a temporary fault. The recloser is programmed such that the recloser’s
IDMT curve will isolate the fault before the fuse blows. After the first reclose, the recloser
will operate using a slower IDMT curve, allowing the fuse to burn out if the fault remains.
Such an operation allows the fuse to remain intact if the fault is temporary. If a significant
EG penetration were to exist in the isolated segment of a network, the EG fault current
may cause the fuse to burn out on the first instance, irrespective of the temporary nature
of the fault. Such an event would have a significant impact on the reliability of the network
[23].
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The impacts of EG on OC protection are further complicated through the diversity of EG
unit interfaces. Synchronous machines are capable of providing a significant fault current,
which implies that OC protection technology could be adapted to protect non-radial DNs
containing synchronous machine-interfaced EG in much the same way as transmission
networks are protected using directional OC and distance protection [27]. However, IIEG
is current limited due to the power electronic switches within the inverter. Over-rating
of inverters is expensive but may offer some advantages such as fault ride-through for
sensitive loads [28]. The maximum current that can be provided by an inverter is generally
stated in literature to be about twice the rated current, but is shown to be approximately
five times the rated current experimentally in [29] lasting for one-tenth of a cycle. An
inverter’s fault current waveform is volatile, stochastic and short-lived; the authors of
[29] compared their findings with manufacturer data and confirmed that the fault current
contribution of IIEG units is much smaller than an equivalent sized synchronous machine.
The implication of fault current contributions must be taken into consideration when
assessing the efficaciousness of traditional protection techniques.

1.5.2

Impacts of a High EG Penetration on Anti-Islanding Protection

Passive anti-islanding protection will operate if a significant voltage or frequency deviation
occurs. Deviations in voltage and frequency are created through the control response
of EG units to disparities in real or reactive power generation and absorption within an
island. Active anti-islanding protection reduces the non-detection zone (NDZ) of an island.
However, with the exception of communications based active anti-islanding technology,
there still exists a point or region of metastability that in theory will prevent anti-islanding
protection from operating under certain conditions [30]. The likelihood of anti-islanding
protection failure increases with the increased penetration of EG in DNs.
Consider the case where an isolated segment of a network maintains supply through EG
support and anti-islanding protection fails to detect loss of mains (LOM). Generally,
the isolated network will shift out of phase with the mains supply. In such as case, a
reclosure attempt could cause significant damage to network infrastructure as well as EG
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technology. It is also possible that a fault arc may not be extinguished as a result of a
failure of anti-islanding protection to operate [24, 31].
A failure of anti-islanding protection to operate could cause utility personnel to incorrectly assume that a section of the grid isolated from the mains supply is dead. Even after
connecting grounding leads on the upstream side of a maintenance site, there is still a risk
of electrocution. The perceived risk of such events occurring is considered to be acceptably small with present EG penetration levels and modern anti-islanding technology [32].
However, the higher the penetration of EG, the higher the risk of protection failure. If the
use of grid-connected renewables continues to grow as expected, the increased likelihood
of protection failure will require reform of DN and EG protection design philosophy.

1.5.3

Moving Towards the Microgrid

As the penetration of EG approaches 100% of peak load within a DN, an opportunity to
establish self-standing segments of a network arises. There are many technical concerns
which have prevented international standards from allowing intentional islanding. Issues
such as control and stability have been addressed through droop control and through
decoupling machine dynamics via inverter interfaces. The protection of a microgrid is a
topic of greater contention; traditional protection schemes are inappropriate due to the
lack of radial fault current flow and the inherent fault current restrictions imposed by
the power electronic interfaces of each EG unit. The connections of transformers and the
grounding configurations of EG units and network infrastructure have a significant impact
on the zero sequence current and zero sequence voltage observable during fault conditions,
which are important for fault discrimination during earth faults.

1.5.4

Conclusion

The proliferation of small-scale grid-connected renewables cannot continue indefinitely
when employing contemporary standards due to various technical concerns. In addition
to utilities imposing limits on the connection of renewables, Australian state governments
have eased incentive programs to curb new connection applications. In order for the
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continued growth of small-scale renewables, these technical concerns must be addressed.
Furthermore, there may be reliability improvements made possible through the implementation of the microgrid concept. By tackling the technical issues concerned with increased
renewable EG penetration, carbon emissions will be reduced, utility infrastructure upgrades can be deferred, locally available energy can be harnessed and the reliability of
DNs can be improved.

1.6

Objectives and Contributions

The purpose of this Thesis is to provide tools that aid the understanding and alleviation
of the negative impacts of high EG penetration with a focus on protection adequacy in
DNs. This Thesis extends from the continuation of contemporary grid-connected EG connection procedures to more experimental DN configurations such as intentional islanding
applications.
The first major objective and contribution is the development of an extensive literature
review examining the proposed protection schemes of DNs with a high EG penetration.
Each method is critically analysed and assessed for appropriateness from a technical and
economic point of view. The literature review encompasses both grid-connected and
autonomous modes of operation.
Secondly, a platform for simulating the fault response of DNs with a high EG has been
developed. The assumptions and underlying equations which define the behaviour of the
models are outlined. The model includes IIEG with a variety of control types, including
conventional constant power control and droop control. The control schemes are modified
in order to aid the identification of high impedance single-phase to earth faults. A justification and verification of the models are provided. The contribution includes a critical
analysis on modelling EG units from a protection perspective, meaning that the models
are designed such that a realistic simulation of the expected fault response is achieved.
Thirdly, this Thesis contributes an OV mitigation scheme which is used to ensure that the
voltage profile of a DN does not exceed given limits. The scheme requires only a minor
modification to contemporary control schemes of grid-connected EG. The scheme does
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not require a communications system nor an off-line sensitivity analysis. Furthermore,
the remuneration received by each proprietor is maximised through use of reactive power
absorption. The scheme naturally favours EG proprietors connected to segments of a DN
with a lower short circuit impedance or in a close proximity to a load.
Fourthly, a tool is proposed that allows a protection engineer to quickly capture the
expected fault responses of a DN with a high level of EG penetration. The tool is based
on Newton’s method of finding the roots of an equation by iterative techniques. The
results are compared with the small-signal models also developed in this Thesis. The
tool provides a fast alternative to small signal modelling; a very desirable quality when
an intricate DN requires hundreds of simulations to verify the efficacy of a protection
scheme. Further, the comparison of the proposed tool with small signal analysis provides
a verification for the tool and validation of the results presented in this Thesis.
Fifthly, an automated protection scheme analysis tool is developed that generates a report
informing the user of the impacts of the connection of EG from the DN protection perspective. The report can be used to identify if a CB’s rating may be exceeded or if the fault
reach of a protection unit is insufficient. This Thesis proposes plausible alterations that
may be made in order to maintain an adequate protective response. The proposed tool
can be used in a case-by-case basis that could be adopted by utilities to assess whether
a prospective EG installation is acceptable. The contribution of the proposed protection analysis tool is significant as currently there exists no automated methodology for
determining the maximum allowable EG penetration before protection efficaciousness is
compromised.
The remainder of the contributions within this Thesis are focused on the application of
the microgrid concept to future DNs. One of the major contributions is the proposal of a
new microgrid design philosophy that aids in the fault identification process. The effects
of earthing and transformer connection are taken into account and a sequence component
voltage-based protection scheme is adopted as the preferred autonomous mode protection
scheme. A tool is also developed to predict the fault response of an intentional island
when droop control is employed. The results are compared to a small-signal model for
verification purposes.
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Significance of Research

This Thesis contributes to the body of research that allows the increased proliferation
of renewable energy resources. The first frontier is assessing when the alteration of protection settings of contemporary DN OC protection devices are necessary. Coupled with
OV mitigation technology, the capacity for EG penetration within a DN can be better
defined. Through understanding the fault behaviour of DNs embedded with renewables,
utilities will likely be able to permit the installation of more grid-connected renewables
and continue to provide adequate protection.
The microgrid concept requires a much more dramatic paradigm shift in DN design philosophy. This Thesis will proffer a microgrid design philosophy that will ensure adequate
protection discrimination for fault current limited IIEG. The microgrid concept is the
culmination of energy decentralisation; EG units will increase in value due to the extra
reliability they will provide in a deregulated market.

1.8

Scope

While stability and control are not the focus of this Thesis, protection design philosophies
are indelibly linked to the underlying characteristics of the power system technology. The
assumption that the commonly accepted constant power control of EG units is sustainable
for future grids with a large penetration of EG is imprudent. Hence, this Thesis proposes
an amendment to constant-power control which mitigates the risk of OV instances whilst
ensuring power flow is allocated in a manner commensurate with the size of the EG and
the short circuit impedance between the EG unit and closest upstream voltage regulated
point.
The networks considered in this Thesis extend from zone substations down to the customer level. The voltage ranges of concern within this Thesis are 11 kV (henceforth
known as high voltage (HV)) and 400 V (henceforth known as low voltage (LV)) as commensurate with most Australian DNs. This Thesis assumes that large EG connections
are three-phase. This research also assumes that medium-scale EG units are likely to be
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implemented in a microgrid rather than only small-scale EG due to the need for reliable,
dispatchable power and the aggregate reduced cost of using medium-scale EG. Mediumscale is defined to be over 30 kW in size with significant reliability, whether through
energy storage or through the innate availability of the primary energy resource. It is
envisaged most medium-scale EG units are connected on strong segments of a DN with a
low short circuit impedance. To simplify simulation studies, balanced loads are assumed
(which is often not the case in LV networks). However, the envisaged worst case unbalance is considered when sequence component protection discrimination efficaciousness is
evaluated.

1.9

Report Layout

The remainder of this Thesis is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 – A literature review with a focus on proposed protection schemes for DNs
with a high EG. The literature review encompasses grid-connected only as well as microgrid applications.
Chapter 3 – The development of a modelling tool capable of simulating EG units, DNs
and protection systems. The modelling tool is designed to realistically simulate the smallsignal response of EG units to disturbances in a DN. The proposed controllers for gridconnected and autonomous EG are designed to aid in the protection prediction process.
A partial verification and examples are included.
Chapter 4 – A control scheme is proposed that is capable of mitigating instances of OV
that have occurred where EG is connected to segments of a DN with low local load and
a high short circuit impedance. The proposed OV mitigation scheme does not require
a significant amendment to contemporary grid-connected EG controllers and does not
require communications between EG units or an off-line sensitivity analyses of the DN.
Chapter 5 – A fault analysis tool is proposed as an alternative to time-intensive smallsignal modelling of fault conditions. The fault analysis tool is also capable of considering
the impact of fault current limiters and IIEG with a limited thermal inertia.
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Chapter 6 – The impacts of high levels of grid-connected EG are explored from the
protection perspective. A tool is introduced that is capable of analysing the efficacy of a
DN line protection scheme. The tool generates a report with the key information necessary
for understanding the impacts of EG on CB ratings and protection discrimination.
Chapter 7 – The protection analysis tool is extended to apply to microgrid applications.
A novel microgrid philosophy is presented with a focus on ensuring protection adequacy.
A voltage sequence protection scheme capable complete fault discrimination during autonomous operation of a microgrid is introduced. Autonomous connection requires use
of a communications medium. If communications systems fail, the microgrid will operate
identically to contemporary networks with a high EG penetration. The protection scheme
is outlined and tested within the simulation platform.
Chapter 8 – The final chapter gives the conclusion and recommendations for future
work.

Chapter 2

Literature Review
2.1

Introduction

The increasing pressure for renewable or ‘green’ energy coupled with government funded
economic incentives has caused a paradigm shift in the way residential, commercial and
governmental bodies approach energy investment. The shift has predominantly manifested
through the dramatic increase in the presence of grid-connected EG in sub-transmission
and DNs.
DNs were designed under the premise of radial power flow [22–26]. The introduction of
small-scale EG introduces the possibility of bi-directional power flow, rendering the network non-radial. The integrity of DN design philosophy is compromised by EG connection
and a detailed analysis is required to ascertain the implications of various levels of EG
penetration.

2.2
2.2.1

Contemporary DN Protection Systems
OC and EF Protection

The DN encompasses the electrical infrastructure between the zone substation and a
customer’s point of common coupling (PCC). The PCC is the point where the utility and
17
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the customer interface. Typically, the PCC is on the customer side of the utility revenue
meter [33]. Protective devices in DNs consist of reclosers, sectionalisers and fuses. To
coordinate protective devices, traditional DN protection schemes implement graded OC
protection and EF protection. OC and EF protection gradings are achieved using IDMT
curves as shown in Fig. 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: IDMT Curves

Each curve incorporates an error margin (the corresponding thin line) in order to account
for delays in signal processing, signal transmission and the time for the relevant CB to
open and extinguish the fault. A radial network has only one source of fault current.
Therefore, any protective devices located between the fault source and the fault will
observe (almost) the same fault current. Using the IDMT curves shown in Fig 2.1 as an
example, the protection device programmed with the green curve is connected downstream
of the protection device programmed with the red curve. A downstream device shall have
a lower pick-up current and an upstream device has a higher maximum fault current; the
IDMT curves are chosen accordingly. The protection device programmed with the green
curve must always operate before the protection device programmed with the red curve
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for any fault downstream of both protection devices. Hence, the green curve is placed
below the red curve (taking into account tolerances shown by the thin lines), satisfying
the protection selectivity criteria. To put it another way, IDMT curves must be arranged
to ensure that the minimum number of customers are disconnected when a fault is isolated.
The design process of choosing appropriate IDMT curves does not incorporate the effects
of EG. In fact, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard
1547-2003 states that [21]:

“Any distributed resource installation connected to a spot network shall not
cause operation or prevent reclosing of any network protectors installed on
the spot network. This coordination shall be accomplished without requiring
any changes to prevailing network protector clearing time practices of the area
electric power system.”

Experimentally, OC and EF protection have been shown to be susceptible to poor discrimination in networks with a high EG penetration [34, 35]. Hence, a threshold of EG
penetration must exist that defines the boundary where a network does not comply with
the protection requirements stipulated within the IEEE Standard 1547-2003. The determination of such a boundary has not been ascertained, largely due to other limiting
factors of EG connection such as OV; empirically, OV instances precede protection failure.
However, there are control mechanisms, such as reactive power absorption and real power
curtailment, capable of eliminating OV occurrences which are discussed in Chapter 3. The
EG threshold before DN protection failure is poorly defined and is an area of research
that requires further investigation.
Failure of OC and EF protection discrimination can be achieved in two ways. Firstly,
a protection device can trip unnecessarily for a fault outside of that protection device’s
zone of protection. Secondly, a protection device can fail to trip when a fault occurs
within that protection device’s zone of protection. These protection failures are referred
to as a nuisance trip and fail-to-trip respectively. Consider the circuit shown in Fig. 2.2.
The star designates a fault which is located in CB2’s zone of protection. Fault current
will flow through all CBs; however, CB1 and CB3 will experience a fault current in the
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opposite direction to normal power flow. OC and EF devices are typically not equipped
with directional elements in DNs; the trip time of CB1 and CB3 can be expressed through
each CB’s respective IDMT curve.

Vs

CB1
EG1

CB2

EG2

CB3

EG3

Figure 2.2: Protection Discrimination Example

The IDMT curves of CB1 and CB2 are not graded in the protection planning process due
to the assumption of radial power flow – no reverse fault current will flow through CB1
during a fault in CB2’s zone of protection if the DN is radial. While it is unlikely that
CB1 would trip before CB2 isolates the fault, a CB1 nuisance trip may occur if the pickup current of CB1 is significantly lower than CB2. The result would be the unnecessary
loss of all customers on CB1’s corresponding feeder. Customers will likely be reconnected
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after an auto-reclosure once CB2 isolates the fault. However, the reliability of the overall
network is compromised.
Similarly, CB3 would observe fault current in the opposite direction of radial power flow
during the fault in CB2’s zone of protection. In the unlikely event that the reverse fault
current is sufficient to trip CB3, no extra customers are lost. A trip at CB2 isolates all customers downstream of CB2 which includes all customers downstream of CB3. All islanded
EG units will isolate themselves via anti-islanding protection and reclosure attempts of
CB2 and CB3 will ensure that the final operational state of each CB is identical to an
equivalent network condition with no EG connection. However, the operation of CB3
violates the IEEE Standard 1547-2003 as normal protection behaviour has been impacted
by EG connection [21].
The fault current provided by EG2 will increase the voltage drop between EG2 and the
fault, reducing the fault current passing through CB2. Thus, the presence of EG may
cause the fault current flowing through a protection device to be below the pick-up current,
especially during a high impedance end of zone fault. In such a case, a fail-to-trip would
occur, increasing the likelihood of bushfires and the electrocution risk to customers and
utility personnel. Fault discrimination problems caused by high penetrations of EG can
pose a significant threat to DN reliability and safety.
Contrary to discrimination, protection selectivity between reclosers can be improved
through EG connection. Consider the circuit shown in Fig. 2.3.
CB2 and CB3 are graded to ensure that CB3 will operate before CB2 for a fault in CB3’s
zone of protection. Due to the presence of an EG unit (EG2) between CB2 and CB3,
the current observed by CB3 is greater than CB2. Hence, the time difference between a
CB3 trip and a CB2 trip will be greater than the graded IDMT curves would suggest.
Hence, the selectivity of an OC/EF protection scheme can be improved through EG
connection. However, there are further complications that must be considered concerning
auto-reclosure.
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Figure 2.3: Protection Selectivity Example

2.2.2

Recloser-EG Coordination

Reclosers will typically trip before an EG unit’s anti-islanding protection will detect LOM.
The maximum allowable time it should take for passive anti-islanding protection to operate
is two seconds according to Australian Standard (AS) 4777.3 and IEEE Standard 1547
[16, 21]. Reclosers will often remain open in the range of hundreds of milliseconds up to
seconds before a reclosure attempt [31]. The time that a recloser remains open before a
reclosure attempt is referred to as the recloser dead time. After the formation of an island,
it is likely that a phase difference of the voltage waveforms across the open recloser will
occur. Thus, an out-of-phase reclosure would create a large disturbance in the network,
possibly damaging network infrastructure and EG. IEEE 1547-2003 states that an EG
must cease to energise a network prior to a reclosure by the DN protection system [21].
Hence, it is important to consider the impact of EG anti-islanding operation when selecting
reclosure times.
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Further, it is possible for an EG unit to sustain an arc even after a recloser has isolated
the fault from the main supply [31]. The purpose of the recloser dead time is to allow the
arc path to de-ionise, thus removing the fault, assuming the fault is temporary. If the arc
is sustained by EG, a temporary fault may become permanent, reducing the reliability of
the network.
A trade-off is necessary when coordinating reclosers with EG units. The recloser must
be open for long enough to ensure that anti-islanding protection can operate, but short
enough such that the interruption experienced by customers is minimised. The coordination is further complicated when fuses and sectionalisers are installed within the DN.

2.2.3

Recloser-Fuse-EG Coordination

Reclosers are essential to maintain high reliability levels as most faults on DNs are temporary [26]. Spurs, off the backbone of a feeder, are normally protected by a fuse. Whenever
a fuse isolates a fault, that fuse has to be replaced by utility personnel before supply is
regained to customers downstream of the blown fuse. In order to further increase the
reliability of DNs, reclosers are coordinated with fuses such that the recloser will isolate
before the fuse will blow on the first detection of a fault. If the fault is temporary, the
fault will usually be cleared before the first reclose and no more protection operations will
be necessary. If the fault is still present, the fault is considered permanent; the fuse will
blow faster than the recloser trip time. Hence, two separate IDMT curves are used for
reclosers which are coordinated with fuses: a fast IDMT curve that will trip the recloser
before the fuse blows and a slow IDMT curve that will allow the fuse to blow if the fault
is still present (and downstream of that fuse). The inclusion of EG in DNs increases the
likelihood of a fuse blowing out on a temporary fault before the recloser with a fast IDMT
curve trips as the fuse may be exposed to more fault current than the recloser [23, 36].
In contemporary DNs, EG penetration levels are low and do not provide sufficient fault
current to interfere with protection grading nor selectivity. However, as EG penetration
rises, the aggregate fault current supplied by EG units may cause fuses to blow unnecessarily. Fig. 2.4 shows an example DN where a fuse has been coordinated with an upstream
recloser (CB2) programmed with both a fast and slow IMDT curve. The additional fault
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current supplied by the local EG implies that the fault current measured by the recloser is
smaller than the fault current flowing through the fuse. If the difference in fault current is
significant enough, the fuse may blow before the fast IDMT curve programmed within the
recloser will send a trip signal. The overall reliability of the network will be significantly
reduced as most faults within DNs are temporary in nature [26].

Vs

CB1

CB2

EG1

FUSE

EG2

Figure 2.4: Effects of EG on Recloser-Fuse Coordination

2.2.4

Recloser-Sectionaliser-EG Coordination

Sectionalisers are incapable of extinguishing fault current levels associated with that sectionaliser’s zone of protection. Hence, sectionalisers are only useful when coordinated with
reclosers. Sectionalisers will open after a set number of identified reclosures and when the
fault current has been extinguished by an upstream CB. The sectionaliser in Fig. 2.5 trips
after the first reclosure: when the fault has been extinguished for the second time.
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Figure 2.5: Sectionaliser Operation

However, if the fault current is sustained by the local EG, the current rating of the
sectionaliser may be exceeded. Either the sectionaliser would be damaged upon trying to
open with a sustained fault current or the sectionaliser may fail to detect an upstream
CB operation. In either case, the overall reliability of the DN would be compromised.

2.2.5

Anti-Islanding Protection

Anti-islanding protection is responsible for preventing instances of unintentional islanding
in DNs. Unintentional islanding is any situation where EG continues to supply a subsection of a network that has been isolated from the main grid. There are significant technical
and safety issues that might arise from an islanding situation. Consequently, intentional
islanding is forbidden by Australian and international standards [16, 21]. Anti-islanding
protection can be broadly classified into three different types: passive, active and communications based. In contemporary applications, anti-islanding protection is limited to
passive and active types.
According to comprehensive reports on anti-islanding technology, there is no form of noncommunications or utility based anti-islanding protection without a non-detection zone
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(NDZ) [30, 37]. In practice, however, the risks of most NDZs being realised are very small.
However, as EG penetration rises, the risk of anti-islanding protection failure increases.
Anti-islanding protection failure can lead to out-of-phase reclosure, decreased reliability
and risk of electrocution to utility personnel.
Anti-islanding protection design is not a focus within this Thesis. A plethora of different
anti-islanding methods have been proposed and assessed [30, 37]. The operational characteristics of an island that are required to prevent LOM detection within two seconds
cannot be achieved with contemporary EG penetration sizes and limitations stipulated
by utilities [13]. However, if EG restrictions are lifted and EG penetration levels can
approach 100% within DNs, the likelihood of anti-islanding protection failure to detect
LOM increases significantly. In such a case, traditional DN line protection would be completely inadequate. A significant protection design philosophy reform would be necessary,
including the protection of EG units.
If EG penetration levels exceed 100% of DN capacity, a logical evolution of DN operation
is the microgrid concept. Within a microgrid, anti-islanding protection is unnecessary, yet
the detection of LOM is still vital such that the control and protection schemes employed
by an EG unit can change as required. For instance, the control scheme of EG units may
change from constant-power control to droop control to ensure proper load following as
the microgrid transitions into autonomous mode. It is important to recognise that the
protection techniques implemented in microgrids are also valid for grid-connected only operation as a microgrid must be capable of isolating a fault during both grid-connected and
autonomous modes of operation. Conversely, grid-connected only protection techniques
can be implemented in a microgrid during grid-connected operation.

2.3

Proposed Protection Schemes for DN Grid-Connected
only Applications

The introduction of EG in DNs subverts the premise of radiality that is central to traditional DN protection philosophy. The non-radiality of DNs can be likened to the power
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flow observed in transmission networks. The protection philosophy for transmission networks implements distance and directional protection elements to detect and locate faults
despite the presence of multiple fault current sources. However, the energy resources
connected to transmission networks are typically large-scale synchronous machines that
are capable of delivering large fault currents. Hence, the principles used in transmission
networks could, in theory, be utilised in DNs with a high EG penetration if EG units were
interfaced through synchronous machines and the extra expense of directional and/or
distance protection can be justified.
The implementation of directional OC relays is proposed by Bhalja et al. in [22]. All
EG units midway through a distribution feeder have two separate protection devices with
directional elements connected on each side of that EG unit’s PCC. All other DN protective
devices are non-directional. There are many concerns with such a protection scheme.
There is a significant extra cost: two current transformers (CTs), two relays and two CBs
are necessary for each EG unit connected midway through a feeder. The scheme also
assumes that EG units are interfaced through synchronous machines which is often not
the case. IIEG units would likely be unable to provide enough fault current for adequate
protection discrimination due to the limited thermal inertia of power electronics switches.
Finally, non-directional relays connected at the upstream end of each feeder could trip
due to EG feeding faults on adjacent feeders. Hence, it may be appropriate for all OC
protective devices to be equipped with directional elements with an EG unit downstream
of that protective device.
An adaptive protection scheme that incorporates protection against voltage sag is proposed by Choi et al. in [38]. A single end-of-line synchronous generator is the adopted
EG interface for Choi et al.’s case study. The proposed protection scheme includes both
OC and voltage-based methods of fault detection. Protection thresholds of ‘critical current’ and ‘critical voltage’ are proposed and can be defined as the expected fault current
and voltage at an EG unit’s PCC during a zero-impedance fault at the nearest upstream
protection device. These ‘critical values’ are thresholds used to determine if a fault is
within the inter-tie CB’s zone of protection. An instantaneous trip is implemented for
any fault current above the critical current, otherwise IDMT curves are implemented if
the measured current at the EG unit is above the pre-determined pick-up current. The
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proposed protection scheme also uses IDMT curves to determine whether the recorded
voltage magnitude is indicative of a fault and, upon detection, will trip the inter-tie CB.
The protection scheme proposed by Choi et al. may be inappropriate for schemes with
IIEG, particularly during high-impedance faults as the fault current would be minimal.
Furthermore, many Australian DNs cover large distances and substantial voltage drops
are frequent. Voltage regulation is commonly found in rural feeders which may affect the
integrity of the proposed scheme. Hence, EG protection using voltage magnitude at the
EG unit’s PCC will likely encounter discrimination issues. Complications for detecting
single-phase to earth faults would also arise as the earthing connection and transformer
connection can prevent the flow of zero sequence fault current from EG units. There are
also unanswered questions regarding the coordination of multiple EG units.
An alternative to OC protection in DNs using distance protection is proposed by Chilvers
et al. in [39]. Distance protection is directional in nature and, hence, is appropriate for
non-radial networks. A disadvantage of using distance protection is the required connection of a voltage transformer (VT) with each EG unit which represents a significant extra
cost compared with traditional OC protection. It could be argued that the addition of a
VT may be unnecessary as the voltage sensor can be connected on the LV side of the distribution transformer. However, the connection of a distribution transformer may restrict
the ability of the distance protection to determine the zero sequence impedance of a fault.
A significant complication arises due to delta-wye connected distribution transformers incapable of passing zero sequence current or voltage. For a fault on the HV side of the
distribution transformer, there will be no zero sequence voltage on the LV side of such a
transformer. The protection scheme attempts to compensate for the lack of measurable
zero-sequence voltage data using a preset estimate of the impedance behind the distance
relay during single-phase to earth faults, including the impedance of the earth return path.
The determination of protection settings for distance protection may be a more rigorous
process than traditional OC protection to prevent fault under-reach or over-reach during
single-phase to earth faults.
Contemporary DNs are often separated by normally-open switches or reclosers which can
be used to reroute supply during maintenance. In theory, normally-open points could be
closed and the network could be protected using distance protection in much the same way
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as transmission networks are protected [27]. The non-radiality of a DN would increase
the reliability of that DN if protection selectivity and discrimination can be achieved.
In addition to protection considerations, the voltage profile and thermal loading of the
line must also be considered before a normally-open point should be closed. Distance
protection also has the advantage of a faster operation time which is important for the
overall stability of the DN. While preliminary research is promising, more research is
necessary to assess the efficaciousness of distance protection in DNs with a high EG
penetration.

2.4

Proposed Protection Schemes for Microgrid Applications

An effective, robust and experimentally verified protection design philosophy for intentional islanding has not yet been developed. Many protection schemes have been proffered
by a variety of authors. Arguably, protection is the least understood topic within the realm
of microgrid design philosophy largely due to the unusual fault response of IIEG units,
which are an integral component of typical microgrid structures. Traditional OC protection alone has been shown to be insufficient for microgrids containing IIEG units [40].
Coordinating protection devices across both grid-connected and autonomous modes of
operation to maintain adequate redundancy, discrimination and selectivity is a key focus
in contemporary protection research.
The simplest method of maintaining a significant fault current during islanded operation
is through connection of machines with a significant inherent inertia. The authors of
[41] propose the inclusion of a flywheel system to complement IIEG in order to supply a
significant current when a fault occurs in an islanded microgrid. Flywheel systems are very
useful in applications containing critical load, especially when coupled with dispatchable
power such as a diesel generators [42]. However, flywheels are expensive and require
a sophisticated control scheme for coordination with IIEG in a microgrid. Due to the
high cost of such a scheme, it is unlikely that every IIEG unit will be equipped with a
flywheel system. Thus it is envisaged that a communications medium would be necessary
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to instigate an inter-trip to isolate all non-inertial IIEG when a relay located at an inertial
EG unit detects a fault. There is also no consideration for back-up protection for cases of
communications or flywheel failure.
An alternative solution to maintaining a significant fault current in an inverter dominated
microgrid is the installation of a fault current source as prototyped by [43]. The fault
current source consists of a storage device, power electronics converter, a triggering circuit and a charging module. Fault current sources are similar to some power conditioning
devices such as dynamic voltage restorers and static VAR compensators, but have an enhanced capability of exporting significant fault current that will aid in the fault detection
process. The ratings of the power electronics must be chosen according to the maximum
expected fault current export. Furthermore, a back-up fault current source may be necessary to ensure a significant redundancy is present within the microgrid. Otherwise,
inter-tripping may be necessary and reliability will be compromised.
Three protection design schemes for microgrids are proffered by Conti et al. [1]. Each
scheme assumes the presence of a microgrid central controller and thus communications
which is a subversion of the desirable and well established plug-and-play microgrid design
philosophy [44–46]. Each scheme also employs OC protection and, hence, cannot be
considered appropriate for IIEG.
The first scheme proposed in [1] uses conventional OC protection to isolate the fault at
the protection device adjacent to the ‘satellite centre’ (SC) (the circuit breaker (CB1)
immediately downstream of SC in Fig. 2.6) of the microgrid. The SC contains a central
controller that is capable of gathering fault data from microgrid protection devices and
disseminating trip instructions in order to isolate faults within the microgrid as necessary.
Before the satellite centre CB (CB1) trips, each protective device determines the direction
of the fault. In the example of a single-phase to earth fault, the zero sequence current
direction is determined using the zero sequence voltage as a reference. A lagging zero
sequence current indicates a forward direction fault and vice versa. The central controller
then determines the location of the fault using the information gathered by each relay
transmitted over a communications channel and switches in and out the appropriate circuit breakers to ensure fault isolation and maximum customer connection. The central
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Figure 2.6: Microgrid Example (adapted from [1])

controller must be given a data set containing the network topology and protective device
locations and identifiers. Any modification of the microgrid requires significant alterations
and reprogramming of the protection devices. There is also a significant loss of reliability
due to unnecessary tripping of upstream protective devices and the abandonment of recloser operation. Reclosures are essential in maintaining DN reliability (though reclosers
can be problematic if EG isolation does not occur before the first reclose). It is important
to note that for the first proposed scheme, the isolation of a fault is not dependent on
communications; only the appropriate selectivity of the protection scheme is dependent
on communications.
The second scheme proposed in [1] uses OC and zero sequence current relays to determine
the presence and direction of a fault to identify the fault location, much like the first
proposed scheme. The difference is that the CB immediately downstream of the satellite
centre (CB1) no longer necessarily trips first. Upon detecting a fault, each protection
device communicates with any adjacent protection devices through a pilot wire. If the
OC or zero sequence current direction is the same, no protection trip is necessary. If the
directions are different, the relevant CBs will isolate the fault. The advantage of the second
proposed scheme is the short duration trip time, reducing the impact of fault current on
existing infrastructure and minimising the risk of igniting a bushfire. The disadvantage
of the second proposed scheme is the extra cost of the pilot wire and control logic, as
well as the lack of contingent protection if communications are to fail. The absence of
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Figure 2.7: Final Protection Scheme Example (adapted from [1])

communication response and the detection of an OC would necessitate a trip signal which
would compromise the selectivity and reliability of the protection scheme.
The final scheme proposed in [1] contains two sets of CTs, CBs and relays adjacent to
every load and EG unit, except at the end of the line where only one set is necessary. Each
protective device is directional in nature and ‘looks’ away from that protective device’s
load or EG unit as shown in Fig. 2.7. When a fault current is detected, the protective
devices at the ends of each line segment (CB1a and CB1b, CB2a and CB2b, CB3a and
CB3b) compare the measured direction of the fault. If the paired protection devices
observe the same forward fault direction, those protection devices will trip, isolating the
fault. A communications medium is required for the protection scheme to operate as
expected; hence, a back-up protection is necessary in the case of communications failure.
The extra protection infrastructure represents a significant cost and could only be deemed
appropriate for large-scale EG such as those found in sub-transmission networks.
All three protection schemes rely on the presence of OC during fault response; a premise
which is unreasonable in the case of microgrids dominated by IIEG. Conti et al. in [1]
discuss the protection issues concerned with IIEG and recommend use of differential protection which also requires a communications medium. The reliance on a communications
medium for adequate protection compromises the reliability of the microgrid. It is also
preferable for the microgrid to operate in a plug-and-play manner as much as possible in
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order to reduce DN planning complexity and to eliminate the need for the reconfiguration
of protection settings each time a modification is made to the DN.
Zamani et al. in [47] use directional OC, negative sequence current and zero sequence
current protection to detect faults within a microgrid. For high impedance faults, an
energy level based protection proposed by [48] is adopted. However, there exists some
‘noisy’ loads in DNs that behave similarly to a high impedance fault [48]; hence, discrimination problems may arise. The proposed control scheme includes the provision of
blocking signals between protective elements to preclude false trips due to faults in adjacent zones of protection. There are several advantages to using blocking signals to ensure
selectivity and redundancy in DNs. Firstly, the use of blocking signals provides back-up
protection for CB failure. Blocking signals will only be transmitted long enough for the
fault to be isolated according to the IDMT curve programmed within each relay. If a
CB has failed to isolate the fault, the blocking signal will be removed and the adjacent
CB will trip, providing adequate back-up protection. Secondly, assuming communications
infrastructure is healthy, selectivity can be achieved in tandem with fast tripping times,
improving the stability of the network. Protective devices no longer have to wait until
each upstream device has the opportunity to isolate a fault before tripping. Finally, in
the event of communications failure, the protection scheme will still isolate the fault. The
disadvantage of communications failure is that selectivity will be compromised, which will
result in an unnecessary disconnection of supply to some customers. Such a disadvantage
can be considered acceptable within the context of safe microgrid operation.
The use of differential protection in microgrids has been proposed by Zeineldin et al. for
microgrid applications in [49] similar to Conti et al. in [1]. To accomplish differential
protection, the end of each line must be equipped with a CT, relay and CB. A communications link will be necessary between devices at the end of each line such that the end of
line currents can be compared. A relay will send a trip signal if the difference in current
exceeds a predetermined level. In Zeineldin et al.’s proposed scheme, each EG unit is
assumed to contain contemporary anti-islanding protection that will inform the central
controller and EG unit whether an island has formed. Constant current control is used for
grid-connected operation and P-V control is used for autonomous control. The proposed
protection scheme offers very effective protection discrimination and selectivity, assuming
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all components are working properly. However, no provision for back-up protection during communications or CB failure is given. The proposed protection scheme is also very
expensive and only appropriate for sub-transmission level microgrids with limited spurs
and loads.
Instantaneous communication-based differential protection is proposed as an effective protection scheme for microgrids in [50]. In the event of a CB failure, adjacent relays would
receive an inter-trip signal to isolate a fault. However, provision for communication failure
is not given. The authors in [51] investigate the efficacy of differential protection, but only
consider three-phase bolted faults which are uncommon. Regardless, differential protection would theoretically provide adequate discrimination and selectivity for any type of
fault given the fault current exceeds 10% of nominal current flow [50].
An interesting approach towards identifying high impedance single-phase to earth faults
is proposed in [50]. The authors use the stochastic nature of single-phase to earth faults
to identify the fault. A crude model of a high impedance fault is given, yet further work is
needed to capture the scope of high impedance fault behaviour before the proposed fault
scheme can be considered reliable.
The use of voltage-restrained over-current (VROC) in inverter dominated microgrids is
proposed by Tumilty et al. in [52]. Tumilty et al. first explore the feasibility of using
solely voltage-based protection techniques for protection adequacy in a network. The
paper concludes that topological selectivity is problematic and impractical for complex
microgrids. VROC relays can provide separate OC protection settings depending on the
locally measurable voltage. The use of VROC reduces tripping times and reduces the
risk of nuisance tripping if protection settings are chosen correctly. However, there still
exists complications in coordinating protection devices using VROC; general selectivity
for every microgrid configuration cannot be achieved without communications.
Al-Nasseri et al. in [53, 54] provide a sequence component voltage-based protection scheme
for islanded operation. The three-phase voltage waveforms are converted into the directquadrature (dq) axes by (2.1) using a rotating reference frame as shown in (2.2). The
difference between the reference dq voltages and the measured dq voltages is calculated
and analysed to determine the fault type and location. Al-Nasseri et al.’s model of EG
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units assumes an outer voltage regulation loop and an inner current regulation loop to control the gating signals transmitted to the inverter. Such a control scheme does not allow
for load following and, hence, is inappropriate for use within microgrids using commonly
accepted droop controllers [53, 55–57]. However, this Thesis will provide an alternative droop controller which will ensure fault discrimination is possible even during high
impedance single-phase to earth faults.
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The sequence component voltage-based protection scheme relies on communications infrastructure to provide fault discrimination. The authors of [51] found that if a significant
voltage drop existed during normal operation, fault discrimination could not be achieved
even with healthy communications. Fault discrimination is further complicated through
the prevalence of very high impedance single-phase to earth faults in DN, particularly
when control schemes such as droop control maintain the voltage within normal bounds
of operation. Hence, voltage-based protection schemes are deemed inadequate as primary
protection within microgrids with EG employing contemporary droop control methods.
A similar protection scheme is proposed by Voima et al. in [58]. The scheme observes
the voltage drop throughout the network to identify the fault in a microgrid with fault
current limited EG. The voltage vector is then compared with the current vector to identify
the direction of the fault. A telecommunications link is subsequently used to exchange
information, identifying the location of the fault with respect to all protection devices and
promptly isolating the fault. This scheme is only suitable for three-phase bolted faulted
which are rare in DNs and, hence, has limited practical applications.
Another protection scheme proposed by Al-Nasseri et al. in [25] involves the use of harmonic content of voltage waveforms in IIEG dominated microgrids. A protection relay
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monitors the total harmonic distortion (THD) of the IIEG unit’s PCC voltage and will
trip the local CB if the THD exceeds a predetermined threshold and the fault is proven
to be within that protection relay’s zone of protection. A communications link is used
to compare the THD at various EG units’ terminals. There are no considerations for
distribution transformer connection which are common in DNs. A delta-wye connected
distribution transformer will have a significant impact on the fault current and voltage
waveform at an EG unit’s PCC. In some cases, protection discrimination through THD
may be impossible. The proposed scheme is also inappropriate for high impedance faults
which may only provide a voltage drop similar to significant unbalanced operation. There
might also exist complications caused by dynamic loads which could cause nuisance tripping [25]. By the author’s admission, protection using THD could only be implmented as
a back-up or complementary form of protection [25].
Li et al. proffer a protection scheme for inverter dominated networks in [2] using transient
fault information. Travelling waves are analysed to determine the location of the fault
using a Rogowski Sensor [59]. If the first two wavefronts detected by a protective device
have the same polarity, the fault is located within the relay’s zone of protection as shown
in Fig. 2.8. If the fault can be located, selectivity is assured and the fault will be isolated
much quicker than traditional protection devices. The shortcoming of using wavefronts
for protection analysis is the ambiguity of the fault inception angle. If the fault occurs
when the voltage is not near peak, the protection performance will be inadequate. A
rate of change of current back-up protection is proposed; however, the discrimination
between fault events and acceptable disturbances has not been assessed and requires
further research to determine the efficacy of the proposed protection scheme.
Distance protection is proposed for microgrid protection in [60] as the recommended form
of primary protection. Directional OC and EF elements are used as local back-up protection. Distance protection requires measurement of the local voltage as well as current.
The voltage is measured at the LV winding of the distribution transformer to avoid the
need for a VT. It is assumed that a delta-wye connected distribution transformer is used.
The distance protection relay must incorporate compensation for the voltage drop across
the transformer. Detection of earth faults can be particularly challenging as the zero
sequence voltage cannot be measured directly due to the connection of the voltage sensor
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Figure 2.8: Protection using Travelling Waves (adapted from [2])

at the LV winding; the zero sequence voltage has to be estimated using an approximate
fault impedance behind the distance relay and the measured line zero sequence current.
Similarly to most proposed protection schemes, distance protection may have discrimination issues when high impedance single-phase to earth faults occur. However, if adequate
impedance compensation and protection discrimination can be achieved, distance protection may be an effective means of microgrid protection.
A similar approach is adopted by Dewadasa et al. in [61] using an admittance-based
protection scheme for application in inverter dominated microgrids. Each DN line protection device implements IDMT curves and expresses the tripping time as a function of
normalised admittance Yr , as shown in (2.3).
Yr = |

Ym
|
Yt

(2.3)

Where Ym is the measured admittance of the relay and Yt is the admittance for a zero
impedance fault at the end of the zone of protection. The scheme is shown to work
for a three-phase bolted fault when the microgrid is operating in islanded mode. Further
research is needed to identify whether admittance protection is effective for high impedance
single-phase to earth faults.
A differential energy based scheme is proposed by Samantaray et al. in [62]. An Stransform is used to analyse the current waveform. The S-transform is a time-frequency
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transform that is an aggregate wavelet and short-time Fourier transform. The current
is measured and modified using the S-transform to find the spectral energy content at
each protective device. The spectral energy is then compared with the data gathered
at the other end of each zone of protection to find the differential spectral energy. The
proposed protection scheme is inherently communication based and thus requires some
form of back-up protection for instances of communication failure. Case studies carried
out in [62] reveal that, in theory, differential energy based schemes are effective for both
grid-connected and islanded modes of operation for a variety of fault types. Doublyfed induction generator wind farms were implemented within the case study as the EG
type. No provisions for energy storage were made which is impractical for microgrid
applications. It is likely energy storage would be connected through an inverter interface.
Further research is required to assess whether protection discrimination is possible for more
complicated networks, particularly in the presence of unbalanced loading and significant
IIEG.
A microgrid protection scheme based on symmetrical and differential current components
is presented by Nikkhajoei and Lasseter in [63]. The authors assume that the microgrid
can be separated from the main grid by means of a static transfer switch. The adopted
protection design philosophy states that the static transfer switch shall be opened for
any fault detection within the microgrid. In [63], Nikkhajoei and Lasseter assume that
microgrid sources are inverter-interfaced and, hence, limited to 2.0 p.u. of rated current;
traditional OC protection is deemed inappropriate for islanded modes of operation.
In [63], Nikkhajoei and Lasseter discuss the plausibility of detecting single-phase to earth
faults using the differential components of phase currents as shown in (2.4).
Id =

X

|Ik |

(2.4)

k=a,b,c,n

The differential phase current scheme proved effective for detection of single-phase to
earth faults if the fault is located downstream of a protection device. All EG units are
interfaced with the microgrid through a wye(neutral)-delta transformer which does not
align with Australian DN transformer connections. All loads are also neutral connected
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and a single earthing point is connected to the neutral upstream of the static transfer
switch. The earthing and neutral connection of the proposed microgrid does not allow
earth current to flow through a relay downstream of a single-phase to earth fault. Hence,
bi-directional fault current detection cannot be achieved unless multiple earth points are
available throughout the network. However, a multi-earthed system would introduce the
possibility of nuisance trips and compromised fault discrimination as zero sequence current
would flow from each earthing point during a single-phase to earth fault. Loads are usually
unbalanced in DNs, providing earth current during normal operation if an earthing path
is supplied, further complicating protection discrimination. A protection scheme based on
differential components of phase currents would also be incapable of detecting line-to-line
faults and, hence, cannot be implemented as a complete protection system.
In order to better identify the presence of single-phase to earth and line-to-line faults,
Nikkhajoei and Lasseter propose a protection scheme that makes use of zero sequence and
negative sequence currents, respectively [63]. Nikkhajoei and Lasseter acknowledge the
presence of unbalanced loading conditions, which are considered when selecting protection
settings for relays within the microgrid. Essentially, protection settings should be chosen
such that a nuisance trip will not occur during the extremes of unbalanced loading and
a trip should occur for a high impedance fault within a relay’s zone of protection. The
results of the proposed protection scheme are shown to be very promising within [63].
The main advantage of a sequence component based protection scheme is the absence
of the requirement of communications. Time delays are used to ensure selectivity of the
protection scheme.
The major complications of sequence-based protection are unfounded assumptions regarding the connection of distribution transformers and earthing points. Australian HV
networks are three wire, meaning that there is no neutral return. Neutral points of the
customer are earthed at each switchboard in Australia by the multiple earth neutral system stipulated in AS/NZS 3000:2007 [64]. The connection of transformer windings and
EG unit earthing also dictates the flow of zero sequence current which must be taken into
consideration if sequence-based protection is to be implemented in microgrids.
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Conclusion

The protection of DNs with a high EG penetration is a very complex and poorly understood concept. There are many degrees of entropy including network topology, gridconnected or autonomous modes of operation, EG size and type, transformer connections,
earthing connections and protective device locations which have a significant impact on
the efficaciousness of the proposed protection schemes. Furthermore, there is a heightened desire for cost effectiveness for EG proprietors on the DN level due to the auxiliary
costs of protection and control constituting a much higher percentage of the overall cost.
Many protection schemes presume the existence of a communications medium which incurs transmission delays and an increased risk of poor reliability within networks. A
back-up protection system using only locally available data is required.
This Thesis will offer a protection scheme that uses communications to improve the speed
and selectivity of the protection response, but does not rely on communications for execution of the trip sequence. The protection scheme will ensure the DN is adequately
protected for any mode of operation with N-1 redundancy including the possibility of
communications failure. If an autonomous network is deemed to be unprotectable, the
protection scheme will apply anti-islanding protection to isolate all EG units.

Chapter 3

Simulation Platform Development
3.1

Introduction

The small-signal simulator implemented in this Thesis is the central tool that was developed for validation of the proposed OV mitigation scheme, fault analysis tool and voltage
sequence protection relay, which are presented later in this Thesis. The small-signal simulator could potentially be replaced with DIgSILENT, PSCAD or similar time domain
simulation packages; however, significant manipulations of control and protection devices
would be necessary. Many commercially available power simulation platforms contain
components with limited flexibility of operation. This Thesis contains novel controllers
and protection relays; hence, the ability to incorporate new components within a simulation is essential. Furthermore, direct juxtaposition of small-signal analysis with the fault
analysis tools developed by the author in this Thesis would be impossible with other simulation platforms. Hence, the author found it pertinent to develop a flexible small-signal
simulator within the MATLAB environment using m-script.
There are two types of solvers developed for this Thesis to perform small-signal analysis.
Firstly, a novel Newtonian solver is used to capture a vectorised snapshot of a network
during: the initial prefault condition, the fault-instant and the steady-state fault response.
Secondly, a linearised solver provides a time domain plot of the network behaviour. The
small-signal model requires an initial operating point to function, which is calculated using
41
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a novel Newtonian iterative solver technique. The proposed Newtonian solver is presented
in Chapter 5. The small-signal model converts differential equations into difference equations, linearising the system. The control and protection systems are solved separately to
the circuit elements to reduce the complexity of each solve and more closely emulate the
digitised approach of modern control and protection systems.
The strength of the presented simulation platform is a heightened level of flexibility where
all presented components can be very easily manipulated. Furthermore, the small signal
platform is indelibly linked to the proposed fault analysis and protection analysis tools
explored in Chapters 5 and 6.

3.2

The Kirchhoff ’s Current Law (KCL) and Kirchhoff ’s
Voltage Law (KVL) Algorithms

Most circuit analysis tools employ a manipulation of KCL to describe the topology of a
circuit, most commonly a Y-bus matrix. The circuit can then be solved by nodal analysis.
The benefit of employing both a KVL and KCL algorithm is the ability to have unearthed
and galvanically isolated circuitry. Solvers that employ nodal analysis require a universal
reference voltage. The lack of reference voltage can generally be solved by asserting on
arbitrary reference point before solving. However, when iterative techniques are required
to find a solution (such as in a load flow solver), floating neutral points of a network can
prevent convergence of the solver, particularly in networks with a large number of floating
neutral points. The benefits of using KCL and KVL in the proposed solver include:

• there is no need to reduce a circuit to a single line diagram or sequence components;
• effects of transformer windings are inherently included;
• earthed and unearthed systems can be solved without an arbitrary reference frame;
• voltages and currents are calculated simultaneously and;
• convergence complications are reduced, especially for fault studies.
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The KVL and KCL algorithms within this Thesis are designed for fast performance but are
limited to three wire systems. The algorithm can be altered to include more complicated
systems at some computational expense. One, two and four wire systems were not included
as the scope of this Thesis extends to 11 kV DNs which are primarily three-wire in
Australia, especially in high-density load areas where medium-scale grid-connected EG
penetration is most useful.
The KVL and KCL algorithm begins by identifying all node adjacencies. The node adjacencies are used to form paths. Subsequently, all elements are sorted into shunt and
series components. Series devices include: lines, CTs, CBs and any fault not connected to
earth. All shunt elements must be incorporated into a loop only once; series components
can be incorporated as many times as necessary.
The path formation begins with a reference element which expands to an adjacent node.
The path is then assessed to see if the path should be pursued, accepted or rejected
through a series of testing. If pursued, further adjacencies will be identified and re-tested.
If rejected, the last path addition will be deleted and the next path will be tested.
During the first iteration of loop formations, the shunt reference element must be connected to earth. The purpose of investigating earth connected paths first is to identify
galvanic isolation from earth due to transformer connection.
The algorithm will reject a path if any of the following tests fail:

• Given the path traverses more than one phase, the path must follow one of the
following phase combinations: depart A and return B; depart B and return C, or;
depart C and return A.
• Further, given the path traverses more than one phase, the occupied phase paths
must be a direct reflection of one another. For example, a path begins with phase A
of the shunt element reference, proceeds through the phase A of a line element to
a delta connected shunt element. The return path must solely traverse phase B of
the same line element and shunt element reference.
• The path must not return to a node already occupied by that path.
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• The path must not include a shunt element that is already part of a previously
accepted path.
Given that all tests have passed but a complete loop has not been identified, the path
will be extended and re-tested. If all tests have passed and a complete loop is found, the
path will be accepted and be used in the KVL matrix derivation. Finally, if a test fails,
the next path will be tested. All possible paths stemming from an earthed shunt element
reference will be tested before shunt elements galvanically isolated from earth are tested.
Galvanic isolation must also be noted for formation of the KCL matrix.
The path testing process is similar when a galvanically isolated element is used as a
reference. Two more tests are included to aid detection of unwanted situations caused
through delta connections.
• The path may pass through at most one winding of any delta connected three-phase
element.
• In the case of three-phase faults, the path must not pass through more than one
fault element.
The algorithm continues until all possible paths are tested, all galvanically isolated segments of the network are identified and the complete set of acceptable loops is compiled.
The KCL and KVL matrices can then be determined.
KCL algorithms are simple to employ and are ubiquitous. The assumed direction of all
elements is asserted upon data entry by selecting ‘to’ and ‘from’ nodes. All elements
with a connection to earth or neutral point are asserted as coming from the neutral/earth
point to an A, B or C phase node. The direction of all other elements can be chosen at
the discretion of the user. Each row of the KCL matrix corresponds to a node within
the circuit. If an element is coming from the relevant node, a coefficient of −1 is used;
otherwise, a coefficient of 1 is used.
Once all nodes are allocated a row within the KCL matrix, one row per galvanic island is
deleted. A network with n nodes requires n − 1 rows for every branch current to be deterministic: the extra row offers no extra information. The deletion is necessary as a square

Chapter 3. Simulation Platform Development

45

matrix is required when the characteristic, KCL and KVL matrices are concatenated for
the linearised system to be solvable.
If no acceptable loops have been identified, the KVL algorithm will set all non-source
voltages to zero. Furthermore, if a non-source element is not included in any identified
loop, the voltage of that element will also be set to zero.
A row is added to the KVL matrix for all acceptable loops. A coefficient of −1 is allocated
to source element; a coefficient of 1 is allocated to all other elements. The coefficient is
then multiplied by −1 if the direction asserted by the user does not match the direction
of the identified loop.
An extra loop is allocated to any galvanic island. The original earth-connected island is
excluded. The loop consists of the delta winding that was used as the reference for the
galvanic island. The extra loops are required to make the entire system solvable; thus
ensuring the concatenated matrix in square.

3.2.1

Kirchhoff ’s Current Law and Kirchhoff ’s Voltage Law Solver Example

Consider the circuit shown in Fig. 3.1. Each box represents three elements that can be
connected in either a wye or delta configuration. All sets of three elements are numbered
in the bottom right-hand corner of each box. Within the given example, every wyeconnected element is earthed at the star point. The earth is always allocated as node 1.
All other nodes (black lines between elements) are allocated node numbers. The upper
segment of the network is completely galvanically isolated from earth.
The red lines show the formation of acceptable loops according to the requirements stipulated in Section 3.2. The direction of each loop begins at the element designated the
lowest number and traverses phases: from A to B, from B to C or from C to A. The
output matrices of the KCL algorithm for the circuit given in Fig. 3.1 are shown in (3.1),
(3.2) and (3.3).
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Figure 3.1: KCL/KVL Example
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(3.3)

Within the program, all three matrices shown in (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) are concatenated,
but are presented separately in this Thesis for clarity. Each row corresponds to a node
within the circuit, minus one for the earth node and minus another for each galvanic island
in the network. The row corresponding to node number 5 within the galvanic island was
deleted in this case. The sign of each non-zero coefficient reflects the assumed orientation
of each element. If an element is coming from the relevant node, a coefficient of −1 is
used; otherwise, a coefficient of 1 is used.
The output matrices of the KVL algorithm for the circuit given in Fig. 3.1 are shown in
(3.4), (3.5) and (3.6).
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(3.6)

V15

Once again, the matrix has been split for clarity. The earth-connected loops were identified
first as expected. Secondly, the loops of the galvanic island were detected. Finally, a delta
winding KVL loop was added as required for each galvanic island. Again, every non-zero
coefficient reflects the assumed orientation of each element. Furthermore, in the KVL
algorithm, the sign is also reflective of the element type; the type may be allocated source
or load. A coefficient of −1 is allocated to source element; a coefficient of 1 is allocated
to all other elements. The coefficient is then multiplied by −1 if the direction asserted by
the user does not match the direction of the identified loop.

3.3

Characteristic Equations of DN Elements

A characteristic equation is defined for each network element. Network elements comprise
of: lines, loads, transformer windings, CBs, sources and faults. Generally, there is one
element per phase with the exception of power transformers that possess two elements per
phase: one element for the primary winding and one element for the secondary winding.
In cases where an element contains an inductive component that does not share the
total current of the element, or a capacitive component that does not share the potential
difference of the element, another parameter is necessary to store the extra current or
voltage parameter. An additional characteristic equation must then be employed to relate
the extra parameter to the element current and/or voltage. The element current is simply
the total current flowing in and out of the element. The element voltage is the potential
difference across the element; not necessarily the potential difference between the positive
node and earth as employed by some solvers.
The characteristic equations are concatenated with the KCL and KVL equations to form
the total linearised representation of the power network as shown in (3.7). The network
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is then solved for every nominated time step τ and stored for analysis upon completion.
The time step can be altered, but is chosen to be 10 µs for the work presented in this
Thesis. 10 µs is considerably less than the switching period of any analysed IIEG systems
and is thus considered to be sufficiently small; a time step of 10 µs is also considered to
be of reasonable computational expense for simulations with under 100 elements.

Ax = B

(3.7)

Where:



characteristic




A=

KCL


KVL

h
i
x = parameters

h
i
B = constants

The characteristic equations contain several differential operators, denoted s. Consider a
parameter F with a coefficient s. The variable n represents the iteration of the simulation
where n ∈ N : n ≥ 2. In order to linearise the system, parameters multiplied by s are
redefined as a difference across a time step divided by that time step τ as shown in (3.8).
The result is a difference equation.

sF →

F (n) − F (n − 1)
τ

(3.8)

In order to satisfy the format shown in (3.7), the differential operator s in matrix A
becomes 1/τ and the F (n − 1)/τ is moved to the relevant B matrix element. Consider
the example of an inductor with the characteristic equation shown in (3.9).
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(3.9)

The s operator is converted into a difference equation. The resulting linearised system
becomes (3.10).

h

 
i V
i
h
I[n−1]
1  =
1 −τ
− τ
I

(3.10)

The inductor current must be stored each iteration to provide the constant matrix data
for the following iteration. The linearised system is easily solvable within the MATLAB
environment, if an initial condition is available.
The linearisations of all differential equations are implemented within the simulation platform, but are not explicitly given within this Chapter. The models for each component are
not chosen to provide maximum accuracy, rather a reasonable approximation for how a
component will behave during healthy and faulted operation. A more detailed simulation
can be easily implemented if required, but represents an extra computational expense.

3.3.1

Constant Voltage Source Modelling

Fault events in DNs generally have enough electrical distance from the transmission network such that the dynamic response of large-scale generation can be ignored; the behaviour of the network upstream of the distribution domain can be approximated as an
ideal voltage source and series impedance. The ideal voltage source can be modelled as
(3.11).

h ih i h
i
1 V = |V | cos (ωt + φ)

(3.11)
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Line Modelling

The focus of this Thesis is Australian distribution level networks: generally 11 kV and 400
V. The line distances of DNs with enough load and prospective generation to warrant an
investigation of the effects of EG on protection are typically only a few kilometres long.
Ergo, shunt impedances of the modelled lines are generally very large and draw very little
current. Hence, the assumption that lines can be modelled as a series connected resistor
and inductor (as shown in (3.12)) can be considered reasonable. However, shunt elements
can be easily included for future simulations if required.

h

3.3.3

 
i V
h i


=
−1 R + sL
0
I

(3.12)

Load Modelling

Loads are modelled as constant impedances by (3.13). Loads can have an effect on fault
response and protection adequacy, particularly in networks with a high EG penetration
and in unbalanced networks. Each load is modelled as a parallel connected resistor, inductor and capacitor (if needed). The parameters are calculated using the power absorbed
under nominal conditions. The current flowing through the inductor Il must be stored
each iteration due to the differential operator s and divergence of current due to the
inherent parallel connection of the load elements.



1

R

3.3.4

 
 V
 

+ sC −1 1 
0


I  =  
−1
0 sL  
0
Il

(3.13)

Transformer Modelling

Each transformer phase is modelled as two separate elements. The equivalent circuit of
the transformer is shown in Fig. 3.2. The equation is given in (3.14), where Rm represents
the core loss, Lm represents the magnetising loss, R1 and R2 represent the respective
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Figure 3.2: Transformer Equivalent Circuit

primary and secondary winding losses and X1 and X2 represent the respective primary and
secondary winding leakage reactances. The magnetising inductance Im must be stored,
again as a consequence of the differential operator s and diverging current through parallel
connected elements.



1 −R1 − sL1 0


0
1
−1

0
0
1

3.3.5

a
a
Rm
a
sLm

V1



   
 
I 
0
 1  





2)
 Im  = 0
+ a(R2R+sL
m



 
 
a(R2 +sL2 )


V
0
2
sLm
 
I2

a(R2 + sL2 )
1
a

(3.14)

Circuit Breakers

CBs are programmed with two characteristic equations: one for each operating state. For
the ‘on’ state, the CB is modelled in exactly the same manner as a line as shown in (3.15).

 
h
i V
h i
−1 R + sL   = 0
I

(3.15)

During the ‘off’ state, the CB is simulated as an ideal current source exporting no current.
A current source exporting zero currently is effectively identical to an open circuit. Hence,
(3.16) is implemented.
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(3.16)

Current Transformers and Voltage Transformers

CTs are also represented in exactly the same way as a line element (3.17).

h

 
h i
i V
−1 R + sL   = 0
I

(3.17)

Voltage or potential transformers are shunt elements and are assumed to draw zero current.
Hence, the VT is modelled as an ideal current source exporting no current. Ergo, (3.18)
is implemented.

 
h
i V
h i
0 1  = 0
I

3.4
3.4.1

(3.18)

IIEG Unit Modelling
DC-Side Modelling

The DC side of an inverter interface usually consists of an energy resource, a DC-DC
converter to ensure maximum power export from the energy resource and a DC link
capacitor to maintain a reasonably constant voltage on the DC side of the inverter. There
may also exist a long term energy storage unit such as a battery bank coupled to the DC
bus through another DC-DC converter.
When a fault occurs in a DN, the transient response of an inverter is largely governed
by the inverter controller and the capabilities of the power electronics [65]. Ergo, the
dynamics of the DC side of an inverter can be omitted from the simulation platform
without significantly compromising the fault and protection response of a simulation.
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The DC link capacitor between the energy resource and inverter ensures that the DC
voltage at the inverter input will remain almost constant during short transients. In
particular, if a storage such as a battery is coupled with the DC bus, it is reasonable
to assume that the DC link capacitor will always be charged to provide energy for short
term transients within the network. In the case of low impedance faults where the DC
link voltage would not be sustained for a lengthy period of time, it is assumed that the
protection will isolate the EG before a significant voltage drop is incurred on the DC-side
of the inverter. Hence, the DC-side of an IIEG system can be modelled as a constant DC
source.
The DC link capacitor has been divided into two capacitors with a centre tap and a
solid earth connection is provided at the centre tap. The earth connection ensures that
the average DC voltage midpoint does not float significantly above or below the earth
potential. Without the split DC link capacitors and earth connection, the AC side voltage
and current waveforms can possess a non-zero DC value.
The DC voltage must be chosen appropriately such that over-modulation does not occur during normal operation of the IIEG unit. As a rule, the DC voltage Vdc must be
larger than that defined in (3.19) where Vrmsl−l is the nominal line-to-line rms (root-mean
squared) voltage at the AC side. The DC voltage must be greater than the line-to-neutral
peak-to-peak AC voltage.

Vdc >

3.4.2

p
8/3Vrmsl-l

(3.19)

Inverter Modelling

The adopted inverter topology consists of a simple three-leg, three-phase system as shown
in Fig 3.3. All inverters are assumed to be three-phase within the proposed simulation
platform. The EG penetration levels required to adversely affect protection coordination
require medium-scale generators (greater than 30 kW) which must be three-phase systems
to prevent a significant voltage unbalance.

Chapter 3. Simulation Platform Development

55

+
S1

C

S3

S5

DCin

VDC
C

ACout

S2

S4

S6

Figure 3.3: Inverter Topology

Most modern IIEG units export at least 1 kW and operate at switching frequencies of a
few kHz. The EG power electronics operational characteristics are commensurate with
the capabilities of insulated gate bipolar transistor (IGBT) [66]. According to a survey
conducted by [67], IGBTs are the most common power electronics switch used in industry.
Hence, IGBTs will be the adopted switch for inverter-interface models within this Thesis.
IGBTs have a very low on-state resistance and a wide safe operating area. When operating
within rated voltages and currents, the IGBT can be modelled as an ideal switch (either a
short or open circuit depending on the state) providing sufficient accuracy for the purposes
of this Thesis.
The transient responses during switching of IGBTs generally only last in the order of
hundreds of nanoseconds [68]. The switching period of the gate signals is in the order of
hundreds of microseconds. The sampling of waveforms for protection response can be as
low as sixteen samples per cycle in modern OC relays such as the Schweitzer Engineering
Laboratories (SEL) relays [69]. The transient response as a direct result of switching
and IGBT behaviour is largely attenuated by the anti-aliasing filters within relays signal
processing systems; hence, the transient behaviour of the power electronics within inverters
can be ignored when simulating protection adequacy.
The failure of IGBTs can be categorised as either catastrophic failure or wear out failure
[70]. Wear our failure occurs as a result of accumulated degradation of components over
time. Catastrophic failure is a result of a single high stress event. Protection devices are
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essential to minimise the risk of failure of power electronic switches. If the voltage across
the IGBTs exceeds rated voltage, the IGBT may break down and continue to conduct
during the off-state. The leakage current and temperature will rise, usually destroying the
IGBT after several microseconds during the on-state [70]. If the current flowing through
the IGBT during on-state exceeds the rated current, a high power dissipation within the
IGBT will cause a failure within a few microseconds.
The process of modelling the destruction of power electronic switches is difficult and unnecessary if an inverter unit is equipped with adequate OV and I 2 t protection. It is
assumed in this Thesis that fault current limiters and protection systems will eliminate
the risk of catastrophic failure of power electronics switches; hence, the extremes of IGBT
behaviour do not require consideration within the simulation platform given inverter protection and/or fault current limiters have been adequately modelled. Furthermore, within
the microgrid scope, it is assumed that IIEG units are over-rated and capable of providing sustained OV which is necessary for the proposed voltage sequence protection scheme
(which is presented in Chapter 7) to operate. Hence, the ideal model of IGBT switches
is considered reasonable as extreme operation is precluded via protection, fault current
limitation and over-rating of inverter interfaces.
Wear out failure is generally a result of long term recurring stresses on IGBTs and is often
mechanical in nature. Long term failure of devices is outside of the scope of this Thesis.

3.4.3

AC-Side Modelling

The AC-side of an IIEG unit consists of a filter before the PCC, metering technology
and usually a distribution transformer. An LCL configuration is the adopted filter within
this design. LCL filters are capable of attenuating both voltage and current waveform
distortion. The L1 and C components are configured as shown in Figure 3.4. The
inductance L2 is supplied by the distribution transformer.
The selection of filter components is achieved using (3.20) and (3.21) [71, 72]. The choice
of filter inductance L1 and capacitance C ensures that ripple current and reactive power
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Figure 3.4: LCL Filter

consumption remains within acceptable bounds. A maximum current ripple of 20% and
maximum reactive consumption of 5% are chosen.

5Vdc Vbase
L1 = √
6Fs Sbase

(3.20)

Sbase
2
20ωref Vbase

(3.21)

C=

Vbase and Sbase are the base voltages and apparent powers on the AC side of the inverter
in Volts and Volt-Amperes. Fs is the switching frequency of the inverter gating signals in
Hertz and ωref is the reference angular frequency in radians per second.

3.4.4

Grid-Connected Inverter Control Modelling

Contemporary IIEG control units employ a constant current or constant power control
strategy. Many well-established control schemes involve an inner current control loop
within an outer power control loop [73–75]. These control schemes are preferred by proprietors as maximum monetary compensation is achieved through exporting the maximum
Watt-hours (Wh). Hence, constant power control with an inner current controlled loop is
the adopted control scheme for grid-connected IIEG as shown in Fig. 3.5.
All measured parameters are converted into the dq rotating reference frame to reduce the
complexity of the controller. All parameters are then passed through a low pass filter
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Figure 3.5: Constant Power Control of IIEG

(LPF) to attenuate short term disturbances. The cut-off angular frequency ωc is chosen
to be five times the fundamental angular frequency. A phase locked loop (PLL) is used
to converge upon the rotating reference angle necessary to ensure that the quadrature
voltage is equal to zero. The design of the PLL can be sourced in [74]. The power
calculator determines the direct and quadrature current references via (3.22) and (3.23).

Idref = 2/3

Vdf Pref + Vqf Qref
2
Vdf2 + Vqf

(3.22)

Iqref = 2/3

Vqf Pref − Vdf Qref
2
Vdf2 + Vqf

(3.23)

The current controller block diagram is given in Fig. 3.6. Note that the controller is
duplicated for the dq axes components.
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Figure 3.6: Current Controller

The current controller also contains an LPF to slow the current response; the cut off
frequency ωc is chosen to be one-fifth of the fundamental angular frequency. The LPF slows
the transient response of the inverter, reducing the impact of short-term disturbances. A
feed-forward voltage signal, Vf f , is implemented for fast voltage following capability. The
output direct and quadrature voltages of the first LPF are used for the feed-forward
voltage signal in the proposed controller. Separating the voltage and current response
times improves the overall stability of the system by decoupling the dynamics of the
control scheme from the network [74]. The use of an LPF also aids in the fault response
prediction process, which is elaborated upon in Chapter 5. An optional FCL is installed
within each inverter control system to allow IIEG to provide fault ride-through without
exceeding the I 2 t capabilities of the power electronic switches. If the fault current limit is
exceeded (meeting the condition represented by (3.24)), the multiplexer selects constant
values for IF CL which are chosen as shown in (3.25) and (3.26).
√
q
k
2Sbase
1
2
2 > √
Idx + Iqx
3Vbase

(3.24)

IdF CL = 0

(3.25)

IqF CL

√
k2 2Sbase
= √
3Vbase

(3.26)

Where k1 and k2 are constants and k1 < k2 . The constants k1 and k2 are chosen such
that, when the FCL is implemented, the fixed output current is greater than the FCL’s
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threshold. Correct selections of these constants shall prevent an oscillation between the
fixed output current and constant power control.
The PR controller is used to replace conventional proportional-integral (PI) controllers. A
PR controller has two important advantages over PI controllers: PR controllers have zero
steady state error and do not require knowledge of the AC side filter circuit parameters of
the IIEG unit [76]. Finally, the gate signal generator synthesises the AC waveform using
pulse width modulation which is then smoothed using the LCL filter.
The grid-connected IIEG unit controller presented in this Chapter is a composite of several
control schemes [74, 76, 77]. The advantages of the presented control scheme include: zero
steady-state error, fault current limitation for fault ride-through support, a feed-forward
voltage loop to decouple grid and controller response during disturbances. Furthermore,
the grid-connected control scheme has been selected such that only minor alterations are
required for autonomous control during microgrid operation.

3.4.5

Grid-Connected Inverter Control Verification

A thorough experimental verification of the grid connected controller is not within the
scope of this Thesis. To the best knowledge of the author, there exists no experimental
data of the adopted grid-connected inverter controller. Hence, a partial verification will
be supplied by considering the theoretical steady-state and transient behaviour of the grid
connected inverter.
A load shedding algorithm developed by the author in [78] yielded the theoretical steadystate condition of an islanded IIEG implementing the grid-connected controller. The
circuit shown in Fig. 3.7 represents an equivalent circuit for an island. All IIEG units
are condensed into one IIEG unit and all lines and loads are condensed into a parallel
connected RLC load. The power convention for the IIEG unit is a positive real and
reactive power indicates a real and capacitive power export, respectively. The network
data is given in Table 3.1.
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Figure 3.7: Equivalent Circuit for Island

Table 3.1: Equivalent Circuit Data

Line Data
Line No.
Resistance (Ω)
Inductance (mH)

1
0.1
1

Load Data
Load No.
1
Resistance (Ω)
200
Inductance (H)
5.093
Capacitance (uF)
2
Note: Impedance are connected in parallel.
IIEG Data
IIEG No.
12
DC Voltage (V)
8002
Switching Frequency (kHz)
4
Filter Inductance (mH)
163.3
Filter Capacitance (µF)
0.3316
Sbase (kVA)
10
Vbase (V)
400
Psp (p.u.)
1
Qsp (p.u.)
0
Low Pass Filter Cut-Off Frequency (Hz)
10
CB Data
Operation No.
1
Operation time (s)
0.05
Fault type
Open
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The voltage and frequency are line commutated and no longer regulated by the mains
supply. Hence, the resultant voltage magnitude |V | and island frequency ω are governed
by the load and power set points of an inverter as shown in (3.27) and (3.28).

r
|V | =

−Qsp +
ω=

q

Psp
P

Q2sp + 4Qc |V |4 Ql

2Qc |V |2

(3.27)

(3.28)

Psp and Qsp are the real and reactive power set points of the IIEG unit. P , Ql and Qc are
the rated real power, inductive and capacitive powers of the equivalent load impedance,
respectively. All values are expressed as per unit. The derivation in given in Appendix A.
The equivalent circuit shown in Fig. 3.7 was simulated within the small-signal analysis
platform. The CB is opened after 0.05 seconds of simulation, thereby creating an island.
The small-signal plots showing the transient response of the island are shown in Figs. 3.8,
3.9, 3.10 and 3.11.
Before the formation of the island, the IIEG unit exports the real and reactive power at
the designated set points as required. Note that the real and reactive powers diverge from
the power set points after the island is formed. The steady-state error is due to the IIEG
unit controller’s response to the non-nominal frequency of the grid. The proportionalresonant (PR) controller is designed to provide accurate control at a fixed frequency only.
Taking into account the power set point errors, the predicted voltage magnitude and
angular frequency based on (3.27) and (3.28) are |VIIEG | = 264.7 V and ω = 348.7388
radians/second. The results of the simulation are |VIIEG | = 264.94 ± 0.54 V and ω =
349.2 ± 1 radians/second incorporating the ripple. The results are acceptably close; the
discrepancies are attributable to the non-nominal frequency of the island which induces
an error in the steady state response of the IIEG unit.
The transient response time of the voltage and current waveforms are dominated by the
LPF and feed-forward voltage signal. The voltage magnitude changes instantaneously
when the CB trips, then both waveforms decay to the steady-state values. The voltage
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Figure 3.8: Islanded IIEG Voltage Waveform

and current waveforms then continue to transition slowly as the frequency is regulated.
The response of the frequency waveform is governed by the PLL. In practice, passive antiislanding protection will observe the voltage and frequency shift, isolating the IIEG as
intentional islanding is forbidden by AS 4777.3 [16]. The transient response behaviour of
the demonstrated example is arbitrary and does not represent a generalised nor required
response time. The transient response of an island is dependent on the natural resonance
of the island as well as the control characteristics of any EG within the island. Since the
control requirements of IEEE 1547 are satisfied, the arbitrary response time of the island
may be considered acceptable, but may be manipulated as required in future applications
[21].
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Figure 3.9: Islanded IIEG Current Waveform

3.4.6

Autonomous Inverter Control Modelling

Constant power control is inappropriate for autonomous operation of DNs as there is
no mechanism for voltage and frequency regulation; the voltage and frequency are linecommutated. Currently, international standards forbid voltage regulation within EG unit
control, mostly due to the need for anti-islanding protection to detect a fault passively [21].
The standards do not permit intentional autonomous operation of subsections of DNs due
to various technical restraints including protection, power quality, control and stability
issues. Subsequently, modelling autonomous subsections of the network requires a subversion of many assertions stipulated within international standards, including the regulation
of voltage by EG unit control systems to ‘path the way’ to international standard reform.
Isochronous control is also inappropriate for autonomous operation. Similarly to large
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scale generation, if voltage and/or frequency set points of EG control units are slightly different, circulating currents between EG units may result within an island. In a large-scale
grid, there is typically a significant impedance between sources and circulated currents are
acceptably small. However, the impedance in microgrids may be insufficient to prevent
circulating currents from exceeding the ratings of network infrastructure and EG units
[55]. Also, a load sharing algorithm will be necessary to prevent disproportionate power
flow. Problems involving circulating current and load flow can be resolved using droop
control. Droop control is well established in large-scale generation and is adopted as the
preferred method by many authors for use during autonomous operation of a microgrid
[44, 46, 55, 61, 79, 80]. The block diagram for the proposed autonomous control is given
in Fig. 3.12.
The autonomous controller has been designed to behave in a similar fashion to the gridconnected controller to simplify the overall design of an IIEG unit within a microgrid.
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Figure 3.11: Islanded IIEG Power Response

Again, all measured voltage and current waveforms are converter to the dq axis and
passed through an LPF. The droop controller block diagram is shown in Fig. 3.13.
The power calculator shown in Fig. 3.13 is identical to the power calculator in the gridconnected controller, which was shown in Fig. 3.5. The voltage calculator in Fig. 3.13
determines the magnitude of the voltage waveform for comparison with the voltage reference generated by the Q/V droop block. The magnitude is expressed in per unit and can
be calculated by (3.29).

r
E=

q
2
2
3 Vdf + Vqf
2

Vbase

(3.29)

The equations for the P/ω and Q/V droop blocks can be are given in (3.30) and (3.31)
respectively.
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Pref − P
+ ωref
mP

Eref = Vref −

Q
mQ

(3.30)

(3.31)

P and Q are the exported real and reactive power respectively. Pref , ωref and Vref are the
power export, angular frequency and voltage references respectively. mP and mQ are the
droop constants which can be calculated by (3.32) and (3.33).

mP =

ωref − ωmin
Pmax − Pmin

(3.32)

mQ =

Vmax − Vref
Qmax

(3.33)

The current calculator provides a reference for the inner current loop. The current calculator assumes that the impedance of the grid will remain constant for a shift in output
current as shown in (3.34). Let I1 be the desirable current and I0 be the present current.

ZI1 = ZI0

(3.34)

ZI1 and ZI0 are the equivalent impedances at an EG unit’s PCC when currents I1 and I0
are exported respectively. Ohm’s law yields (3.35).

VI
V I1
= 0
I1
I0

(3.35)

Where VI1 and VI0 are the desirable and present voltages. The current references can then
be expressed as in (3.36) and (3.37).

Idref =

Idf

p
2/3E cos δ
Vdf

(3.36)
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(3.37)

The output of the Q/V droop block Eref and the calculated voltage magnitude E are
compared and then passed through a PI controller. The output of the PI controller VP I
and the phase angle δ are used to determine the feed-forward voltage signal via (3.38) and
(3.39).

r
Vdf f =

r
Vqf f =

2
Vbase VP I cos δ
3

(3.38)

2
Vbase VP I sin δ
3

(3.39)

The inner current loops of the autonomous and grid-connected controllers are identical.
The only differences between the two controllers are the use of a PLL and droop controller.
A PLL is not essential for autonomous control as the phase angle is not directly regulated
in the proposed controller and the angular frequency is only a function of the exported real
power. The concept of phase angle regulation in an autonomous controller was explored
by [81] and proved to reduce oscillations after a disturbance in the network. Hence, phase
regulation may be incorporated in future controllers, but has not been deemed essential
for understanding the fault behaviour of autonomously controlled IIEG units.

3.4.7

Autonomous Inverter Control Verification

Consider the small microgrid shown in Fig. 3.14. The network data is given in Table 3.2.
The CB is originally closed, opens at 0.2 seconds and closes again at 0.4 seconds. The
expected response of the network to each disturbance compromises of:
• balanced load sharing where load dispatch is proportional according to the power
base of each IIEG;
• an inverse relationship between real power and frequency as defined in (3.30);
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Table 3.2: Autonomous Microgrid Data

Line Data
Line No.
Resistance (Ω)
Inductance (mH)

1
2
0.1
0.2
1
2
Transformer Data
Transformer No.
1
2
Primary Voltage l-l rms (V)
11000
11000
Primary Winding Resistance (Ω)
0.001
0.001
Primary Winding Inductance (mH)
0.1
0.1
Primary Connection
Wye-earthed
Wye-earthed
Secondary Voltage l-l rms (V)
400
400
Secondary Winding Resistance (Ω)
0.001
0.001
Secondary Winding Inductance (mH)
0.1
0.1
Secondary Connection
Wye-earthed
Wye-earthed
Load Data
Load No.
1
2
Real Power (kW)
15
10
Reactive Power (kVAr)
0.5
0.5
Note: The equivalent resistance and inductance of the load are connected in parallel.
IIEG Data
IIEG No.
1
2
DC Voltage (V)
800
800
Switching Frequency (kHz)
4
4
Filter Inductance (mH)
8.165
16.33
Filter Capacitance (µF)
6.631
3.316
Sbase (kVA)
20
10
Vbase (V)
400
400
Pref (p.u.)
1
1
Pmax (p.u.)
1.05
1.05
Pmin (p.u.)
0
0
P = Qmax (p.u.)
0.4
0.4
Vref (p.u.)
1
1
ωref (rad/sec)
2π50
2π50
ωmin (rad/sec)
2π49.5
2π49.5
Low Pass Filter Cut-Off Frequency (Hz)
10
10
CB Data
Operation No.
1
2
Operation time (s)
0.2
0.4
Fault type
Open
Close
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Figure 3.14: Autonomous Microgrid Example

• an inverse relationship between reactive power and voltage as defined in (3.31) and;
• a transient response time of approximately five time constants as in (3.40).

5τ =

5
5
≈ 0.08s
=
ωc
2π10

(3.40)

The voltage and current waveforms of IIEG 1 and IIEG 2 of the small-signal model are
shown in Figures 3.15, 3.16, 3.17 and 3.18. Figures 3.19 and 3.20 show the real power,
reactive power, voltage and angular frequency responses. All figures show a transient
response consistent with the in-built LPF with a cut-off frequency of ωc = 2π10 radians/second as the settling time was approximately 0.08 seconds. A clear inverse relationship
between the real power and angular frequency as well as reactive power and voltage magnitude is apparent as observed in Figures 3.19 and 3.20. Furthermore, the per unit power
export of each IIEG match with significant accuracy during steady state and the transient
response.
The results indicate that the proposed control scheme satisfies the droop control requirements of autonomous operation. The results can also be considered as a partial verification
of the simulation platform for steady-state and transient conditions of an intentional island.
The most significant operational difference between the proposed microgrid controller
and controllers published by other authors [44, 81–83] is the slow current regulation that
maintains the same current across all three phases. However, the current references may
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Figure 3.15: Autonomous Control Verification – IIEG 1 Voltage Waveform
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Figure 3.16: Autonomous Control Verification – IIEG 2 Voltage Waveform
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Figure 3.17: Autonomous Control Verification – IIEG 1 Current Waveform

89 



8

23

ÿ

20

89 ÿ

3
0
73

720
723
740
0ÿ123

014

0143

015
0153
 ÿ

016

0163

Figure 3.18: Autonomous Control Verification – IIEG 2 Current Waveform
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Figure 3.19: Autonomous Control Verification – (a) IIEG 1 Real and Reactive Power,
Voltage (p.u.) and (b) Angular Velocity (rad/sec)
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Figure 3.20: Autonomous Control Verification – (a) IIEG 2 Real and Reactive Power,
Voltage (p.u.) and (b) Angular Velocity (rad/sec)
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oscillate across phases during instances of low impedance faults. The fault response of
the autonomous controller offers significant benefits from a fault protection perspective,
which will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 7.

3.4.8

Justification of Inverter Models

A comprehensive and detailed verification of the IIEG model presented in this Chapter is
prohibitively difficult and beyond the scope of this Thesis. Each manufacturers inverter
will behave differently due to small variations in control and power electronics components.
Irrespective, the adopted controllers are not designed to perfectly simulate a particular
IIEG unit, rather provide a preferable control scheme for IIEG in future networks.
In order to establish a comprehensive model, significant experimental data would be required to establish a range of dynamic behaviour of each IIEG unit. The anticipated
failure of power electronics devices when subjected to over-voltages or over-currents is
virtually impossible to model precisely. However, catastrophic failure modelling is not
required if protective devices are selected appropriately for detection of faults on a DN.
Hence, the modelling presented in this Thesis is predicated on adequate protection of
IIEG units.
IGBTs have a low thermal capability and can generally only sustain a short circuit for
approximately 10 µs before destruction [84, 85]. However, inverters are equipped with
heat sinks which will increase an IGBT’s thermal tolerance and I 2 t protection which
will isolate the inverter before the IGBT’s tolerance is exceeded, preventing damage to
the power electronics. Furthermore, the impedance and control of the overall IIEG unit
can reduce the short circuit current flowing through the IGBT during fault conditions,
increasing the likelihood of inverter isolation before IGBT destruction. The authors of [29]
present the fault response of a 1 kW single-phase IIEG and a 500 kVA three-phase IIEG.
The single-phase inverter supplied a peak current of approximately five times the rated
peak current for 1.6 ms. After repeated testing, the three-phase inverter supplied between
two and three times the rated peak current for a duration of 1 to 4.25 ms. The duration of
fault response is dictated by the protection characteristics of the inverter-interfaces which
are not specified.
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The actual destruction time of an inverter is dependent on the fault current magnitude,
the voltage magnitude, the gate voltage, the ambient temperature of the inverter and
the condition of the IGBTs. It is outside the scope of this Thesis to provide a model
encompassing all possible operational variations. When developing an inverter for power
applications, a design engineer has to perform a trade-off between the cost of components
and the requirements of the overall system. For instance, in contemporary applications,
grid-connected IIEG is not required to provide fault ride-through during disturbances
in the DN. Hence, control schemes and IGBT do not need to provide excess current to
maintain the voltage during reflected faults. Each IGBT simply needs to be able to sustain
the current drawn due to a bolted fault at the EG terminals without destruction until the
protection system operates. Empirically, the trip time for low impedance faults is in the
order of 1-4.25 ms for medium-scale generators [29]. Hence, the assumption that power
electronics failure will not occur before protection operation for modelling purposes can
be justified.
Many authors propose the use of current limiters for IIEG fault modelling [28, 77, 86, 87].
Each of these papers contains an underlying assumption that the inverter will be able to
support the current limit. This assumption can be achieved by rating power electronics
switches appropriately. There exists a point of contention regarding imposing fault current
limitations above rated current. Rated current can be defined as the export current at
which the reliability or functionality of a device may be impaired [88]. From the power
electronics’ perspective, the rated current IC is based on the ability of a device to remove
heat when conducting current as shown in (3.41). TC is the nominal ambient temperature,
TJ(max) is the maximum junction temperature, RΘJC is the thermal resistance and VCE(on)
is the voltage across the collector and emitter of the IGBT. Ignoring factors such as
junction temperature, if a fault current exceeding rated current is drawn from an IIEG
unit, damage will be incurred and I 2 t protection should isolate the fault.

IC =

TJ(max) − TC
RΘJC VCE(on)

(3.41)

It is important to note that over voltage will also cause the breakdown of IGBT cells
creating leakage current and high temperatures [70]. Over-voltage protection is mandatory
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in grid-connected IIEG applications by AS4777.3 [16] and is adopted within all models;
hence, IGBT failure due to over-voltage does not require modelling.
Future networks may consist of applications where sustained operation of IIEG units
to achieve fault ride-through is desirable. In microgrid applications, Loix et al. in [28]
suggest that the inverter output current should be limited to a value which the inverter
is able to provide protective devices adequate information to isolate the fault. The overrating of inverters for microgrid application in explored in detail in Chapter 7. For the
purposes of simulation, the imposition of current limitations is not deemed essential for
microgrid applications as fault ride-through is not required. Applications of FCLs in gridconnected only operation may prove unfeasible as the over-rating of power electronics may
be considered an unjustifiable expense. However, Tang and Iravani in [87] propose use
of current limiters to prevent the flow of excessive fault current that would compromise
traditional DN line protection efficacy. Synchronous machines are used as the EG interface
connected through a hybrid solid-state/mechanical switch current limiter.
In conclusion, the proposed controllers are not intended to represent an ideal case for the
‘future of Australian DNs’. Rather, the controllers are designed to satisfy the envisaged
requirements of future networks. In particular, to provide a level of predictability in fault
response that does not require an advanced understanding of every grid-connected IIEG
unit nor time-intensive small signal modelling. The controller is also designed to simplify
high-impedance fault detection in microgrids which will be explored in detail in Chapter
7. The controllers are also flexible in terms of changing set points, use of a FCL and
response time.

3.5

Line Protection Modelling

The line protection of contemporary Australian DNs consists of OC, EF and sensitive earth
fault relays. Distance protection is usually reserved for transmission and sub-transmission
networks which are considered outside the scope of this Thesis.
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All line protection devices must take voltage and/or current measurements from VTs
and/or CTs connected to the network. Each line protection device automatically compensates for the turns ratio of each CT and VT. The voltage and current waveforms
are then filtered by a cosine filter before further analysis is taken (with the exception of
frequency-based protection).

3.5.1

Cosine Filters

Modern protection devices are generally solid-state and analyse the voltage and current
waveforms using digital signal processing. Sampling and filtering of the measured waveforms is necessary to maintain the integrity of the captured signal. Cosine filters have the
ability to significantly attenuate DC offsets and harmonic components whilst maintaining
the fundamental frequency [89]. Cosine filters are common in many protection device
applications and are adopted as the filtering method used by protection devices in this
Thesis [69]. The cosine filter can be determined by (3.42).

IXsmpl+spc =

N −1
2 X
Ismpl+spc−n CF Cn
N

(3.42)

n=0

where:

CF Cn = cos (

2πn
)
spc

spc is the number of samples per cycle and is set to 16, N is the number of samples per
cycle (spc) minus one, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N , smpl is the set of non-negative integers, I is a
sample from the waveform and IX is the filter output.
The phasor output Io can then be determined by (3.43).

Iosmpl+spc = IXsmpl+spc + jIXsmpl+spc− spc
4

(3.43)
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Table 3.3: OC and EF Standard Constants [4]

Characteristic
Standard Inverse
Very Inverse
Extremely Inverse

A
0.0515
19.61
28.2

B
0.1140
0.491
0.1217

p
0.02
2
2

Voltage and current amplitudes, phases and sequence components can then be calculated
and interpreted by the relay in order to determine whether a trip is necessary.

3.5.2

OC, EF and SEF Protection

OC, EF and SEF protection has been essential for effective fault detection in Australian
DNs. Under the premise of radial power flow, it can be assumed that the current flowing
through each protection device upstream of a fault is almost equal. Hence, protection
devices can be graded to ensure selectivity within the DN without requiring a communications medium. The IDMT curve which governs the trip time of an OC or EF relay can
be expressed as in (3.44).

t = TD


A
+B
−1

Mp

(3.44)

where: t is the time to trip, T D is the time dial setting and M is the ratio of input
current to the pick-up current M = |I|/Ipu . Constants A, B and p determine the relay
type, which are defined to emulate the induction relays that were employed historically in
DN protection schemes [4]. There are three characteristics of IDMT curves used in DNs:
the standard inverse, very inverse and extremely inverse curves. The standard values for
these characteristics are given in Table 3.3.
All OC, EF protection devices in DNs employ the same IDMT curve constants. When
the detected fault current exceeds the time threshold defined by (3.44), a trip signal
is sent to the corresponding CB, completing the trip sequence and isolating the fault.
SEF relays are designed to detect high impedance single-line to earth faults and hence
require high sensitivity. A large time delay of several seconds is also employed to prevent
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nuisance tripping due to circulating zero sequence currents. The most likely reason for
zero sequence current flow (other than a single-line to earth fault) is a parallel connection
of two adjacent feeders during switching, particularly if a high impedance joint is present
in the resultant ring network.

3.5.3

Sequence Component Protection

EF and SEF protection is identical to zero sequence OC protection. The three-phase
currents are summated and the resulting zero sequence current is subjected to a time
delayed threshold to identify whether a trip signal is warranted. Negative sequence OC
protection is also a useful tool for back-up protection and is a common option in modern
protection relays [69]. Negative sequence OC is particularly useful for identifying lineto-line faults. The sequence component of parameter F can be calculated through the
transform (3.45).

 

 
F0
1 1 1
F
  1
  a
 




F1  = 1 a a2   Fb 
  3
 
F2
1 a2 a
Fc

(3.45)

Voltage sequence protection is not implemented in Australian DNs, but forms an important part of the proposed protection scheme presented in Chapter 7. Within the scope of
the microgrid concept, the most difficult fault event to detect is a high-impedance singlephase to earth fault within an island. Various authors have proposed several protection
schemes to identify high impedance faults, many of which are complicated or ignore effects such as transformer connections [50, 62, 63]. Through a combination of transformer
and earthing connection stipulations, IIEG control modifications and the use of voltage
sequence protection, a simple solution to the high-impedance fault detection problem is
presented in Chapter 7.
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Anti-Islanding Protection
Passive Anti-Islanding

Within the scope of the proposed microgrid structure, contemporary anti-islanding protection is implemented whenever communications failure occurs. All grid-connected only EG
must be equipped with anti-islanding protection as defined by the Australian Standard
4777.3 [16].
The Australian Standard 4777.3 states that each EG unit must incorporate passive antiislanding technology including under and over voltage (UOV) as well as under and over
frequency (UOF) protection [16].
The Australian Standard 4777.3 indicates that tripping must always take place within two
seconds once an island is detected. The IEEE 929 standard indicates the same maximum
delay for most voltage deviations, but requires a much faster trip time for extreme UOVs.
IEEE 929 also states that UOF protection should operate within six cycles. Accordingly,
the small-signal model will incorporate multiple time-delayed trip settings for UOV and
UOF protection.
The voltage magnitude is gathered using the voltage waveform gathered at the PCC passed
through the cosine filter shown in (3.42). The frequency is gathered using a zero crossover
method. An optional rate of change of frequency (ROCOF) passive anti-islanding protection is also available. The ROCOF model adopted in this Thesis was presented by Ten
and Crossley in [90]. A window of five cycles is used as shown in (3.46).

5

df
1 X ∆fi
=
dt
5
∆ti

(3.46)

i=1

The ROCOF is then passed through a low pass filter and compared to a pre-defined
value to determine if a trip is necessary. Passive anti-islanding protection is very effective
at identifying LOM when a significant power discrepancy between an island’s load and
available generation is present. In modern Australian DNs, the risk of failure to detect
LOM is very low as EG penetration levels are very small and contemporary grid-connected
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EG does not offer reactive power support. Irrespective, the Australian Standard 4777.3
mandates one form of active anti-islanding protection.

3.5.4.2

Active Anti-Islanding

Each EG must contain at least one form of active anti-islanding protection; however, there
is no preference towards any particular type of anti-islanding protection. Active antiislanding protection will generally never be essential to island detection in contemporary
networks as the disparity between the load and supply within an island is always large
enough to create a significant voltage and/or frequency deviation. In DNs where the
local load and supply are similar, this Thesis will assume that intentional islanding is
advantageous and active anti-islanding techniques will be considered unnecessary. Hence,
active islanding will not be modelled within this Thesis.

3.6

Conclusion

The modelling work presented in this Thesis does not provide an exhaustively accurate
representation of the behaviour of modern nor future Australian DNs. The simulation
platform and inherent models aim to provide a reasonable approximation for the fault
and protection response of DNs with a high EG penetration to gain a conceptual understanding and verification of protection strategies that may prove useful as the DNs
evolve into a decentralised entity. The proposed IIEG control schemes have never been
implemented in practice and similar schemes, such as the Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions (CERTS) microgrid concept, employ control schemes and
transformer configurations which are incompatible with the protection schemes proposed
in Chapter 7. Hence, the conclusions drawn based on the simulation work presented in
this Chapter require further investigation to verify that the concepts explored within this
Thesis also apply in the field.

Chapter 4

Over Voltage Mitigation Scheme
4.1

Introduction

The principal technical constraint that is preventing connection of high levels of EG to
DNs is instances of OV. EG units are not permitted to regulate the voltage at the PCC
by the IEEE Standard 1547-2003 [21]. The resultant voltage at the PCC is determined
by the EG power export as well as the electrical proximity of the EG to load and points
of voltage regulation (such as the zone substation transformer or voltage regulator). In
order to mitigate the risk of OV, utilities have imposed various policies regarding the
sizing and connection restrictions of EG before a technical assessment is necessary [13].
It is important to note that there exists little consensus on how much EG penetration
is tolerable before instances of OV become a likelihood. The electrical characteristics
of feeders differ significantly across Australia. Line topology, line impedances and load
behaviour significantly affect voltage profiles. An independent study is necessary to ensure
that each EG connection will not cause OV; however, for small EG connections, the cost
of an independent study is prohibitively expensive. A generalised policy is necessary to
perpetuate the business case for small-scale EG connections.
Whilst an OV mitigation scheme does not explicitly pertain to protection studies, control
schemes play an important part in analysing the protection response of IIEG. Empirically,
OV issues have arisen at relatively low penetration levels; instances of OV have always
83
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arisen before protection miscoordination in DNs could be incurred. Hence, it is imprudent
to analyse EG penetration protection efficacy before imposing an OV mitigation scheme.

4.2

Review of OV Mitigation Schemes in DNs with a High
IIEG Penetration

The simplest way to avoid OV in DNs with IIEG penetration is to place restrictions
on IIEG size and location within the planning process. Australian utilities can impose
a restriction on the size of a proposed IIEG unit upon application [91]. The current
philosophy of IIEG control stipulates fixed power at unity power factor – a paradigm
which suppresses the growth of IIEG penetration in Australian DNs. The worst case
voltage profile can be determined by approximating the low load condition of a DN and
running continuous load flow analyses for IIEG sizes until the voltage limit is breached.
Such an exercise is time intensive and shown to be unnecessary through voltage sensitivity
analysis as shown by Ayres et al. in [92].
Voltage sensitivity analysis manipulates a Jacobian matrix in order to predict the maximum IIEG size permissible before an OV is likely to arise. The Jacobian matrix is an
array of the linearised rates of change tangential about a given operating point. For small
deviations, linearisation can yield a reasonably accurate representation of a network’s expected performance. Ayres’s work is extended upon in [93] where the loadability of a line
is also considered to ensure the thermal limits of a distribution network are not exceeded
under low load conditions. However, these papers do not explore the plausibility of an
OV management scheme which could allow for a greater IIEG penetration. The authors
in [94] use the sensitivity matrix to approximate the appropriate power factor for a IIEG
unit in a worst case low load scenario. The sensitivity analysis is useful for determining
a fair method for allocating the reactive power license of each IIEG unit with respect to
that IIEG unit’s position in a DN. Various reactive power control methods are outlined in
[94] and [95] including: constant power factor control, real power-dependent power factor
control and voltage-dependent reactive power control. The principal weakness of these
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control strategies is the necessary reconfiguration whenever a network upgrade occurs or
a new IIEG unit is installed.
Consider the scenario where each IIEG unit is to be coupled with an energy storage device
such as batteries. In such a case, any surplus power produced by the distributed energy
resources shall be diverted into the battery bank, thus eliminating the risk of producing
an OV caused by exporting more power than is being absorbed locally. Under continuous
low load conditions, it may be possible that the batteries may be filled to capacity. The
power set points of the inverter interface must then be altered or the IIEG unit will trip
due to the OV anti-islanding protection. Such a problem can be mitigated through the
appropriate sizing and control of the battery bank. However, it is important to note that
the most significant deterrence of the installation of battery banks remains the exorbitant
cost and slow return rate. It is unlikely that most customers would invest in energy
storage unless either the cost of storage is reduced, a mandate for storage is legislated or
significant benefits were to arise such as the possibility of intentional islanding. Intentional
islanding is forbidden by Australian Standard 4777.3 [16] and, as such, shall not be further
considered within this Chapter.
Another possible technique for OV mitigation is demand-side load management. If load
behaviour could be configured to coincide with times of maximum generation, the risk
of OV could be greatly diminished. However, customer and load coordination can be
particularly challenging as maximum IIEG availability can be unpredictable. Even in
the case of solar irradiation being somewhat predictable due to the quotidian nature of
our planet’s rotation, the maximum solar irradiance tends to occur when people are at
work. In a commercial site, this coincidence is fortunate, but for residential premises,
there exists a disparity between load and generation availability. It is generally accepted
that variable tariffs and consumer awareness can be used to curb power usage during
peak times [96]. However, under low load conditions where OV instances are most likely,
there may be little extraneous load that customers are willing to forfeit. The notable
exception is the off-peak power usage of hot water systems; hot water water systems are
capable of storing heat for large periods of time. While demand-side management can
be implemented to ease the disparity between generation availability and demand during
times of peak load, off-peak demand-side load management schemes will likely coalesce
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into an energy storage problem, yielding a situation similar to that explored previously
with power diversion into battery banks. For similar reasons, demand-side management
schemes shall not be considered within this Chapter.
Assuming that most customers do not invest in energy storage, the next most viable option
for OV mitigation whilst maximising return is reactive power absorption. Currently,
Australian IIEG unit proprietors are paid for real power injection only. There is a strong
case that eventually reactive power may become a marketable commodity within DNs
[97]; however, the notion of reactive power remuneration is unlikely to be prevalent in
Australian DNs in the near future; hence, the notion shall not be included in this Chapter.
Without reactive power remuneration, it makes financial sense for a IIEG unit to absorb
reactive power during OV in order to maintain the voltage within acceptable levels rather
than solely reducing the real power export. A small amount of real power output capacity
is lost when reactive power is injected or absorbed by an inverter. However, the net real
power export is increased through use of reactive power absorption if an OV condition is
deemed unacceptable.
The capability curve of an IIEG unit can be expressed as a function of the rated current.
Assuming the inverter is operating at rated voltage, a current restriction is implemented
to prevent damage to the power electronic switches of the inverter interface. The utility
imposes strict boundaries on the power factor produced by any IIEG unit; for example,
0.85 leading or lagging according to the standard IEEE 929 [33]. An OV mitigation
scheme’s configuration must be commensurate with these boundaries.
If the limitations of reactive power absorption are met, then the real power set point of the
inverter interface must be limited as proposed by Calderaro et al. [98]. Calderaro et al.
builds on the sensitivity matrix work presented by Ayres et al. in [92] to provide an OV
mitigation algorithm. The algorithm accounts for both the voltage and current limitations
of the IIEG unit. There are two main drawbacks to Calderaro et al.’s algorithm. Firstly,
an off-line knowledge of the sensitivity of the network is required; the control scheme
needs to be reconfigured whenever a significant alteration occurs in the DN. Hence, the
Calderaro system cannot be considered as plug-and-play. Secondly, the perturbation and
observation nature of the control scheme can make convergence to a preferred set point for
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each IIEG unit difficult and potentially produce disproportionate power flow allocations
between IIEG units. In comparison, the OV mitigation protection scheme proposed within
this Thesis requires only local readings and converges to a power set point that ensures
fair power flow within a DN.
Other voltage control schemes for DNs with a large EG penetration are proposed by
Caldon et al. in [99] and Conti in [100]. The schemes makes use of a centralised controller
located at the zone substation of a given feeder. Coordinated regulation is achieved
through disseminating voltage set point instructions to the on-load tap-changer in the
zone substation and reactive power instructions to EG units within the feeder. Sensitivity
matrices are used to determine reactive power export of EG units in [100] as a function
of voltage magnitude. Historical data is used to determine the empirical relationship
between voltage magnitudes and reactive power export in [99]; hence a significant amount
of trial and error may be necessary after a new EG unit is installed. The advantage of
the proposed schemes is that existing technology is adopted where possible. However, the
addition of a centralised controller and communications scheme is costly and a controller
that uses only locally avaiable data is preferable.

4.2.1

Novel OV Mitigation Algorithm

The proposed OV mitigation algorithm is designed to ensure a fair power flow allocation
using only locally sourced data. The algorithm incorporates the capabilities of the inverter
interface, the available power from the distributed energy source as well as the stipulated
requirements of the DN.
In order to express the power export capability of each IIEG, the same power convention
as traditional machine generators such be adopted. Hence, a positive real power and
reactive power shall indicate an export of real power and capacitive power of the IIEG
unit, respectively.
Firstly, a voltage limit shall be imposed as in (4.1).

~IIEG | ≤ Vlimit
|V

(4.1)
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~IIEG | is the voltage magnitude at a IIEG unit’s PCC and Vlimit is the voltage
Where |V
magnitude limit imposed by the OV mitigation algorithm. The voltage limit should be
chosen to be below the OV threshold of the anti-islanding protection system to avoid
nuisance tripping.
A power factor limit, p.f.limit , is also imposed in order to abide by standards such as the
IEEE Standard 929 [33]. Note that the power factor is always either lagging and the
power angle limit, θlimit , is always non-positive. Both of these restrictions are necessary
as reactive power injection is not permitted by the proposed OV mitigation scheme.

p.f.limit = cos(θlimit ) ≤

P
~
|S|

(4.2)

Finally, the power capability curve of the inverter interface is represented as a semicircle
which is considered a reasonable approximation within the tolerable power factor domain
bounded by (4.2). The capability curve is implemented by the control scheme to prevent
damage to the power electronic switches. The domain of complex power operation is
expressed in (4.3).

~ x = C : |~x| ≤ |Srated |, θlimit ≤ arg(~x) ≤ 0}
S{~

(4.3)

Reactive power injection is forbidden within the scope of the proposed OV mitigation
~ will always be nonscheme. Ergo, the imaginary component of the complex power S
positive.
Beyond the constraints defined in (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3), the control scheme must provide a
fair and equitable solution to avoid OV and maximise real power output. Firstly, it must
be understood that it is preferable to absorb reactive power before reducing real power
below the value defined on the outermost limit of the power capability domain. It is only
~ should be deliberately
when the power factor limit is reached that the apparent power |S|
curtailed. The power factor limit is maintained during apparent power curtailment, again
with the purpose of maximising real power output.

Chapter 4. Over Voltage Mitigation Scheme

89

Given that the available apparent power Savailable is known, the domain of steady-state
operation can be reduced to (4.4):

~ x = C : |~x| = Savailable , θlimit ≤ arg(~x) < 0}
S{~

(4.4)

until real power curtailment is necessary to reduce the voltage when the domain changes
to (4.5).

~ x = C : 0 ≤ |~x| ≤ Savailable , arg(~x) = θlimit }
S{~

(4.5)

The available apparent power Savailable is capped at the rated apparent power of the system
Srated . Without some form of energy storage coupled to the DC side of the inverter, the
available power may drop below the rated power of the inverter. In such a case, the value
of available power can be sourced from the maximum power-point tracker (MPPT).
If a single IIEG unit is present within a grid, the control scheme could utilise a constant
voltage magnitude limit. Reactive power absorption would begin once the voltage magnitude threshold was reached. The controller would operate in a perturb and observe
fashion, where the maximum real power in achieved using the domains of (4.4) and (4.5)
where the voltage limit is not exceeded satisfying (4.1). If the power factor limit was
met and the voltage still exceeded the voltage magnitude threshold, then apparent power
curtailment would begin until the voltage condition was satisfied. However, when multiple
IIEG units are connected to a DN, a constant voltage threshold can incite power export
contests. Without some form of communication medium, there is no way to prevent a set
of IIEG units from inadvertently and needlessly forcing other IIEG units into apparent
power curtailment submission. There would also be an inherent stability problem with no
clear point of convergence throughout this perturb and observe control scheme.
The proposed OV mitigation scheme uses piecewise equations to define the real and reac~ | at the PCC and the available
tive power set points based on the voltage magnitude |V
apparent power Savailable sourced from the MPPT. The piecewise equations are defined
in (4.6) and (4.7). The piecewise equations are segregated by three voltage magnitude
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Table 4.1: Example Values

Parameter
V1
V2
V3
p.f.limit
~
|S|

Set Point
1.01 p.u.
1.02 p.u.
1.03 p.u.
0.85
1 p.u.

1

power factor (lagging)

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0.95

1
|V|

1.05

Figure 4.1: Proposed OV Mitigation Scheme: Power Factor and Voltage Magnitude
Relationship

threshold tiers V1 , V2 and V3 . Example plots are shown in Figs. 4.1 and 4.2 using the
data in Table 4.1.

p.f. =











~ | ≤ V1 ,
1 if |V
1−p.f.limit ~
V1 −V2 (|V

~ | ≤ V2 ,
| − V1 ) + 1 if V1 ≤ |V
p.f.limit otherwise.

(4.6)
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0.2

0
0.95

1
|V|

1.05

Figure 4.2: Proposed OV Mitigation Scheme: Apparent Power and Voltage Magnitude
Relationship

~ =
|S|











~ | ≤ V2 ,
Savailable if |V
Savailable ~
V2 −V3 (|V

~ | ≤ V3 ,
| − V3 ) if V2 ≤ |V

(4.7)

0 otherwise.

The voltage thresholds V1 , V2 and V3 are predefined and common to all generators. The
relationship Vnominal < V1 < V2 < V3 <= Vlimit must be satisfied, but there is a considerable degree of freedom otherwise. The real and reactive set points can be determined
from (4.8) and (4.9).

~
P = |S|p.f.

~
Q = |S|

q
1 − p.f.2

(4.8)

(4.9)
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Figure 4.3: Grid-Connected Controller with OV Mitigation

V/pf
Vdf
Vqf

++
|x|
-

|V|

pf

LPF
V/S

|S|

S,pf->P,Q

P
Q

Figure 4.4: OV Mitigation Control Block

These power set points are then exported to a typical constant power inverter control
system to determine the gating signals for the power electronic switches. The modified
grid connected controller is shown in Fig. 4.3. The contents of the OV mitigation block
are shown in Fig. 4.4.
The |x| block computes the voltage magnitude using (4.10).

r
|V | =

q
2
2
3 Vdf + Vqf
2

Vbase

(4.10)
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Figure 4.5: OV Mitigation Example

The voltage magnitude signal is then passed through a LPF to ensure that any changes in
power set points are gradual and unaffected by short term voltage ripples and disturbances
in the DN. The power factor, apparent power, real power and reactive powers are then
calculated by (4.6), (4.7), (4.8) and (4.9), respectively. The remainder of the controller is
identical to the grid-connected controller outlined in Chapter 3, emphasising the minimal
alterations of the controller required to employ the proposed OV mitigation scheme.

4.2.2

OV Mitigation Simulation

An example network as shown in Fig. 4.5 has been constructed to demonstrate in principle
how the OV mitigation scheme should operate. The network data is given in Table 4.2.
Transformers Tx 2 and Tx 3 are tapped up to exaggerate the problem in a small network.
In practice, transformers are tapped up in rural locations where a significant voltage
drop is present in the network. When lightly loaded and a significant grid-connected EG
penetration is present, considerable OV can arise. The OV mitigation scheme aims to
alleviate instances of OV without penalising EG proprietors connected to strong segments
of the network. The chosen thresholds are used for demonstration purposes only and do
not reflect the preferred voltage thresholds. In Australian DNs, the acceptable low voltage
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Table 4.2: OV Mitigation Example Data

Infinite Bus Data
Voltage l-l rms (kV)
Frequency (Hz)

11000
50
Line Data

Line No.
Resistance (Ω)
Inductance (mH)

1
1
0.01
Transformer Data
Transformer No.
1
Primary Voltage l-l rms (V)
11000
Primary Winding Resistance (Ω)
0.1
Primary Winding Inductance (mH)
0.1
Primary Connection
Delta
Secondary Voltage l-l rms (V)
400
Secondary Winding Resistance (Ω)
0.1
Secondary Winding Inductance (mH)
0.1
Secondary Connection
Wye-earthed
Load Data
Load No.
1
Real Power (kW)
20
IIEG Data
IIEG No.
1
DC Voltage (V)
1000
Switching Frequency (kHz)
4
Filter Inductance (mH)
20.41
Filter Capacitance (µF)
3.316
Power Setpoint (kVA)
10
Low Pass Filter Cut-Off Frequency (Hz)
10
OV Mitigation Voltage Thresholds
V1=1.01
p.f.limit
~
|S|

2
5
0.05

3
10
0.1

2
11000
0.1
0.1
Delta
404
0.1
0.1
Wye-earthed

3
11000
0.1
0.1
Delta
408
0.1
0.1
Wye-earthed

2
15

3
50

2
1000
4
20.41
3.316
10
10
V2=1.02
0.85
1 p.u.

3
1000
4
20.41
3.316
10
10
V3=1.03
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Figure 4.6: OV Mitigation Example – IIEG 1 Voltage

range is 230 V (+10 % -6 %) [101]. Hence, a more reasonable range of voltage curtailment
might be V 1 = 1.08 p.u., V 2 = 1.09 p.u. and V 3 = 1.1 p.u..
Load 1 is isolated at t=0.1 seconds and Load 3 is isolated at t=0.2 seconds. The voltage
magnitude and power export of IIEG 1 are given in Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7, respectively. The
voltage magnitude of at the POC of IIEG 1 does not exceed the first voltage threshold of
1.01 p.u.; hence no reactive power absorption nor apparent power curtailment is necessary.
The real power and reactive power set points are fixed at 10 kW and 0 kVAr, respectively.
The controller maintains the power export as desired. The ripple is a consequence of the
imperfect attenuation of the harmonics induced by the power electronics interface. The
ripple shown is further reduced by the inductance of the transformer before the power is
exported into the network.
The voltage magnitude and power export of IIEG 2 are given in Fig. 4.8 and Fig. 4.9,
respectively. The voltage magnitude of IIEG 2 remains within the first two thresholds
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Figure 4.7: OV Mitigation Example – IIEG 1 Power

V 1 and V 2 throughout all disturbances. Hence, the real and reactive power set points
are governed by (4.11) and (4.12). The response to changes in load is consistent the
expectations of the OV mitigation scheme. The power export of IIEG 2 follows the power
reference set points with significant accuracy.

~ = Savailable
|S|

p.f. =

1 − p.f.limit ~
(|V | − V1 ) + 1
V1 − V2

(4.11)

(4.12)

The voltage magnitude and power exports of IIEG 3 are given in Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.11,
respectively. The voltage magnitude remains between thresholds V 1 and V 2 for the first
two loading states and then extends beyond V 2 for the final loading state. Therefore, for
the first two loading conditions, the real and reactive power set points are governed by
(4.11) and (4.12) as with IIEG 2. However, after load 3 is isolated, the real and reactive
power set points are governed by (4.13) and (4.14). The power set points follow these
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Figure 4.8: OV Mitigation Example – IIEG 2 Voltage

governing equations as expected. Further, the power export of IIEG 3 closely matches the
power set points. Hence, the IIEG unit’s controller provides reactive power absorption
and apparent power curtailment consistent with the OV mitigation scheme.

~ =
|S|

p.f. = p.f.limit

(4.13)

Savailable ~
(|V | − V3 )
V2 − V3

(4.14)

The same network was simulated with the OV mitigation scheme turned off. The voltage
magnitudes at IIEG 1, IIEG 2 and IIEG 3 are shown in Fig. 4.12, Fig. 4.13 and Fig. 4.14.
The power set points of each IIEG unit are fixed where the customer is exporting the maximum allowable real power and no reactive power irrespective of the voltage magnitude.
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Figure 4.9: OV Mitigation Example – IIEG 2 Power

The voltage magnitude increases when the OV mitigation scheme is turned off because
IIEG 2 and IIEG 3 are exporting more real power (and absorbing no reactive power) than
in the previous case, raising the voltage profile of the entire feeder. Hence, implementation of the OV mitigation scheme has reduced the voltage profile of the DN. All IIEG
units must implement the proposed OV mitigation scheme to ensure power exports are
fair and the voltage remains within acceptable bounds. The scheme will naturally permit
a greater power export and therefore greater financial remuneration for IIEG unit’s connected to stronger segments of a DN. Hence, the scheme also encourages IIEG connection
at stronger segments of a feeder and an increased financial incentive for upgrades of power
lines.

4.2.3

Conclusion

The proposed OV mitigation scheme has been shown to operate effectively within the
simulation environment. The are a wide array of advantages of the proposed scheme,
including:
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Figure 4.10: OV Mitigation Example – IIEG 3 Voltage

• the scheme requires only a small modification of contemporary IIEG unit controllers.
• there exists no reliance of communications infrastructure for the scheme to operate
correctly.
• a knowledge of sensitivity matrices or network data is not required.
• each IIEG unit can be installed in a plug-and play fashion. No recalibration is
necessary upon modifications of the overall DN.
• the scheme automatically restricts power export based on local load availability and
the short circuit impedance of the POC. The voltage thresholds must be common
to all EG units to ensure the scheme is fair for all proprietors.

The suitability of the proposed scheme in practical applications requires further exploration. In particular, the effects of the scheme on the economic suitability of IIEG requires

Chapter 4. Over Voltage Mitigation Scheme

100

Pref
Qref
P
Q

10000

Power (W or VAr)

8000

6000

4000

2000

0
0

0.05

0.1

0.15
Time (s)

0.2

0.25

0.3

Figure 4.11: OV Mitigation Example – IIEG 3 Power

further exploration. Furthermore, the proposed scheme may have a negative impact on
the efficacy of anti-islanding protection. However, since the controller is incapable of exporting reactive power, it is very unlikely that the available generation will exactly match
the demands of a load which normally absorbs reactive power. A sufficient frequency
deviation that will active passive anti-islanding protection is very likely. The small nondetection zone of the passive anti-islanding protection scheme can be eliminated through
use of an appropriate frequency-based active anti-islanding protection selection.
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Figure 4.12: OV Mitigation Example – IIEG 1 Voltage with OV Mitigation Turned Off

Chapter 4. Over Voltage Mitigation Scheme

102



ÿ

31037

ÿ 11

310322
31032

310362
31036
310352
0ÿ

0102

013

0132
89 ÿ

014

0142

Figure 4.13: OV Mitigation Example – IIEG 2 Voltage with OV Mitigation Turned Off
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Figure 4.14: OV Mitigation Example – IIEG 3 Voltage with OV Mitigation Turned Off

Chapter 5

Fault Analysis Tools
5.1

Introduction

One of the significant contributions of this Thesis is the development of a fault analysis
platform suitable for DNs with a high EG penetration. Traditional fault analysis techniques were predicated on the notion of radial power flow from large-scale synchronous
generators. The application of fault analysis techniques is common practice in modern
protection design. Presently, the low EG penetration levels in DNs are insufficient to
adversely affect protection setting practices using radial techniques. In fact, the IEEE
Standard [21] states that EG must not impact the normal operation of protective devices,
which implies that EG must not invalidate the efficacy of traditional fault analysis techniques. However, as EG penetrations rise, international standard reform will be required
to sustain the proliferation of small and medium-scale renewable energy resources. In
such a case, improved fault analysis techniques that encompass EG fault response will be
required.
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Figure 5.1: (a) Positive Sequence Equivalent Circuit (b) Negative Sequence Equivalent
Circuit (c) Zero Sequence Equivalent Circuit

5.2

Traditional Fault Analysis Techniques

Traditional fault analysis techniques of DNs typically employ sequence component Thévenin
equivalent circuits for all power infrastructure upstream of the analysed feeder. The equivalent circuits are shown in Fig. 5.1.
Sequence components allow the parameters of three-phase networks to be expressed as
a set of three sequence parameters. The transformation between phase and sequence
components can be achieved using (5.1) and (5.2).

  
 
Fa
1 1 1
F
  
  0
  



 Fb  = 1 a2 a  F1 
  
 
Fc
1 a a2
F2

(5.1)


 
 
F
1 1 1
F
  a
 0 1 




 
F1  = 1 a a2   Fb 
 
  3
Fc
1 a2 a
F2

(5.2)

The character a is the unit vector at 120o , that is a = 1∠120o and F can be replaced
by any three-phase vector quantity such as voltage and current. The equivalent sequence
component circuits can then be concatenated according to the fault type [102]. The use
of sequence components greatly simplifies the process of approximating the fault current
drawn for any given fault type and location.

Chapter 5. Fault Analysis Tools

107

Adjacent feeders are generally omitted when determining the Thévenin equivalent circuit
upstream of a feeder for two reasons. Firstly, there exists no reverse fault current flow in
traditional radial DNs. Secondly, the current drawn by the adjacent feeder during a fault
is negligible compared to the fault current. The reactance of the Thévenin equivalent
circuit is generally determined by (5.3).

X=

Sb
SCC

(5.3)

Where X is the equivalent per unit reactance of a bolted three-phase fault, SCC is the
short circuit capacity in MVA and Sb is the apparent power base in MVA, typically
100 MVA. The assumptions made in (5.3) are:

• The prefault voltage is 1 p.u. and;
• Voltage bases are equal to voltage ratings.

Generally, the reactance X is adopted as the positive and negative sequence impedance
for the Thévenin equivalent circuit upstream of the DN for fault analysis. Assuming the
zone substation transformer is wye-earth connected, upstream zero sequence data is not
required for earth fault analysis in DNs.
The inclusion of EG subverts the premise of radiality implemented in fault analysis within
DNs. In order to gain an understanding of the fault response of a DN with a high EG
penetration using sequence components, a sequence component representation of each
component within the DN is required. The derivations of sequence component representations of synchronous generators, power lines, transformers and loads are well established
and are commonly used within protection design practice.

5.2.1

Sequence Representation of Earth Impedances

Generators, transformers and loads can be connected in multiple configurations including delta, wye and zig-zag. Furthermore, the earthing connection can have a significant
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impact from a protection perspective. Generally speaking, the connection type of power
infrastructure does not have an effect on positive and negative sequence representations
of that power infrastructure. However, zero sequence currents are significantly affected
by phase and earth connections.
Zero sequence currents are in-phase and therefore do not cancel out when connected to an
earth-connected star point. The sum of the three zero sequence currents will flow through
to earth if an earth connection is available. Given that a star point is connected to earth
through impedance Ze , the total zero sequence impedance Z0 (total) can be expressed as
(5.4).

Z0 (total) = Z0 (phase) + 3Ze

(5.4)

Where Z0 (phase) is the zero sequence impedance of each phase connection. If no earthing
impedance is used, Ze = 0. If there is no connection to earth at the star point or the power
infrastructure is delta-connected, the zero sequence equivalent circuit can be represented
as an open circuit.

5.2.2

Synchronous Generators

During three-phase balanced faults, the transient synchronous machine fault current can
be calculated by (5.5).

iac (t) =

√

2E0 [(

√ E0
1
1
1 −t/τ 0
1
1
00
d+
− 0 )e−t/τd +( 0 −
)e
] sin (ωt + δ)+ 2 00 sin (δe−t/τ0 )
00
Xd Xd
Xd Xd
Xd
Xd
(5.5)

Xd00 , Xd0 and Xd are the direct axis subtransient, transient and steady-state reactances
respectively. τd00 , τd0 and τd are the direct axis subtransient, transient and steady-state time
constants respectively. E0 and δ are the prefault voltage magnitude and angle respectively.
The reactances Xd00 , Xd0 and Xd can be employed as the positive sequence impedances in a
fault analysis. It is often acceptable to choose the direct axis subtransient reactance as the
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positive sequence Thèvenin Impedance to simulate fault response as protection systems
normally operate within the few cycles [26].
The negative sequence reactance is largely determined by the damper windings of the rotor
[3, 26]. The negative sequence impedance is constant throughout subtransient, transient
and steady-state response of a synchronous machine. The constant negative sequence
impedance is presumed to be close to the positive sequence subtransient reactance in
[3], but is chosen to be the average between the direct and quadrature axes subtransient
impedance in [26].
The zero sequence impedance of a synchronous machine is approximated to be equal to
the leakage reactance Xl . The zero sequence impedance of a synchronous machine is
generally very small. In fact, many synchronous generators are unearthed or earthed
through an impedance to prevent damage incurred during a single-phase to earth faults
at the generator terminals. An unearthed synchronous generator has an infinite zero
sequence impedance, represented as an open circuit. A synchronous generator with an
earthing impedance Ze must pass the zero sequence current of each line through the
earthing impedance; therefore, the total zero sequence impedance can be expressed as in
(5.4).
The decoupling of machines from the grid via a power electronics interface can offer significant flexibility of the transient response of the overall generation system. The proposed
controllers chosen in Chapter 3 implement a LPF to determine the transient response
on each IIEG. The proposed fault analysis tool presented in this Chapter assumes that
the proposed IIEG controllers are employed and are standard across all IIEG units. This
assumption greatly simplifies the fault determination process including the transient response without computationally expensive small-signal models.

5.2.3

Power Line Sequence Representation

Most 11 kV three-phase power lines in Australia can be approximated to be balanced.
If the power line geometry is consistent irrespective of the phase rotation, the positive
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and sequence impedances can be considered equal. The zero sequence impedance can be
approximated by (5.6) [3].

Z0 = X1 + 3ω(0.2 ln (

Dn
))mΩ/km
D

(5.6)

Where Dn is the average distance of the earth of the three phases and D is the average
distance of each phase conductor to the other phase conductors.

5.2.4

Power Transformer Sequence Representation

The windings of power transformers can be configured in multiple forms. Winding and
earth connections can have a significant impact on the fault response of a DN. Delta-wye
transformers yield a 30o phase shift which does not impact the fault current magnitude
and, hence, can be neglected in some analyses where phase is unimportant. The core losses
and magnetisation current are in the order of one percent of the rated value and are usually
ignored in fault analysis [3]. If there is no earth impedance and the transformer allows the
flow of zero sequence current, all sequence component impedances can be approximated
to be equal to the leakage impedance Zl as shown in (5.7) [3].

Z0 = Z1 = Z2 = Zl

(5.7)

The phase shift of the positive sequence is the complement of the negative sequence phase
shift. For example, if the positive sequence HV leads the LV winding by 30o , the negative
sequence HV will lag the LV winding by 30o . The zero sequence equivalent circuits for
each transformer configuration are dependent on the winding and earthing configurations
and are shown in Fig. 5.2.
For current to flow in a transformer, there must be a magneto-motive force (mmf) balance
between the primary and secondary windings. With the exception of core reluctance, the
mmf of the primary winding is equal to the mmf of the secondary winding. The mmf is
measured in Ampere-turns and can be expressed as shown in (5.8).
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Figure 5.2: Zero Sequence Equivalent Circuits of Various Transformer Configurations
[3]

mmf = N I

(5.8)

Where N is the number of turns in a coil and I is the current passing through a coil in
amperes. The turns ratios can be accounted for using the per unit system. Ignoring core
losses and phase shifts, the per unit current entering the transformer is equal to the per
unit current leaving the transformer. Hence, if zero sequence current cannot flow through
one winding, no zero sequence current can flow through the other winding irrespective of
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winding connection and earthing. By (5.2), the zero sequence current can be calculated
as the residual unbalance of phase currents. Hence, the zero sequence equivalent circuits
as shown in Fig. 5.2 can be explained as follows:
(a) Wye-earthed to Wye-earthed – Both windings have a path for unbalanced current to
flow; therefore, zero sequence current can flow. The mmf of the transformer will ensure
that the per unit zero sequence current entering the HV side will leave the LV side. The
zero sequence impedance is equal to the leakage impedance as stated in (5.7).
(b) Wye to Wye with one star point earthed or neither – If a wye-connection is not
earthed, the sum of all currents must equal zero; therefore, there can be no zero sequence
current. As a result, there will be no zero sequence mmf in either winding which suggests
that the zero sequence impedance is infinite and best represented as an open circuit.
(c) Wye-earthed to Delta – Zero sequence current may flow in the form of a circulating
current in a delta winding as a result of zero sequence mmf from the magnetically-coupled
winding. However, no zero sequence current will flow into or out of a delta connection.
Hence, an earth path is available to the wye-earthed connection that will allow the flow
of zero sequence current as zero sequence mmf can be induced in the delta winding.
(d) Wye to Delta with no earthing point – If a wye-connection is not earthed, the sum of
all currents must equal zero; there can be no zero sequence current and no zero sequence
mmf. The equivalent circuit is identical to part (b).
(e) Delta to Delta – Both delta windings contain a path for circulating zero sequence
current to flow. However, the sum of current flowing into a delta connection must be zero
as there is no return path; therefore, the zero sequence current must also be zero by (5.2).
Zero sequence current may not enter nor leave a delta-to-delta connected power transformer; subsequently, there is no path for zero sequence current flow from the perspective
of the DN.
Transformer connections have a significant impact on the flow of zero sequence current.
The transformer connection must be noted when coordinating protection devices across
transmission and DNs. However, most power transformers in zone substations in Australia
are connected in a Delta to Wye-earthed configuration; a configuration which possesses
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two important attributes from a protection perspective. Firstly, zero sequence current
cannot flow from the HV line to the LV line across a transformer; hence, the EF protection
does not need to be coordinated across the zone substation transformer. Secondly, zero
sequence current can flow from the earth connection of the Wye winding to a DN earth
fault, allowing EF and SEF protection to detect earth faults within the DN. Therefore,
a knowledge of the zero sequence impedance upstream of the Wye-earth winding of the
zone substation power transformer is not necessary for DN fault analysis.
Thévenin equivalent circuits are adequate to approximate fault response in traditional
DNs as the response time of OC and EF protective devices is usually very fast, typically
within the subtransient domain of generator response. Hence, the subtransient reactance
of synchronous generators is implemented to define the positive and negative sequence
components for fault analysis.

5.2.5

Load Sequence Representation

Positive and negative sequence representations of balanced loads are identical. The zero
sequence impedance of a load depends on how the load is connected. If a load is delta
or unearthed-wye connected, no zero sequence current will flow as there is no return path
for unbalanced currents. Otherwise, the zero sequence impedance can be calculated as in
(5.4).

5.2.6

Conclusion

An outline of sequence component analysis is given as a precursor to analysing the behaviour of DNs with a high EG. The contemporary fault analysis techniques used in DNs
are heavily standardised and are predicated on assumptions that may not apply in future DNs with significant EG penetration levels. Small-signal models are popular within
research when investigating the impacts of IIEG on DNs [53, 61, 82, 103]. However,
small-signal models are computationally expensive, require a significant amount of data
and are time consuming. The proposed fault approximation tool aims to simplify the fault
analysis process with significant accuracy and speed.
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Novel Fault Approximation Tool

5.3.1

Introduction

The increasing prevalence of IIEG in DNs has progressively undermined the efficacy of
traditional line protection design philosophy. Many dynamic models have been developed
in order to better understand the effects of IIEG on traditional protection design philosophy. However, the development of dynamic models is a time consuming process and IIEG
unit design differs significantly across manufacturers. Utilities usually do not possess the
time and resources to build a model for each different IIEG unit that is connected to
a DN. To simplify to modelling process, this Thesis presents a fault approximation tool
(FAT) that utilities may adopt to ease the fault analysis of DNs with a high penetration
of IIEG.
The development of dynamic models is a common topic within research. Authors of
[74, 104–107] have presented different control diagrams with the common goal of simulating
a constant-power, grid-connected IIEG. An accurate representation of the control scheme
of an IIEG is of particular importance as there are no innate machine dynamics to govern
the fault response. However, utilities may not have access to a detailed representation
of an IIEG unit’s control scheme and control data may be unavailable. Hence, from the
utility perspective, the preferred modelling tool for a grid embedded with IIEG would
require minimal IIEG behavioural information yet yield a reasonable representation of
the behaviour of the IIEG when exposed to a disturbance.
A simplified modelling tool is presented by [105] using Gauss-Seidel load flow. All phases
are investigated independently; hence, it can be inferred that all neutral points are assumed to be earthed. The effect of loads are ignored which may prove problematic when
accurate representations of high-impedance faults required. There may also arise convergence issues for significant disturbances within the DN due to a poor selection of initial
conditions. A similar tool is proposed by Tu in [86] using minor alterations to NewtonRaphson load flow, which will likely yield similar convergence issues to the tool proposed
by [105]. Tu claims that Newton-Raphson solvers are less likely to have divergence issues
for fault analysis than Gauss-Seidel solvers. Both authors use sequence components to
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simplify the solution process. However, consideration of transformer windings and earthing connections have not been included. The proposed FAT scheme contains allowances
for floating neutral points by using KVL in addition to KCL. Convergence issues are also
much less likely using the proposed FAT as IIEG current outputs are used as the iterated
variable; the initial values can be calculated using fault-instant data without the need of
an iterative process.
The EG model in [65] uses a series of approximation methods to determine the subtransient and transient response of IIEG. The adopted control scheme used to govern the
IIDG unit is voltage based and prone to large current deviations between phases during
disturbances. The absence of current regulation removes the possibility of fault current
limitation and increases the likelihood of nuisance tripping. When deriving the dynamic
response of IIEG, a knowledge of the equivalent grid impedance is necessary which may
prove complex in a system with many IIEG units and a topologically varying network.
The errors observed in the simulations conducted by [65] are much more significant than
the results found using the proposed FAT.
IIEG is generally not designed to sustain fault current continuously due to the low thermal inertia of the power electronic switches within the inverter [28]. The fault current
capability of an inverter is dependent on the ability of the inverter to draw heat away from
the power electronics during a sustained fault. Most contemporary IIEG units are not
designed with the explicit intention of providing fault ride-through; hence, fault currents
tend to be limited in magnitude and brief in duration. The authors of [29] find that fault
current peak magnitudes can vary from 2 to 5 times rated current for 1 to 4.25 milliseconds. The magnitude of the fault current is determined by the grid conditions as well as
the characteristics of the IIEG unit. The duration of a significant fault current response
is largely governed by the thermal protection of the IIEG unit. A single unified representation of the fault response for the short term transient of an IIEG unit is difficult as the
thermal dynamics of the inverter must be accurately modelled in addition to the control
and power dynamics of the IIEG and grid. The variety of fault current data gathered by
[29] and the range of control schemes presented by authors [74, 104–107] is testament to
the impracticality of deriving a unified detailed model for short term transients. The FAT
provides a means of approximating the fault response of IIEG for use in analysing DN
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line protection schemes without the prerequisite of an in-depth understanding of an IIEG
unit’s control structure.

5.3.2

Underlying Assumptions within the FAT

The FAT is predicated on the implementation of the grid-connected IIEG control characteristics defined in Chapter 3. The controller includes a feed-forward voltage which
is used to ensure fast voltage commutation of the IIEG unit. The control scheme contains a PR controller which has two important advantages over commonly implemented
PI controllers: PR controllers have zero steady state error at nominal frequency and do
not require knowledge of the AC side filter circuit parameters of the IIEG unit [76]. The
control scheme also contains a PLL which determines the phase of the voltage at the
IIEG unit’s PCC. Both the PR and PLL controllers have very fast tracking capabilities;
thus the time delay effects of these controllers are omitted when analysing the transient
response of an IIEG in the FAT.
There are two features of the control scheme that dominate the dynamics of the FAT: an
LPF after the current controller and the feed-forward voltage signal. The LPF slows the
response of the current reference, which implies that the power exported by the IIEG at the
instant of a fault will not necessarily be equal to the power set points during the transient
response. The use of a feed-forward voltage signal suggests that the voltage commutation
of the IIEG is almost instantaneous. From the perspective of DN line protection device
operation, the assumption of an instantaneous voltage shift is suitable as the anti-aliasing
filters within protection devices attenuate high frequency transients [108].
The algorithm is based on a concatenation of the linearised solver presented in Chapter 3
and a solver based on Newton’s method to find the roots of non-linear equations. Convergence issues are less likely to arise using the proposed algorithm than traditional load
flow techniques for fault simulation. The key differences between the proposed algorithm
and traditional load flow techniques are:

• All loads are modelled as constant impedances rather than constant loads.
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• IIEG is treated as a constant current source within the inner loop of the algorithm.
The current is manipulated each iteration of the outer loop until the desired power
export is present.
• KCL and KVL matrices are employed rather than a Y-bus matrix.
• The variables altered each iteration are the current magnitude and angle, rather
than the voltage magnitude and angle.

The benefit of the KVL and KCL matrices is that no reduction to a single line diagram
is necessary. All transformer windings and earthing connections are inbuilt in the model;
no artificial phase shifting nor reference voltage is necessary anywhere in the network.
The alteration of current instead of voltage was chosen as the IIEG controller maintains
a balanced current with equal current magnitude across all three phases of the IIEG unit;
whereas the voltage across the phases of an IIEG may float. The loads were treated as
impedances to reduces the number of iterative variables in the network. However, the
loads may be treated as constant power with some minor alterations to the programming.
The FAT implements a novel, iterative solver that converges upon IIEG currents instead
of all non-slack node voltages as used in the Newton-Raphson load flow solver.

5.3.3

FAT Algorithm

The complete FAT algorithm is expressed as a logic diagram in Fig. 5.3. All IIEG units are
allocated an identifying constant. Then, the iterative variable k is reserved as a reference
indicating the IIEG unit where the partial differential operator is currently being applied.
For example, the partial derivative with respect to |Ik | will yield the partial derivative of
all element parameters with respect to the current magnitude of the IIEG unit designated
with the same identifier as k. Similarly, the partial derivative with respect to δk will yield
the partial derivative of all element parameters with respect to the current angle of IIEG
unit k.
IIEG units do not possess an inherent inertia. The dynamics of the inverter are therefore
governed by the control and protection of the IIEG unit. Within the controller, the voltage
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Determine 0th iteration
conditions

Create matrices A and B by
characteristic, KCL and KVL
equations at 0th iteration
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Find ΔS
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Create C matrix for partial
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Create C matrix for partial
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Solve for partial derivative and
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Figure 5.3: FAT Flow Chart
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signal is passed ahead of the current controller through a feed-forward channel. The feedforward filter has a much faster response time than the current controller; hence, the IIEG
unit will response to changes in voltage must faster than changes in current. From a DN
protection perspective, the change in voltage as a result of a fault can be assumed to be
instantaneous. The current injected by an IIEG unit will gradually change until the power
reference set points allocated within the control scheme are realised. The output of the
FAT is an envelope of the transient and steady-state responses of any grid-connected DN.
Assuming that the IIEG voltage does not change significantly as the current controller
regulates the power export by the IIEG and the protection does not operate, the fault
response of an IIEG and envelope generated by the FAT can be accurately represented by
(5.9).

i(t) =

∗
Sref
∗
3VLN
post-fault

+ (IIIEGfault-instant −

∗
Sref
∗
3VLN
post-fault

) exp−ωc t

(5.9)

Where ωc is the cut-off frequency of the LPF and Sref is the complex power set-point of
an IIEG controller. VLNpost-fault is the line-to-neutral post-fault voltage at the PCC of the
IIEG unit. IIIEGfault-instant is the current supplied by the IIEG at the fault-instant.
In order to utilise (5.9) to approximate the fault response, the pre-fault voltage, VLNpre-fault ,
of each IIEG unit must be known as well as the steady-state current supplied by each IIEG
unit. In order to find the voltage at the fault-instant, each IIEG unit behaves as a constant
current source where the current is defined by (5.10); the current can be assumed to be
fixed due to the slow nature of the LPF within the IIEG unit’s controller. The faultinstant data is a function of the pre-fault data. All three operating states (pre-fault,
fault-instant and steady-state) are determined using the FAT.

IIIEGfault-instant =

∗
Sref
∗
3VLNpre-fault

(5.10)
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Determination of 0th Iteration Conditions

The algorithm is run twice to solve for the pre-fault condition and steady-state post-fault
condition. The 0th iteration variables for the pre-fault condition are selected based on
the ratings of each IIEG unit with a current phase angle of 0 degrees. The 0th iteration
variables for the steady-state post-fault condition are taken from the fault-instant data.
The fault-instant solver does not contain any non-linear functions and, hence, does not
require an iterative solver.

5.3.3.2

Characteristic Equations

The network model of N elements is represented as a set of characteristic, KVL and KCL
equations as shown in (5.11). The method for deriving the KCL and KVL equations was
given in Chapter 3. A network element is defined as one phase of a source, line, load or
transformer winding.

Ax = B

(5.11)

Where:



characteristic




A=

KCL


KVL

h
x = V1 I1 V2 I2 . . . VN

IN

i0

h
i
B = constants

All matrix elements contain vectors unless otherwise specified. The voltages in the x
matrix V1 , V2 , . . ., VN are the potential differences across each element (there is no need
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for an absolute reference as used in the Newton-Raphson solver). The currents in the x
matrix I1 , I2 , . . ., IN are the currents passing through each element. Each line of the
characteristic, KCL and KVL matrices are of sizes C1×2N and the constants matrix is of
size C2N ×1 .
The characteristic and constant matrices of lines and loads are simple arrangements of
Ohm’s Law, (5.12).

h

 
i V
h i


= 0
−1 Z
I

(5.12)

Where Z is the impedance of the line or load. An infinite slack bus at element p is
represented as a constant voltage, (5.13).

h

 
i V
h i


=
1 0
V
I

(5.13)

Transformer windings can be connected in any desired configuration. The characteristic
equation does not require a knowledge of external winding connections; rather, a threephase transformer is represented as three single-phase transformers. The determination
of the winding connections and subsequent phase shifting is achieved through the KCL
and KVL equations. Each of the transformer single-phase equivalents are treated as two
separate elements 1 and 2 and, hence, requires two characteristic equations.


−1/Zm 1 + Z1 /Zm

1
−Z1

 
V1
   
 
0
0 1/a  I1 
  =  
 
0
a aZ2 V2 
 
I2

(5.14)

Where Z1 and Z2 are the primary and secondary winding impedances respectively, Zm is
the magnetising impedance and a is the turns ratio.
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The characteristic equation of the IIEG can be determined by (5.15). The value for IIIEG
is iterative. For the pre-fault condition, the ratings of each IIEG unit and a 0o current
phase angle are adopted. For the post-fault steady-state condition, the fault-instant data
is employed instead.

h

5.3.3.3

 
h
i
i V
0 1   = IIIEG
I

(5.15)

FAT Outer Loop

Upon concatenating the characteristic equations with KCL and KVL equations, the matrix x as shown in (5.11) can be determined. Once solved, the matrix x contains the
voltage and current vectors of all elements for the 0th iterative condition. The next step
in determining the steady state currents of the IIEG is finding the error in the power
export of each IIEG unit which is calculated by (5.16).

∆S = ∆P + j∆Q = −Sref +

X

Vα Iα∗

(5.16)

α=a,b,c

Where α = a, b, c is used as a partial sum iterative variable across all three phases. An
application of (5.16) is undertaken for every IIEG unit; each application is concatenated
to form the complete ∆S. Each successive iteration of the FAT will correct the output
current vector of each IIEG until the total apparent power error Σ|∆S| is acceptably
small.
When the differences between the power exports by the IIEG and the specified set points
are acceptably small, the FAT can be terminated. The maximum tolerable gross error is
designated  and has been chosen arbitrarily to be 10−6 .
If the condition Σ|S| <  is not satisfied, a new value for the current vectors of each
IIEG unit must be determined. The complete Jacobian matrix can then be constructed
as shown in (5.17). The partial derivatives within the Jacobian matrix are determined
within the inner loop of the FAT.
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−1 

∂∆S
∂∆S
∆|I|
Re( ∂|I| ) Re( ∂δI )
∆P

=
 

∂∆S
∂∆S
Im( ∂|I| ) Im( ∂δI )
∆δI
∆Q

(5.17)

Given the grid-connected control scheme in Chapter 3 is employed, the current magnitude
must be common across all three phases of an IIEG unit and the current phase difference
must be 120o across all phases. Hence, the new IIEG unit’s current vectors can be grouped
into one reference vector I representing the A phase current. This reference vector is
calculated by (5.18). The subscript n refers to the iteration number of the outer loop
within the FAT.

In = (|In−1 | − ∆|I|) expj(δn−1 −∆δI )

5.3.3.4

(5.18)

FAT Inner Loop

The A and x matrices constructed for (5.11) will be reused for determination of the partial
derivatives of x with respect to each IIEG unit current magnitude and phase. However,
the matrix of constants will require alteration as the partial derivatives of constants are
all equal to zero, with the exception of the elements denoted by k which specify the
IIEG currents. The altered matrix of constants is designated as C. When finding the
partial derivative with respect to the IIEG current magnitude, the corresponding nonzero constant matrix elements can be calculated as shown in (5.19).

Ck =

Ik
|Ik |

(5.19)

The partial derivatives of the network voltage and currents with respect to the IIEG
current magnitudes can then be calculated by (5.20).

A

∂x
=C
∂|Ik |

The Jacobian elements can then be calculated by (5.21).

(5.20)
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X I∗
X
∂∆Sk
∗ ∂Vkα (Ik )
kα
=
Vkα (Ik ) +
Ikα
∂|Ik |
|Ikα |
∂|Ik |
α=a,b,c

(5.21)

α=a,b,c

All non-diagonal elements are equal to zero. The same method can be used to determine
the partial derivatives of the network voltages and currents with respect to the current
phase using (5.22), (5.23) and (5.24).

Ck = jIk

A

(5.22)

∂x
=C
∂δk

(5.23)

X
X
∂∆Sk
∗ ∂Vkα (Ik )
∗
Vkα (Ik ) +
Ikα
=
−jIkα
∂δIk
∂δk
α=a,b,c

(5.24)

α=a,b,c

A set of partial derivatives with respect to all IIEG current magnitude and current angle
must be applied. The inner loop iterates k from 1 to the total number of IIEG units, thus
satisfying the condition k == numel(IIEG), before terminating the inner loop.

5.3.3.5

Terminating

Upon the tolerance requirement of the FAT algorithm being satisfied, the gathered data
can then be used to extrapolate the pre-fault, transient and steady-state response of each
IIEG unit using (5.9). Provisions should be made for an escape sequence if convergence
is not achieved within a set number of iterations.
Upon terminating, the FAT produces an envelope to be superimposed with small-signal
analysis. The following simulations shall demonstrate the strengths and limitations of the
FAT.
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Figure 5.4: Example Network

5.3.4

Simulation

A simulation of an example network shown in Fig. 5.4 was implemented to verify the FAT
against an equivalent small-signal model. Fig. 5.4 is a single line diagram of a three-phase
system. The details of the example network are given in Table 5.1. The details are chosen
to represent plausible conditions for a simple system with a high EG penetration but are
otherwise arbitrary.
All plots employing the FAT contain a small-signal waveform and corresponding envelope
for each parameter. All envelope colours match the colour of the corresponding smallsignal waveform. Note that in cases on balanced networks, envelopes may overlap as only
the parameter magnitude are considered in each plot.

5.3.4.1

Simulation I

The first simulation involved a single-phase to earth fault on phase A as indicated in
Fig 5.4 at 0.15 s. The current and voltage waveforms of IIEG1 are given in Figs. 5.5
and 5.6. The current and voltage waveforms of IIEG2 are given in Figs. 5.7 and 5.8. The
sinusoidal waveforms are the results of the small-signal model and the enveloping curves
are the voltage and current magnitude outputs of the FAT. The plot measurement points
are located at the PCC of IIEG1 and IIEG2. All voltages are measured in a line-to-line
fashion.
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Table 5.1: Example Network Data

Infinite Bus Data
Voltage l-l rms (kV)
Frequency (Hz)
Line No.
Resistance (Ω)
Inductance (mH)

11000
50
Line Data
1
0.3
3
Transformer Data

2
0.3
3

3
0.3
3

4
0.003
0.3

Transformer No.
1
2
Primary Voltage l-l rms (V)
11000
11000
Primary Winding Resistance (Ω)
0.003
0.0003
Primary Winding Inductance (mH)
1
0.5
Primary Connection
Delta
Delta
Secondary Voltage l-l rms (V)
400
400
Secondary Winding Resistance (Ω)
0.003
0.0001
Secondary Winding Inductance (mH)
1
0.2
Secondary Connection
Wye-earthed
Wye-earthed
Load Data
Real Power (kW)
200
Reactive Power (kVAr)
10
Note: The resistance and inductance of the load are connected in parallel.
IIEG Data
IIEG No.
1
2
DC Voltage (V)
800
800
Switching Frequency (kHz)
4
4
Filter Inductance (mH)
16.33
16.33
Filter Capacitance (µF)
3
3
Power Setpoint (kVA)
10+j0
10+j0
Low Pass Filter Cut-Off Frequency (Hz)
10
10
Fault Data
Simulation No.
I
II
Fault time (s)
0.15
0.15
Fault type
A phase to earth A phase to B phase
Fault impedance (Ω)
0.0001+j0
0.001+j0
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Figure 5.5: FAT Simulation I: Single-phase to Earth Fault – IIEG1 Current Comparison
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Figure 5.6: FAT Simulation I: Single-phase to Earth Fault – IIEG1 Voltage (Line-toLine) Comparison
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Figure 5.7: FAT Simulation I: Single-phase to Earth Fault – IIEG2 Current Comparison
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Figure 5.8: FAT Simulation I: Single-phase to Earth Fault – IIEG2 Voltage (Line-toLine) Comparison
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Figure 5.9: FAT Simulation II: Line-to-Line Fault – IIEG1 Current Comparison

5.3.4.2

Simulation II

The second simulation involved a line-to-line fault at the same location between phases
A and B at 0.15 s. The current and voltage waveforms of IIEG1 are given in Fig. 5.9
and Fig. 5.10. The current and voltage waveforms of IIEG2 are given in Fig. 5.11 and
Fig. 5.12.

5.3.4.3

Analysis

The results of the simulations show that the FAT data envelope closely matches the corresponding small-signal waveforms in both steady-state and transient responses. The
consistency of the small-signal waveforms and FAT envelopes suggests that the FAT is
accurately calculating the pre-fault, fault-instant and post-fault data and the transient
response can be accurately represented by (5.9). Hence, the transient response is dominated by the LPF.
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Figure 5.10: FAT Simulation II: Line-to-Line Fault – IIEG1 Voltage (Line-to-Line)
Comparison
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Figure 5.11: FAT Simulation II: Line-to-Line Fault – IIEG2 Current Comparison
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Figure 5.12: FAT Simulation II: Line-to-Line Fault – IIEG2 Voltage (Line-to-Line)
Comparison

The small-signal model shows a very short term fault current excursion for IIEG2 in
both simulations that is not observed by the FAT. The sub-transient response is not
observed by IIEG1 due to the increased electrical distance between the IIEG1 and the
fault. The most notable anomaly is the fault current response of IIEG2 during simulation
II. Line commutation can only be achieved through the C phase connected through the
delta-wye transformer. The result is a heavily distorted signal; however, the FAT still
provides a reasonable approximation for the fundamental component of the resultant
current waveform.
The peak current excursion of IIEG2 is approximately 2.5 times the peak rated current and
has a duration of approximately 1 millisecond. The observed results are commensurate
with the data published in [29] under laboratory conditions. The fault current observed
within the first millisecond can be likened to the sub-transient response of a synchronous
machine. The sub-transient response of an IIEG is important for the protection of the
power electronics within the inverter. Hence, the FAT is inappropriate as an analysis
tool for thermal protection of IIEG devices unless an IIEG contains a significant thermal
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inertia where the transient and steady-state responses become important. However, the
primary function of the FAT is to approximate the fault response for the purpose of DN
line protection design.
Modern DN protection devices pass fault current data through an anti-aliasing filter, often
a cosine filter, before analysing the waveform [108]. Cosine filters effectively eliminate
high frequency transients. Therefore, the sub-transient response of an inverter will not be
observed by DN protection devices. Hence, the omission of the sub-transient response of
an IIEG unit is acceptable from the perspective of DN protection analysis.
The fault current and voltage of an IIEG unit calculated by the FAT is determined by
the response of the control system. IIEG units are incapable of sustaining over-current
and over-voltage; protection systems are designed such that an IIEG unit will be isolated
before thermal breakdown of the power electronics switches occurs. The FAT can be
linked with protection settings such that the fault response of a network is recalculated
each time a protection device operates. The fault current contribution of an IIEG can be
removed by simply setting the output current and power set points to zero or by removing
the IIEG from the characteristics, KVL and KCL equations.

5.3.5

Application of OC protection and Fault Current Limiting

The IIEG simulations presented in this Chapter thus far have assumed that each inverterinterface is capable of exporting an unlimited fault current. In practice, the fault current
contribution of an IIEG unit is restricted by the ratings of the power electronics within
the inverter, which are generally IGBTs. In order to make the FAT simulations more
accurate during significant fault conditions, three possible simulation types are offered.

1. All inverters are designed with a significant thermal inertia such that an IIEG unit
can sustain a large fault current long enough for DN OC protection devices to
operate. Under this assumption, the simulations presented thus far in this Chapter
can be considered reasonable representations of what would happen in practice.
However, increasing the thermal inertia is expensive and presents little benefit for
DN customers. In future networks where EG penetrations reach 100% of subsections
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of the network, there may be reason to increase the thermal capacity of inverters due
to the plausibility of intentional islanding. The increased thermal capacity of IIEG
would help maintain stability and provide fault ride-through. While the first option
may be reasonable for research purposes within the context of microgrid research,
the ratings of contemporary grid-connection IIEG render the first option impractical
for fault studies.
2. An effective OC instantaneous trip of IIEG units from the perspective of DN OC
protection analysis is employed. Most contemporary IIEG units do not have a
significant thermal inertia, nor are equipped with fault current limiters. Isolation
of IIEG units via anti-islanding protection can take as long as two seconds whilst
OC and EF protection can operate in the range of tens of microseconds for a low
impedance fault and up to several seconds for high impedance sensitive earth fault
detection. Hence, both the connected and disconnected state of each IIEG unit must
be considered within the context of anti-islanding protection and DN line protection
coordination. However, if a significant fault current is drawn from the IIEG unit,
the inverter’s OC protection will trip the IIEG unit in the order of one to five
milliseconds [29]. In such a case, the fault current supplied by the IIEG unit would
not exist long enough to create a significant deviation in the fault current passing
through DN line protection units.
3. A fault current limiter is installed at each IIEG unit which mitigates the need for
OC protection to operate. If the current exported by an IIEG unit exceeds the fault
current limit, the FAT is rerun with that IIEG unit’s current export fixed at the
fault current limit. The fixed current is controlled to be purely reactive, lagging the
voltage at the PCC by 90 degrees.

Irrespective of the application of an effective OC instantaneous trip or FCL, the first
application of the FAT will assume each IIEG is capable of exporting any voltage or current
necessary to satisfy the power export requirement of that IIEG. Once convergence is
achieved, the results will be assessed to see if any fault current limitations or instantaneous
trip thresholds have been exceeded. If an anomaly is observed, the simulation will rerun
where:
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• All IIEG units that do not exceed a current threshold (or are without a current
threshold) will be unchanged.
• All IIEG units that exceed an instantaneous current threshold will be removed.
• All IIEG units that exceed an FCL threshold are set to constant current devices
with an angle ninety degrees out of phase (reactive) with the voltage angle at the
fault-instant.

The FAT may have to be rerun several times as the inclusion of the FCL of one IIEG unit
may require the subsequent implementation of another FCL. Once again, a Newtonian
solver is implemented to find the roots of a non-linear system of equations. In the case
of a fault current limiter which exports a fixed reactive current, the power export must
be equal to zero. As the current magnitude is fixed, only the current angle δI will be
implemented as an iterative variable.
Let Sk be the complex power export of a three-phase IIEG unit k. Given:

Sk = Pk + jQk =

X

Vαk Iα∗ k

(5.25)

α=a,b,c

Setting the real part to zero yields:

0 = Pk =

X

|Vαk ||Iαk | cos (δVαk − δIαk )

(5.26)

α=a,b,c

The IIEG controller ensures that |Iαk | is equal across all phases. Hence, both sides of
(5.26) may be divided by |Iαk |, reducing the complexity of the equation to (5.27).

0 = Pk =

X

|Vαk | cos (δVαk − δIαk )

α=a,b,c

For balanced networks, the equation may be further reduced to (5.28).

(5.27)
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0 = δI − δV −

The IIEG current angles are fixed at
δIck −

2π
3 .

2π
3

π
2

(5.28)

radians out of phase. Let δIk = δIak = δIbk + 2π
3 =

For unbalanced networks, the partial derivative of (5.27) with respect to the

iterative variable δI can then be calculated as (5.29).

X ∂|Vα |
∂δVαk
∂∆Pk
k
=
cos (δVαk − δIαk ) + |Vαk |(1 −
) sin (δVαk − δIαk )
∂δIk
∂δI
∂δI

(5.29)

α=a,b,c

For balanced networks, (5.30) is sufficient.

∂∆Pk
∂δV
=1−
∂δIk
∂δI

(5.30)

The FAT calculates (5.29) and (5.30) in almost exactly the same fashion as in Section 5.3.3.
The only significant differences are: only one iterative variable exists for an IIEG unit
employing the FCL and all non-diagonal elements of the Jacobian matrix that correspond
to an IIEG employing a FCL are set to zero. The constant power and FCL equations may
be concatenated together and solved simultaneously.
In order to explore the implications of an FCL and the efficacy of the FAT in approximating
the response of the FCL, an example using the same network shown in Fig. 5.4 is given. A
single-phase to earth fault at phase A of the load is applied at t=0.1 seconds. The threshold
for the FCL implementation and execution are k1 = 1.2 and k2 = 1.32, respectively.
Hence, the FCL will not be applied unless the current magnitude exceeds 1.2 per unit
and when the FCL is triggered, the constant current export will be 1.32 per unit. These
values where chosen such that the FCL would not oscillate between constant-current fault
current limitation and constant-power control. The choice of constants also assumes that
the inverter can safely export 1.32 times the nominal current until the protection isolates
the fault. The results for IIEG1 are presented in Figs. 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15.
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Figure 5.13: FCL Application: IIEG1 Current Waveform
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Figure 5.15: FCL Application: IIEG1 Power Waveforms

The FAT had to be run three times to find the the final steady-state solution. Once with
no FCL implementation which found that the FCL threshold of IIEG2 was exceeded. The
second iteration fixed the current export of IIEG2 which, in turn, cased the FCL threshold
of IIEG1 to be exceeded. The third iteration gave the current and voltage magnitudes
which have been superimposed onto the figures shown for comparison with the small signal
model.
The FCL threshold of IIEG1 was exceeded just after t=0.14 seconds. The shift to constant
reactive current output causes a significant current distortion which can be observed in
Fig. 5.13, lasting about half a cycle. Fig. 5.14 shows that the effect of the current distortion
on the voltage waveform distortion is minimal and should not significantly impact the
fault ride-through capability nor the integrity of the DN. However, a significant voltage
unbalance is present during the fault that shall be alleviated once the fault is isolated.
The power plots shown in Fig. 5.15 show that no real power export is present after the
FCL comes into effect. Furthermore, the reactive power present is absorbed by the IIEG
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as expected.
The transient response of the current waveform predicted by the FAT does not match
the small signal model until the FCL threshold is exceeded. The error is acceptable from
the perspective of fault studies which are only interested in the prefault and steady-state
post-fault conditions. However, if desired, the complete envelope can be derived and
implemented using (5.31).

i(t) =







I0 if t < tfault ,
I∞ + (I0 − I∞ ) exp−ωc t if tfault ≤ t ≤ tFCL ,






(5.31)

IFCL if t > tFCL .

Where i(t) is the instantaneous current export, I0 is the pre-fault current export, I∞ is the
steady-state post-fault current excluding the FCL and IFCL is the current output once the
FCL threshold is exceeded. The times tfault and tFCL refer to the time of the fault-instant
and the time when the FCL threshold is exceeded, respectively. The value of tFCL can
be derived by (5.32) and ωc is the cut-off angular frequency of the IIEG unit’s current
control LPF.

tFCL = −

IFCL − I∞
1
ln [
]
ωc
I0 − I∞

(5.32)

The results for IIEG2 are presented in Figs. 5.16, 5.17 and 5.18. The FCL threshold of
IIEG2 is exceeded at approximately t=0.11 seconds. Again, a visible current and voltage
distortion are present for about half a cycle whilst the constant reactive current reference
is initiated. Again, the voltage distortion is limited and unlikely to negatively impact DN
infrastructure or the fault ride-through ability of the DN. Once again, only reactive power
is absorbed from the IIEG whilst the FCL is operating.

5.3.6

Conclusion

The FAT is an effective means of approximating the fault response of IIEG in DNs from the
perspective of DN line protection. The envelopes produced by the FAT closely matched
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Figure 5.16: FCL Application: IIEG2 Current Waveform
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Figure 5.18: FCL Application: IIEG2 Power Waveforms

the small-signal modelling of faulted DNs with a high EG penetration. The FAT is much
less computationally expensive when compared with small signal modelling, yet provides
an accurate representation of the steady-state and transient responses of IIEG units. It
must be emphasised that FAT may not be appropriate for analysing the efficacy of IIEG
protection, in particular the effects of the ‘sub-transient’ response and islanded modes
of operation on local protection. Future work will involve incorporating the protection
settings of DN protection devices into the FAT. Also, an investigation into the possibility of
modelling the sub-transient response of the IIEG without requiring a significant knowledge
of the control dynamics of the IIEG would be of significant value.

Chapter 6

Protection Analysis Tool
6.1

Introduction

The presence of EG in DNs has, to date, not incurred an appreciable adverse effect on
distribution line protection systems in Australia. The present EG penetration levels and
fault current limiting nature of IIEG are insufficient to compromise fault discrimination
practices. Empirically, the utility has observed problems due to OV at EG levels too
small to concurrently cause protection problems. However, if an OV mitigation scheme is
implemented, protection failure due to EG may become plausible and a reality in future
networks.
Additional limiting factors of EG connection may be physical constraints such as siting
(physical space or proximity to energy resource such as cogeneration), the business case
for connecting the EG and the thermal loading of distribution line infrastructure. For
the purposes of this Chapter, these limiting factors are assumed to have been considered
separately. The proposed OV mitigation scheme and protection analysis do not preclude
further constraint analysis encompassing these limiting factors.
The impacts of EG penetration on protection are dependent on a large number of variables:

• The topology of the network.
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• The distribution line impedances.
• Load locations and sizes.
• EG location, interface, control and size.
• DN protection device locations and settings.
• EG protection settings.
• Transformer location, size, impedance and winding connections.
• Fault location, configuration (three-phase, line-to-line, single-phase to earth) and
impedance.
• The earthing configuration of the distribution network.

Due to the variability and range of the characteristics of a DN containing a significant
EG penetration, a generalised expression for fault efficaciousness is imprudent. Hence,
this Thesis proposes an analysis tool for the protection integrity of a given DN. Note that
the proposed tool is specifically designed for applications of IIEG rather than machineinterfaced EG.

6.2

Protection Analysis Tool Overview

The protection analysis tool (PAT) is designed to investigate the worst case scenarios of
loading and EG connection from the protection perspective. The end result of the PAT
is a report which outlines the extremities of the normal and faulted operation for a given
DN. A separate section for each protection device is allocated within the report. The
results of the following conditions are given for all sections:

• The current flowing through each protection device during peak loading.
• The minimum pick-up current for OC and EF relays.
• The maximum possible fault current flowing through each protection device.
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• The maximum out-of-zone (OOZ) fault currents observable by OC and EF relays.

The results of each condition are calculated using the FAT (as introduced in Chapter 5)
for all IIEG connection combinations. Hence, the FAT may be thought of as the engine
within the PAT. The PAT provides all IIEG connection combinations and relevant DN
operating conditions to the FAT. Subsequently, the FAT calculates and returns the current
measured by all protection devices to the PAT. Once all simulation data is gathered, the
PAT filters through the data in order to identify the conditions pertinent to protection
efficacy; these pertinent conditions constitute the generated report.
The motivation for the FAT was to provide a fast method of providing fault simulations
for DNs with a high IIEG penetration. In order to understand the benefits the of PAT,
it is important to understand the high volume of simulations required to develop a full
analysis of a DN protection scheme.
Given any network containing OC and EF protection devices, the total number of FAT
simulations required can be expressed by (6.1).

No. simulations = 2EG

RELAYS
X



7 + 4EOZa + 3EOZEFa + 4EOZSa + 3EOZEFSa (6.1)

a=1

Where:

• EG is the number of IIEG units.
• RELAYS is the number of protection devices in the network under consideration.
• EOZa is the number of primary OC end of zone nodes corresponding to protection
device a.
• EOZEFa is the number of primary EF end of zone nodes corresponding to protection
device a.
• EOZSa is the number of secondary OC end of zone nodes corresponding to protection
device a.
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• EOZEFSa is the number of secondary EF end of zone nodes corresponding to protection device a.

Evidently, a DN containing several IIEG units and protection devices requires a large
number of simulations. If all simulations were completed using small-signal analysis,
developing a complete report of the impacts of IIEG on protection efficacy would be a
very time-intensive process. The PAT not only significantly reduces the analysis time, but
automates much of the analysis process.
A simple flow diagram of the PAT algorithm is shown in Fig. 6.1. The flow diagram is
designed to give a general overview of the PAT and does not provide a detailed mapping
of the PAT algorithm.
The PAT begins by identifying the slack bus within the simulated DN. A single slack bus
is needed as the algorithm is predicated on radial power flow for protection assessment.
If the number of buses in the DN does not equal one, the PAT algorithm shall terminate. The user is then prompted to nominate any protection devices to be excluded from
consideration within the PAT algorithm. Devices that do not constitute part of the DN
line protection scheme should be omitted, such as protection devices used for busbar or
transformer protection in zone substations.
The PAT algorithm continues by locating and identifying the protection devices and zones
of protection. Primary and secondary zones of protection are both required such that the
N-1 redundancy criteria of DN protection can be validated by the PAT. OC and EF zones
of protection are identified separately to account for transformer winding connections.
Zero sequence current cannot enter nor leave a three-phase delta-connected transformer
winding in a DN. Distribution transformers are typically delta-wye connected to ensure
all zero sequence current flows from the zone substation transformer during an earth fault.
Zone substation transformers are also often delta-wye connected. Hence, the connection
of transformers must be taken into consideration when assessing the fault discrimination
and selectivity of an EF protection device.
The PAT sequentially constructs the DN cases containing three-phase bolted, line-to-line
and single-phase to earth fault types for all start of zone (SOZ) and end of zone (EOZ)
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Identify Slack Bus
(terminate if no. buses ≠ 1)
User may select any protection
devices to be excluded from
consideration
Locate all SOZ and EOZ nodes for
OC and EF protection (both
primary and secondary)
User may select implementation
of FCL or EIS for any protection
devices

Set peak load conditions

Use FAT to solve for the given
conditions

Repeat for all IIEG
combinations

Store the results
Finished
Set fault conditions

Use FAT to solve for the given
conditions

Repeat for all fault
types, fault locations
and IIEG combinations

Store the results
Finished
Analyse results to find worst
case peak loading, pick-up
current, maximum fault current
and maximum OOZ fault current

Generate and print report

End

Figure 6.1: Flow Diagram of PAT Algorithm

locations, before employing the FAT to simulate the data. Furthermore, each case is
reassessed for every IIEG connection configuration. Each IIEG is represented in two
possibles states: full rated power export and isolated mode. Hence, for N IIEG units, 2N
assessments are necessary. All fault and EG combinations variations are automatically
applied to the DN by the PAT, greatly reducing the workload of the user. Upon completion
of all simulations, a significant amount of data is gathered which must be filtered to
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discern which information is useful from the perspective of a utility protection engineer.
This filtering process is automated by the PAT. A report is then generated outlining the
‘worst case scenario’ fault response data which may be used to simplify protection setting
determinations.
The PAT is also capable of incorporating FCLs and an effective instantaneous trip (EIT)
which may be implemented at the user’s discretion. The EIT allows an IIEG connection
to be omitted from consideration if the fault current drawn by an IIEG unit during a
simulation exceeds a predefined multiple of that IIEG unit’s rated current. The EIT is
a simple tool that may be implemented to better represent the impacts of actual IIEG
applications on DN line protection efficacy. If neither FCL nor an assumed EIT are chosen,
the PAT ignores the ratings of power electronics devices and assumes that the power set
points of each device will be realised in every case where convergence to a solution can be
achieved by the FAT.
There exists no general consensus on how a FCL should be applied to grid-connected
IIEG units. The FCL can: absorb reactive power only, inject reactive power only, export
real power only or any desirable power factor. Due to the variability in plausible FCL
application and the lack of contemporary practical application with grid-connected IIEG
units, FCL is excluded from the PAT study in this Thesis. However, if a consensus can be
reached as to how FCLs are applied and constant power and positive sequence current can
be achieved across all phases, the PAT can incorporate the effects of FCLs for protection
studies.

6.3

Employing the PAT Report Data

An understanding of the protection requirements within DNs is necessary in order to
correctly interpret a PAT report. The report does not specifically determine the best
protection settings of relays: the choice of protection settings is an inexact practice as a
range of values may provide effective protection (or none at all). However, the report can
be used as an aid when determining which protection settings are appropriate for a given
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case. Preferably, the user would also have some understanding of the subtle impacts of a
high IIEG penetration within DNs from the protection perspective.
There are two OC protection issues that can arise from EG penetration which were discussed in Chapter 2 and are reiterated here. Firstly, the current ratings of protection
devices may be exceeded. Assuming that the largest fault current is supplied from the
main grid during faults in a close proximity to an OC line protection device, the maximum fault current condition will occur for a fault located immediately downstream of that
OC line protection device. The nodes located immediately downstream of a protection
device are known as the SOZ nodes. Generally the largest fault current is drawn during
a low impedance single-line to earth fault or three-phase bolted fault. The PAT simulates all single-phase, line-to-line and three-phase bolted faults at each SOZ and records
each corresponding fault current to form the set ISOZ fault . Each CB must be capable of
interrupting the maximum fault current. Hence, the reported maximum current is the
minimum admissible CB rating ICB rating and can be calculated to be the maximum of
all recorded fault currents measured at the protection device as shown in (6.2). Every
IIEG connection combination is investigated to account for fault current increases and
decreases incurred through IIEG connection.

ICB rating > max[ISOZ faults ]

(6.2)

The second OC protection complication involves compromising the discrimination of a protection scheme. There are two ways that discrimination failure can be achieved. Firstly,
a protection device can fail to detect a fault within that protection device’s zone of protection. Secondly, a protection device can trip unnecessarily for a fault outside of that
protection device’s zone of protection. Both forms of discrimination failure must be taken
into consideration when choosing pick-up currents.
Contemporary OC protection settings are determined using peak load and line data. The
maximum permissible pick-up current is calculated by simulating EOZ fault responses
ignoring the presence of loads. The minimum permissible pick up current is the forecasted
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peak load current Iforecasted peak . The range acceptable for a pick-up current, Ip.u. , setting
can be expressed as in (6.3).

Iforecasted peak < Ip.u. < k · min[Ifaults ]

(6.3)

Where k is an error factor multiplier used to ensure higher impedance faults are detected.
The matrix Ifaults is the set of fault currents at all EOZ nodes corresponding to a protection
device. Values for k can vary: this Thesis employs k = 0.5 for primary protection and
k = 0.67 for secondary protection.
The proposed PAT incorporates traditional OC and EF protection requirements, but is
expanded to include protection discrimination issues that arise due to IIEG connection.
Note that OC protection is designed to detect three-phase and line-to-line faults whilst EF
protection is designed to detect single-phase to earth faults. Hence, the PAT only analyses
the fault types relevant to the protection type. The set Ifault includes each IIEG connection
combination to gain the entire range of possible fault currents within the designated zone
of protection. Furthermore, all fault currents for OOZ faults, Iout of zone faults , are gathered
to ensure a nuisance trip does not occur. The range for an acceptable OC pick-up current
can now be expressed as in (6.4). The value Iin-zone faults contains the set of all fault
currents simulated within a protection device’s zone of protection. Note that an OOZ
fault is generally only included for instances of reverse current flow.

max[Iforecasted peak , Iout of zone faults ] < Ip.u. < k · min[Iin-zone faults ]

(6.4)

The domain for an acceptable EF pick-up current can be expressed as in (6.5). The process
for calculation is the same, except single-phase to earth faults are analysed instead of lineto-line and three-phase faults. Furthermore, an EF relay does not detect peak current,
rather the current unbalance Iunbalance . Hence, Iunbalance contains the maximum current
unbalance during healthy operation of the DN. The calculation of Iunbalance is not included
in the PAT report as the simulations within this Chapter are all balanced. In practical
application, many distribution feeders, particularly in remote locations, may have two or
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single phase spurs. Customers are generally connected in a manner designed to minimise
load unbalance; a pick up current of 30-40% of peak current is considered acceptable
[109]. Alternatively, unbalance data can be captured by protection devices and accessed
via system control and data acquisition (SCADA).

max[Iunbalance , Iout of zone faults ] < Ip.u. < k · min[Iin-zone faults ]

(6.5)

If there is no acceptable domain for the pick-up current, protection discrimination cannot
be achieved. There are a few techniques that can be taken to remedy poor protection
discrimination due to IIEG connection:

• If the issue is caused by protection misoperation during OOZ faults, directional
current elements could be installed to block nuisance trips.
• Installing FCLs on each IIEG device may reduce the risk of fault under-reach.
• Otherwise, an upgrade of DN cable is most likely necessary.

6.4

Convergence Issues

The FAT is based on Newton’s method of finding the roots of an equation. Newtonian
iterative solvers can be prone to conditions of divergence where a solution cannot be
found. Empirically, the author has identified two situations where FAT convergence is not
achieved:

• When a three-phase bolted fault is located upstream of a IIEG unit.
• When a three-phase bolted fault causes a significant voltage drop (|V | < 0.1Vnominal )
at the terminals of an IIEG unit.

To reduce instances of FAT divergence, if an IIEG unit is downstream of a three-phase
fault, that IIEG unit is excluded from simulation as no voltage or frequency commutation
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is possible. It is assumed that the IIEG unit will be isolated by I 2 t or anti-islanding
protection. Irrespective of successful isolation, the IIEG downstream of the fault will not
have a significant adverse effect on the fault current flowing through protection devices
upstream of the fault. In the unlikely event that a protection device downstream of the
fault is subject to a nuisance trip due to reverse power flow before anti-islanding protection
operation, a reclose attempt after IIEG isolation will ensure that the feeder reaches the
same switching state as if the IIEG unit had not caused the nuisance trip. The nuisance
trip does not pose a negative impact on the overall reliability of the grid: any downstream
customers will lose power due to the upstream fault irrespective of nuisance tripping.
There may be cases where the voltage drop at the IIEG unit’s PCC due to a three-phase
bolted fault is too significant for convergence of the FAT. The effects of subjecting a
three-phase IIEG unit to a bolted three-phase fault was explored in [29]. The thermal
I 2 t protection trip time was only a fraction of a cycle, ranging from approximately one to
four milliseconds. The fastest anti-islanding trip time defined within IEEE recommended
practice due to voltage or frequency deviation is six cycles (100 ms in USA) [33]. The
anti-islanding trip delay is implemented for fault ride-through purposes and is designed to
protect the grid rather than an IIEG unit. The IGBTs within the inverter cannot sustain
a significant OC for six cycles without over-rating the IGBTs. Hence, fast thermal protection is essential is providing protection of the inverter. Ergo, it is reasonable to assume
that an inverter is likely to be isolated by thermal protection during three-phase bolted
faults at or near the inverter’s PCC rather than isolation via anti-islanding protection.
DN line protection relays commonly utilise cosine filters which are ideal for protection
applications [69]. The cosine filter attenuates all harmonics and any DC component in an
AC current waveform [89]. The cosine filter’s analogue to digital converter samples at a
rate of sixteen samples per cycle. Hence, the sampling period is 1.25 ms within Australian
power networks.
Consider the reflected fault scenario shown in Fig. 6.2 with the IIEG unit possessing the
fault and protection characteristics of the IIEG studies in [29]. A three-phase bolted fault
is implemented within CB 2’s zone of protection.
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Figure 6.2: Low Impedance Three-Phase Bolted Reflected Fault

A significant fault current of 2-3 times rated current will be drawn from the IIEG unit for
less than five milliseconds (generally around one millisecond) before the thermal protection
of the IIEG unit will initiate a trip, isolating the IIEG unit. Hence, a maximum of four
samples of fault current supplied by the IIEG will be captured by the protection relays
of CB 1 and CB 2 before the IIEG will be isolated. The current waveform is normally
passed through a LPF, further attenuating the OC waveform over the short time frame
where the IIEG is still supplying fault current. Hence, the IIEG fault current observed
by a line protection device will be minimal and short-lived.
The fault is within CB 2’s zone of protection. The trip time for a three-phase bolted fault
is variable and depends on the fault level and protection settings of devices upstream
of the zone substation. However, due to grading restrictions, the trip time is generally
going to be greater than the maximum five millisecond trip time of IIEG. Hence, one can
assume that the IIEG has been isolated before CB 1 is opened. Therefore, consideration
for increasing the rating of the CB to interrupt the aggregate fault current during a
three-phase bolted fault is unnecessary.
Furthermore, the trip time of CB 1 will be considerably slower than CB 2 as CB 2 will
measure a significantly greater fault current than CB 1. Hence, all IIEG thermal trip
times are shorter than CB 1’s trip time. The inception of the fault creates a significant
voltage drop across the adjacent feeder. Because IIEG units are constant power controlled,
a voltage drop induces an increase in IIEG current export. A reflected fault creating a
significant voltage drop shall cause an increase in the current export from all IIEG units
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sufficient to trigger thermal tripping of all IIEG units on the adjacent feeder. Ergo, it is
reasonable to conclude that for a low impedance three-phase fault, the thermal protection
of all IIEG units will operate before the DN line protection devices will attempt to isolate
an OOZ three-phase bolted fault. Hence, the failure of the FAT to converge during bolted
faults does not significant impact the integrity of the proposed PAT.

6.5

Tolerances in PAT Data

In order to illustrate the tolerances of the reports generated by the PAT, the limitations
of the accuracy of the FAT must be understood. The anomalies introduced by the FAT
are highlighted via the juxtaposition of results generated by the FAT and small-signal
modelling. The comparison was applied to the DN represented by the single line diagram
shown in Fig. 6.3 with data as presented in Table 6.1.
Some interesting anomalies occurred when comparing FAT results to small-signal simulations in instances of low impedance faults. In some cases, the FAT was able to converge
to a solution during disturbances too significant for the IIEG unit to operate as expected.
Generally, the cause is the IIEG unit’s controller being unable to maintain a constant
current (or in extreme cases, power) when a significant voltage unbalance occurs due to a
non-symmetrical low impedance fault.
Consider the case study where a zero impedance single-phase to earth fault is placed
immediately downstream of CT 1 on phase A at t=0.05 s. The voltage and current
waveforms of IIEG 1 are shown in Figs. 6.4 and 6.5, respectively. The magnitude of the
voltage waveforms is predicted by the FAT with great accuracy. The current waveforms,
however, are prone to a significant total harmonic distortion once the DN is exposed to the
fault. The IIEG constant power controller attempts to maintain the same current across
all three phases. The rms current is shown in Fig. 6.6. The rms current clearly shows that
Ic > Ia > Ib . The rms current predicted by the FAT is 3.935 A which is approximately
the mean current magnitude across the three phases. However, Ic is greater than the
expected rms current (Ic ≈ 4.1 A) and Ib is less than the expected rms current (Ib ≈ 3.7
A).
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Figure 6.3: Single Line Diagram

The current response is oscillatory and is a response to the fluctuating dq voltage and
current calculated by the controller. The fluctuating dq signals are a result of unbalance
in the measured waveforms. In order to capture the maximum expected current reference
signal deviation, the projected worst case scenario single-phase to earth reflected fault
was simulated using the code shown in Appendix B. The three-phase voltage and current
waveforms are converted into the dq axis and the reference angle is assumed to be regulated
such that Vq = 0. To illustrate the control response of the current reference signal, all LPFs
were simulated and the current reference was then calculated (by (3.22) in Chapter 3).
The A phase voltage was set to zero to simulate a low impedance single-phase to earth
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Table 6.1: Single Line Diagram Data

Infinite Bus Data
Voltage l-l rms (kV)
Frequency (Hz)

33000
50
Line Data

Resistance (Ω)
Inductance (mH)

0.5
5

Transformer Data
Primary Voltage l-l rms (V)
33000
Primary Winding Resistance (Ω)
0.01
Primary Winding Inductance (mH)
1
Primary Connection
Delta
Secondary Voltage l-l rms (V)
11000
Secondary Winding Resistance (Ω)
0.01
Secondary Winding Inductance (mH)
1
Secondary Connection
Wye-earthed
Load Data
Real Power (kW)
25
Reactive Power (kVAr)
0.5
Note: The equivalent resistance and inductance are connected in parallel.
IIEG Data
DC Voltage (V)
20000
Switching Frequency (kHz)
4
Filter Inductance (mH)
2245.37
Filter Capacitance (µF)
0.022
Power Setpoint (kVA)
50+j0
Low Pass Filter Cut-Off Frequency (Hz)
10

fault. The output plot is given in the Appendix B. The plot compares the current error
signal peaks with the voltage peaks. As most IIEG units export real power only, the peaks
of the current waveforms match the peaks of the voltage waveforms. The FAT predicts
a current export assuming that all three-phase currents are of equal magnitude and

2π
3

radians out of phase to be consistent with the expect operation of the constant power
defined in Chapter 3. Hence, the FAT assumes that Vd is constant and equal to the mean
value of the actual oscillatory Vd .
By matching the phase voltage peaks and troughs to the positions of the oscillatory current
error signal, the phase error percentages can be calculated to be: ∆Ia = −2.57%, ∆Ib =
−4.67% and ∆Ic = 6.22%. These errors are not attenuated by cosine filters as the resultant
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Figure 6.4: Voltage waveform of IIEG 1 Exposed to Close Proximity Single-Phase Fault

error manifests in the fundamental frequency. However, the errors are prone to the phase
shift caused by the PR controller (as well as errors induced by higher order harmonics).
Hence, the aforementioned percentage errors may be considered approximations of the
expected deviations in phase current magnitude during a single-phase to earth fault.
The results of Fig. 6.6 show errors of ∆Ia = −0.84%, ∆Ib = −5.75% and ∆Ic = 4.25%
which suggests that the effect of the PR is a slight negative phase shift at 100 Hz. The
peak current reference error due to the oscillatory Vd signal is 7.3%. Empirically, the
aforementioned simulations have shown that fundamental current magnitude differs by
no more than 7% as a result of extreme unbalance and the dynamics of the overall control scheme. A heuristical rule is thus proposed that a tolerance of 7% is required for
FAT simulations of current response of IIEG implementing the constant power controller
proposed in Chapter 3 when exposed to low impedance single-phase to earth faults.
The same test was repeated for a zero impedance line-to-line fault immediately downstream of CB 1 across phases A and B. As shown in Appendix B, the predicted current
error signal deviation during a line-to-line fault was shown to be 21.26 %. Upon running
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an equivalent small-signal model, IIEG 2’s controller was unable to regulate real and reactive power as the current export signal calculated by the controller was too volatile for
normal operation. The power export of IIEG 2 is shown in Fig. 6.7.
In cases of a large voltage drop caused by a three-phase bolted fault, errors are not
induced through an unbalance of signal. Rather, the current set point calculated within
the controller cannot be physically exported by the IIEG unit under such a significant fault
condition. Even if over-rating of the power electronics is employed within the inverter,
a greater DC voltage is required to export the desired current. The resultant waveform
contains heavy clipping as shown in Fig. 6.8.
Under such extreme fault circumstances, the results of the FAT are unreliable. It must
be stressed that the controllers are not designed to provide a smooth sinusoidal output
for extreme fault conditions. In practice, exposure to extreme faults will result in fast
tripping via I 2 t thermal protection. However, as shown in Chapter 5, the results of the
FAT are very accurate for higher impedance faults. The aforementioned errors can be
eliminated by employing an EIT current threshold that will nullify all fault conditions
where the IIEG controller is incapable of maintaining constant power and/or constant
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Figure 6.6: rms Current of IIEG 1 Exposed to Close Proximity Single-Phase Fault

current conditions. The FAT and PAT are predicated on both conditions being met when
an IIEG unit is exposed to a fault.
The FAT is incapable of simulating sub-transient responses within a DN. However, the
small-signal simulation platform passes all rms and sequence plots through a cosine filter
of sixteen samples per cycle in order to be commensurate with protective relay devices.
Hence, any brief sub-transient responses to disturbance in the grid are attenuated by
protection devices and have little or no effect on the protection response. Therefore, the
omission of short-term sub-transients does not negatively impact the integrity of the FAT
nor PAT.
The PAT attempts to capture the worst case scenario fault instances for protection integrity analysis. The PAT takes into account the possibility of over-rated power electronic
switches within IIEG units for fault ride-through purposes. The FAT assumes that the
power set points of the control system can be realised during steady-state operation. In
instances where an IIEG unit’s control scheme and AC filter are subjected to a condition
that does not allow the power set points to be realised, the resultant steady-state current
will likely exceed the rated current of the inverter. The implementation of FCL or EIT can
aid in providing a more realistic evaluation of a contemporary DN’s protection scheme.
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Figure 6.7: Power Set-Point Failure During Reflected Line-to-Line Fault

Various simulations showed that convergence is achieved for all single-phase to earth and
line-to-line faults as at least one phase voltage remains at approximately the nominal
value, irrespective of transformer winding connections and fault locations. However, the
predicted fault response may not provide an accurate representation of the true fault
response of an IIEG unit. Hence, to mitigate misleading data, an EIT should be implemented in accordance with the capability of IIEG units.

6.6

PAT Case Study

The PAT has been applied to the circuit shown in Fig. 6.9. The network data is given in
Table 6.1. The generated reports of the following cases are shown in Appendix C:

• No FCL nor EIT implemented.
• EIT threshold of 1.2 is implemented.
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Figure 6.8: Current Export of IIEG 3

Both reports contain 22 cases of convergence error. The errors are reported within the
MATLAB command window but are not explicitly included within the report. An analysis
of the errors showed that all were instances of three-phase bolted faults immediately
downstream of CT 1 and CT 2. For every fault location and type, every IIEG combination
is considered. As there are four IIEG units, there are 24 simulations for every fault case in
the example network. Consider the sixteen simulations for a three-phase fault immediately
downstream of CT 1. Eight of the simulations will contain IIEG 1 which is incapable of
convergence (when connected) as IIEG 1 is completely devoid of voltage and frequency
regulation. Secondly, consider the sixteen simulations with a three-phase fault at CT 2.
Fourteen of the simulations will contain IIEG 2, IIEG 3 or IIEG 4 which are similarly
incapable of convergence without frequency and voltage regulation. Hence, there are a
total of 22 cases of convergence error which are unavoidable using the PAT, but are also
non-essential from a protection analysis perspective as explained in Section 6.4.
The reports show subtle differences in expected minimum, maximum and OOZ fault
currents when the EIT is implemented. The peak load is unchanged as EIT thresholds
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Figure 6.9: Single Line Diagram

are not met during healthy conditions. In order to provide a partial verification for the
presented reports, a few cases were chosen to compare the small-signal modelling with the
results of the generated report. Examples for PAT report interpretation for the following
cases are also included. The chosen cases were:

• the peak current at CT 1.
• the OOZ current at CT 2.
• the pick-up current at CT 3.
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• the maximum current at CT 4.

6.6.1

Peak Current at CT 1

In a DN with a high EG penetration, there are two possible peak current conditions for
every protection device that may occur during healthy conditions:

• Forward flowing current: peak loading downstream of a protection device with no
local IIEG availability.
• Reverse flowing current: low loading downstream of a protection device with maximum local IIEG availability.

The presence of upstream IIEG (or IIEG on adjacent feeders) can both increase and
decrease the peak current flowing through a CT and therefore must be taken into consideration. The PAT considers all combinations of IIEG connection to determine the peak
current for every protection device under healthy conditions.
A small-signal analysis of the network in Fig. 6.9 was simulated with IIEG 1 disconnected
and all other IIEG units connected. This simulation represents the forward flowing current
condition. The rms currents observed after passing through the cosine filter are shown in
Fig. 6.10. All rms currents overlap as the DN is balanced.
The current passing through CT 1 under peak conditions as observed by the cosine filter
during the small-signal analysis is 1.3121 A, which is below the value generated by the
report 1.3123 A, which was determined by the PAT (see Appendix C). The discrepancy
exists because the forward flowing condition did not provide the peak current for CT 1 in
the PAT’s analysis.
A second small-signal analysis of the network in Fig. 6.9 was simulated with IIEG 1
connected and all other IIEG units disconnected. This simulation represents the reverse
flowing current condition. The rms currents observed after passing through the cosine
filter are shown in Fig. 6.11.
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Figure 6.11: CT 1 rms Current under Peak Load Condition II
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Figure 6.12: CT 1 rms Current under Peak Load Condition II

The theoretical current flowing through CT 1 according to the FAT is 1.312349 A, which is
consistent with the PAT’s peak loading value. However, the rms current measured by the
cosine filter is approximately 1.24 A, well below the current observed in the forward flowing
current condition. The discrepancy between the small-signal simulation and FAT results
can be attributed to the large impedance between IIEG 1 and equivalent load. Each IIEG
unit’s control scheme was designed under the assumption that the power export would
be consumed locally. This assumption is not satisfied during the reverse flowing current
case. The power export of IIEG 1 is shown in Fig. 6.12 and is not operating at 50 kW
unity power factor as assumed by the FAT.
A small discrepancy in the predicted peak current arose during the reverse flowing current
condition. Whilst the error is in an order of magnitude that shall not negatively impact a
protection scheme, it is essential to recognise that the PAT assumes that each IIEG unit
is capable of exporting the desired power for all conditions. The reverse flowing current
condition represents an extreme case where the IIEG power export on a feeder was double
the local load. Such a condition could be eliminated through use of storage devices or
careful DN planning.
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The presence of IIEG on the adjacent feeder reduces the current demand of the zone
substation, raising the voltage at the zone substation busbar (ignoring voltage regulation
via tap-changers). Depending on the load, the voltage rise could increase or reduce the
current passing through CT 1. In the simulations presented in this Thesis, all loads are
constant impedance. Hence, a higher voltage usually implies a higher current drawn by a
load. However, a constant power load may have an inverse relationship between voltage
and the current drawn by a load. Ergo, every IIEG combination should be examined and
compared to capture the true peak load situation from the perspective of any protective
device.
The EIT thresholds were not exceeded by any IIEG unit during peak conditions. Therefore, the reported peak current is common across both reports. Hence, when the protection
engineer is selecting the pick-up current setting, the peak current of the relevant CT within
the PAT report may be used as a reliable source. The peak current is then increased to
compensate for forecasted peak load and may then be used in (6.4).

6.6.2

OOZ Current at CT 2

Referring to the PAT report for CT 2 in Appendix C, there exist two OOZ cases for OC
and EF protection. There exist are four protection zones in total, each corresponding
to the CT immediately upstream of each zone (the CT corresponding to the CB that
should trip first for a fault within a designated protection zone). The protection zones are
illustrated in Fig. 6.13 for clarity. The primary and secondary zones of CT 2 correspond
to zones of protection 2 and 3, respectively. Hence. the zones of protection 2 and 3 are
considered to be in-zone and are excluded from OOZ protection analysis.
The purpose of OOZ analysis is to identify instances of possible nuisance tripping. The
presence of IIEG can provide reverse fault current through a protective device which
may instigate an unnecessary trip for a fault outside of a protection device’s zone of
protection. The identification of the plausibility of such a loss of discrimination may be
easily remedied through either a change in pick-up protection settings or installation of a
directional element with OC protection.
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Figure 6.13: Single Line Diagram with Zones of Protection

Consider the case where no EIT is used in the PAT. The OC and EF OOZ fault currents of
zone of protection 4 are significantly higher than the fault currents of zone of protection 1.
However, as zone of protection 4 is downstream of CT 2, no discrimination problems will
arise provided the IDMT curves between zone CT 2, CT 3 and CT 4 are graded properly.
A small-signal model of the example network was run with a single-phase to earth fault
placed immediately downstream of CT 1, representing the worst case scenario for an OOZ
fault from CT 2’s perspective. The rms current and current waveform flowing through
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Figure 6.14: CT 2 rms Current with Reverse Current Flow

CT 2 are shown in Figs. 6.14 and 6.15, respectively. Note that the small-signal current
waveform is superimposed with the FAT approximation. The current waveform is heavily
distorted due to the significant voltage unbalance at the IIEG unit’s PCC. The control
dynamics of the inverter and the AC filter are not designed to provide a smooth sinusoidal waveform during such significant disturbances. The steady-state rms current is
11.71 ± 0.14 A which closely matches the predicted OOZ EF current of the PAT which
was 11.742 A. Hence, the PAT result has accurately capture the worst case scenario EF
condition for CT 2.
A three-phase fault immediately downstream of CT 2 rendered the FAT unsolvable as
the voltage drop on the adjacent feeder was too significant to allow voltage commutation.
Hence, the results from such a situation are excluded. However, as explained in Section
6.4, the significant voltage drop at each IIEG unit’s PCC will likely result in a fast thermal
trip, isolating the IIEG prior to the operation of any line protection devices. Hence, the
three-phase fault case may be ignored without compromising the integrity of the PAT.
A line-to-line fault was placed immediately downstream of CT 2 across phases A and B
at t = 0.05 s. The fault response predicted by the FAT proved to be significantly different
from the small-signal simulation. The controller of each IIEG was unable to maintain
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the specified power set points 50,000+j0 VA. The power export of IIEG 2 is shown in
Fig. 6.16. The power calculation within the small-signal environment requires a cycle of
voltage and current data before plotting the real and reactive powers. Hence, the first
0.02 seconds of power data are omitted.
In practice, all IIEG would be isolated via thermal protection due to large fault current drawn from each IIEG unit; failure to quickly isolate the IIEG would result in fast
destruction of the inverter interface. Hence, the fault contribution of IIEG does not significantly affect the protection efficacy of the DN line protection and can be ignored from
consideration in the PAT using the EIT.
The PAT report employing EIT in Appendix C shows that the maximum fault current
flowing through CT 2 during any fault in CT 1’s zone of protection is less than the peak
current. However, the PAT examines only SOZ and EOZ faults. There may exist a point
within CT 1’s zone of protection which defines the threshold where the fault current of
IIEG 2 does not exceed the EIT threshold. The true maximum OOZ fault current flowing
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Figure 6.16: IIEG 2 Power Export during Low Impedance Line-to-Line Fault

through CT 2 for a fault in CT 1 lies between the values indicated by the two reports. If
the worst case report can be satisfied within the scope of (6.4), then no further exploration
is necessary. However, if tolerances on the pick-up current do not satisfy the worst case
scenario, supplementary FAT or small-signal simulations will be necessary to capture the
true OOZ fault current in this case.
Supplementary simulations will explore faults midway through a zone of protection, rather
than the extremities. The desired fault location will incite the maximum fault current
through CT 2 without IIEG 2 from tripping due to thermal tripping. An algorithm to
automate the desired fault location is outside the scope of the PAT, but represents an
opportunity for future work.
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Pick-up current at CT 3.

Pick up currents are determined through an analysis of forecasted peak load, OOZ fault
events and the minimum expected fault current for a given zone of protection. EOZ faults
will generally not necessitate fast tripping of IIEG units upstream of the fault unless an
IIEG unit is in very close proximity to the fault.
Consider the case where a low impedance single-phase to earth fault is placed at CT 3’s
EOZ. IIEG 3 and IIEG 4 both exceed the threshold for an EIT. The PAT report predicts
a primary earth fault pick-up current of 535.49 A without the EIT and 535.65 A with
the EIT. The implementation of an EIT generally offers only a minor change in pick-up
settings. The increased predicted fault current of the EIT case compared to the non-EIT
case can be attributed to the effect of IIEG 3 on the fault current. A decrease in the fault
current flowing through a protection device occurs whenever an IIEG unit is exporting
real power in between that protection device and a fault. The discrepancy in the PAT
report is caused by the EIT case omitting the connection of IIEG 3 during the fault as the
current threshold of IIEG 3 is exceeded; the non-EIT case does not exclude the connection
of IIEG 3.
Two cases of the observed fault current of CT 3 during the single-phase to earth fault are
shown in Figs. 6.17 and 6.18. Fig. 6.17 is the rms current when IIEG 3 is connected; Fig.
6.18 is the rms current when IIEG 3 is disconnected.
The PAT predicted fault currents of 535.49 A when IIEG 3 is connected and 535.65 A
when IIEG 3 is disconnected. The small-signal results yield a fault current of 535.50 A
when IIEG 3 is connected and 535.65 A when IIEG is disconnected. Hence, the PAT is
capable of discerning the subtle effects of IIEG connection (and disconnection) on the
required pick-up currents within a tolerance reasonable for DN line protection devices.
The minimum fault current is the final piece of information required for determination of
an acceptable pick-up EF current, which is redefined in (6.6).

max[Iunbalance , Iout of zone faults ] < Ip.u. < k · min[Iin-zone faults ]

(6.6)
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Figure 6.17: CT 3 rms Current with IIEG 3 Connected
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The aforementioned results found a minimum in-zone EF current of 535.49 A. Hence,
min[Iin-zone faults ] = 535.49 A. Using the information in the PAT reports found in Appendix C, and OOZ cases can be found. The PAT report without the EIT has a maximum OOZ EF current of Iout of zone faults = 7.84 A. The PAT report with the EIT has
only a slight variation in OOZ EF. There is no unbalance within the simulated networks;
hence, Iunbalance = 0 A. A FAT tolerance error does not need to be included as only high
impedance faults are assessed in pick-up current determination. Choosing a hypothetical
forecasted peak load of 2 times the current peak load and k = 0.5, the range of acceptable
EF pick-up currents can be expressed as (6.7).

15.68 < Ip.u. < 267.75

(6.7)

The process can be repeated similarly for the OC pick-up settings by employing (6.4).
The peak current is available in the PAT; however, forecasting is necessary to determine
the value of Iforecasted peak .

6.6.4

Maximum current at CT 4.

The maximum current reported in Appendix C by the PAT is 540.27 A which occurs
during a three-phase bolted fault immediately downstream of CT 4. When the EIT option
is employed, the maximum anticipated fault current is reduced to 535.28 A. IIEG 4 is
excluded from the simulation as all IIEG downstream of a three-phase bolted fault are
incapable of voltage and frequency regulation. IIEG 2 and IIEG 3 both exceed the EIT
current threshold and are therefore excluded during the EIT case.
A small-signal model of the same DN with a three-phase bolted fault placed immediately
downstream of CT 4 was simulated. The rms currents and voltages measured by CT 4
are shown in Fig. 6.19 with all IIEG connected (reflecting the non-EIT case) and Fig. 6.20
with IIEG 2 and IIEG 3 disconnected (reflecting the EIT case). Note that the voltages
across the CTs are very small due to the low impedance of the CTs and overlap the time
axis.
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Figure 6.19: CT 4 rms Current with IIEG 2 and IIEG 3 Connected
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Figure 6.20: CT 4 rms Current with IIEG 2 and IIEG 3 Disconnected
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Figure 6.21: Voltage at Terminals of IIEG 3

The rms current measured by the small-signal simulation with all IIEG connected is
544.4 ± 0.3 A which is significantly higher than the maximum fault current predicted by
the PAT (540.27 A). Once again, the error is a result of an IIEG unit’s inability to provide
the constant power and constant current on which the PAT scheme is predicated. The
most extreme case is IIEG 3 where the voltage drops to approximately 14% of the prefault
voltage as shown in Fig. 6.21. The current exported by IIEG 3 and the current predicted
by the FAT are shown in Fig. 6.22. The current waveform is clearly prone to clipping as
the IIEG unit is incapable of exporting such a high current.
The rms current measured by the small-signal simulation with IIEG 2 and IIEG 3 disconnected is 535.1 ± 0.3 A which is within range of the maximum fault current predicted
by the PAT (535.28 A). Once again, the results of the PAT for extreme faults are unreliable without the application of an EIT. An appropriate setting for EIT is pivotal to the
integrity of the PAT scheme unless IIEG units are over-rated and designed such that the
desired constant power and constant current output is achieved.
The results within the PAT predicting the maximum current flowing through a CT can
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Figure 6.22: Current Export of IIEG 3

aid in the appropriate selection of CBs. The PAT data in Appendix C reveals the impacts
of IIEG connection on fault currents with and without the application of an EIT. The
EIT option reveals a more realistic requirement of the maximum fault current that will
flow through a CB assuming IIEG units will trip due to thermal overloading for low
impedance faults. However, if the CB is rated higher than the maximum fault current
predicted without application of the EIT, then the CB is correctly selected such that
all faults can be cleared in instances of IIEG protection failure and significant inverter
over-rating.
Maximum fault currents are the most likely candidate for errors in calculations within the
FAT. If the EIT is incorporated into the PAT, then this error should be minimised. For
single-phase to earth faults, an error of 7% should be added to the contribution of IIEG
fault current. For all other fault types, it may be assumed that either a thermal trip will
isolated the IIEG unit or the voltage drop at the PCC of the IIEG unit is insufficient to
create a significant error in the IIEG unit’s fault current.

Chapter 6. Protection Analysis Tool

6.7

175

Conclusion

The PAT has proven to be an effective means of analysing the protection adequacy of a DN
with a high IIEG penetration if the tolerances of the tool and IIEG unit’s are taken into
consideration. The constant power control scheme adopted in the small-signal modelling
(which was introduced in Chapter 3) was shown to be ineffective in achieving the desired
output for extreme fault conditions. In all cases of significant voltage drop at the terminals
of an IIEG, the controller was unable to maintain the desired constant power export and/or
a balanced current export. Hence, for the adopted controller, implementation of an EIT is
essential in maintaining the accuracy of the results generated by the PAT. Alternatively,
an FCL could be utilised thus removing the risk of excessive fault current be drawn from
IIEG units under fault conditions.
The limitations of the PAT to adequately represent the actual fault response of an IIEG
unit are generally made redundant by the thermal tripping feature of IIEG units. For the
IIEG unit’s controller to be unable to export the desired power set points, a significant
fault current will always be drawn, triggering the thermal trip.
Examples of how the PAT may be applied to a DN have been included. The PAT is simply
an aid is the process of determining appropriate CB ratings and OC/EF relay protection
settings. The PAT must in practice be supplemented with data captured by SCADA, DN
line data as well as expectations of demand growth. The connection of a large IIEG unit
may preclude DN protection adequacy; the PAT is a very useful tool for this purpose. If
the proliferation of IIEG continued in Australian DNs, the applications for the PAT will
become apparent.
Future work involves verifying the application of FCLs to the PAT and defining the power
factor utilised when the FCL is applied. Furthermore, the ability for the threshold fault
locations where a maximum OOZ fault event occurs without triggering an EIT could be
of significant value in DNs where protection discrimination is difficult to achieve.

Chapter 7

Proposed Microgrid Design
Philosophy
7.1

Introduction

Chapters 3 through 6 have focused on methods allowing for the increased presence of
IIEG in DNs. If IIEG penetration levels grow past 100% of local load, an opportunity for
isolated and autonomous segments of DNs arises. The concept of autonomous segments
of DNs is otherwise known as the microgrid.
This chapter proposes a microgrid control and design philosophy that will ensure adequate
fault discrimination during intentional islanding. Fault discrimination is assured through a
novel autonomous IIEG controller, alterations to transformer winding connections within
microgrids and the voltage sequence detection protection scheme. Small signal modelling
results within the MATLAB environment yield a proof of concept for the proposed controller, microgrid design philosophy and protection scheme. Further research is required
to prototype the proposed microgrid design philosophy.
The proposed microgrid design philosophy is not intended to assimilate the various microgrid design philosophies asserted by other authors as outlined in Chapter 2. Rather, the
proposed microgrid design philosophy simply adopts the preferred microgrid attributes
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and applies these attributes to an envisaged microgrid deployment that is retrofitted with
Australian distribution networks. Hence, minimal changes to existing distribution network
design philosophy are recommended – the most significant change exists in the installation of reliable medium-scale IIEGs coupled to distribution networks. Medium scale IIEG
units are defined to be three-phase, over 30 kW in size, highly reliable and must be galvanically isolated from all loads through a wye-wye transformer. The presence of reliable
medium-scale IIEGs is vital to ensure sufficient local generation is available to meet the
demand of an island and adequate power quality can be maintained.

7.2

The Motivation for Microgrids

The contemporary microgrid concept is a vision for maximising reliability in DNs. The
renewable nature of most small and medium-scale IIEG is attractive from an environmental perspective and possesses the potential to be lucrative through carbon pricing (if
such a scheme is permanently implemented). However, due to the intermittent behaviour
of IIEG energy resources, a significant storage capacity is an essential segment of any
network. These large storage units constitute an important part of medium-scale IIEG.
The presence of storage negates issues concerned with steady state voltage levels and
can provide superior stability, protection discrimination and reliability properties if well
designed.
Medium-scale generation is presently incapable of satisfactory operation when in autonomous mode. Hence, pre-existing systems will require a significant investment in
control, storage and protection systems in order to render microgrid operation permissible. Furthermore, new systems would have to be added to bolster the EG penetration
level of a microgrid in excess of 100% of peak demand. The implementation of the proposed microgrid philosophy is primarily the deployment of new infrastructure with limited
manipulations of older infrastructure.
Due to the sizing and location of medium scale EG, much of the cost is borne by investors,
rather than the government bodies. A highly capitalistic economic structure such as
the Australian economy would thrive if adequate returns could be achieved. The most
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significant cost to the utility would be the deployment of communications infrastructure
between medium scale IIEG units and microgrid DN devices. A cost-benefit analysis is
beyond the scope of this Thesis; however, if DN reliability decreases due to deregulation
and the increase in the frequency of natural disasters, microgrids may become the only
viable alternative for many customers whom cannot sacrifice supply and for the utility
that wants to defer infrastructure upgrades.
The focus of this Chapter is the development of a microgrid philosophy which allows for
adequate fault discrimination. IIEG are used instead of traditional synchronous machinebased generation; hence, traditional OC and EF techniques are insufficient for fault identification. Protection is only one of several technical challenges that must be overcome
within microgrid design philosophy. Islanded microgrid stability is an important issue
that will require further research before this design philosophy can be accepted. Voltage,
frequency and reactive power support can all be achieved in principle using the droop
controller defined in Chapter 3 and through EG coordination as elaborated within this
Chapter. Disconnection and reconnection with the grid is explored in this Chapter briefly,
but again requires significant investigation before the proposed microgrid design philosophy can be accepted. Furthermore, the proposed earthing and transformer connection
is a topic of controversy: the balance between cost, electrical safety and robustness of
microgrid operation a topic requiring further debate.

7.3
7.3.1

Microgrid Components
Static Transfer Switch

A static transfer switch (STS) is a microgrid component implemented to separate and
reconnect a microgrid with a larger grid. However, when considering a more modular
microgrid, each STS defines a point of modularity: a point where any segment of a
network can be divided or adjoined to any other segment of a network where intentional
islanding is permitted. The functionality of a STS must include:

• the ability to communicate with all other local STSs and IIEG units;
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• the ability to deliberate whether intentional islanding of a microgrid meets certain
requirements;
• the ability to detect LOM;
• the ability to disconnect and resynchronise with the grid, which requires:
– the ability to measure the voltage difference across the circuit breaker when
open, and;
– the standard protection and fault isolation capabilities of contemporary reclosers.

The envisaged STS is essentially an advanced form of recloser that has been modified to
allow for grid resynchronisation and advanced coordination with other protection devices
and IIEG units. Grid resynchronisation can be achieved via zero voltage difference detection across the open terminals of the STS. The voltage waveforms on each side of the STS
will eventually reach zero phase difference due to slight frequency discrepancies between
the segregated networks [44]. Islanded microgrids are controlled using a droop control
scheme; a very slight real power deviation from nominal will result in a non-nominal
island frequency. The impacts of resynchronising the proposed microgrid on network stability are beyond the scope of this Thesis, yet are an important topic for future research.
It is envisaged that, if the microgrid becomes commonplace, eventually every DN recloser
will have the ability to behave as a STS to allow for any future upgrades of a network
segment.

7.3.2

Transformers

Each load and small-scale IIEG unit must be interfaced with the grid through a threephase delta-wye transformer. The wye side must be solidly earthed to be commensurate
with AS/NZS 3000:2007 [64]. In urban locations in Australia, the use of three-phase deltawye transformers is wide-spread; hence, little modification of existing infrastructure would
be necessary. In rural applications, there exists many single phase transformers. However,
rural applications tend to have significant impedances between loads. It is uneconomical
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to design and implement a microgrid when exporting power to any neighbours requires a
significant upgrade of power lines. In the case where high reliability is necessary, the most
economical solution is an uninterruptable power supply, usually a diesel generator and
flywheel. Hence, the assumption that all customers in a microgrid are connected through
a three-phase delta-wye transformer can be considered reasonable.
All medium-scale IIEG units within the proposed microgrid design philosophy must be
interfaced within the grid through a wye-wye transformer. Both star points of the transformer must be solidly earthed. The use of wye-wye transformers in distribution networks
has been avoided, mainly due to the impacts of multiple zero sequence paths on sensitive earth fault protection and power quality. Consequently, an analysis of sensitive
earth fault reach must be conducted for a proposed microgrid before the proposed microgrid design philosophy can be adopted. Furthermore, the use of wye-wye transformers
will preclude the zero sequence harmonic attenuation normally associated with delta connected transformer windings. Where harmonics are considered to be a problem, harmonic
compensation can be achieved through IIEG control [74].
From a microgrid perspective, there are significant benefits of having an IIEG unit connected through a wye-wye transformer. The rated voltage of an inverter interface is not
necessarily the grid voltage; hence, a transformer can be useful in stepping up the voltage.
The transformer also behaves similarly to a series connected inductor providing a filtering
function which is useful when attenuating voltage waveform distortion. Finally, a wyewye transformer allows measurable zero sequence voltage at the terminal of an IIEG unit.
Since all loads are connected through delta-wye transformers, no zero sequence voltage
will be present at any load terminals. Hence, all zero sequence voltage can only be instigated by shunt elements such as capacitances between lines and earth and earth faults.
Given that the lengths of lines in a microgrid are in the order of only a few kilometres,
the shunt reactances between power lines and the earth are very large and can generally
be neglected during fault calculations. Hence, the use of wye-wye connected transformers is beneficial for the detection of high-impedance single-phase to earth faults without
resorting to complicated energy spectral methods such as those proposed by [62].
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It is important to note that zero sequence current flow can also be achieved if a wye
earthed-delta transformer is installed at each IIEG unit (where the delta connection is
on the IIEG side). Furthermore, triplen harmonic attenuation can be achieved through
use of a wye-delta transformer. However, the current and voltage measurements would
need to be made on the high voltage side for zero sequence current and voltage detection
which would likely necessitate extra expenditure on CTs and VTs. There would be little
benefit from a the line protection’s SEF adequacy perspective. Hence, the use of wye-wye
connected transformers for medium-scale IIEG interconnection is preferred and adopted
within this Thesis.

7.3.3

Embedded Generation

All EG units are to be coupled to a microgrid via an inverter interface. The inverter
interface provides decoupling of the energy resource dynamics from the grid [18]. The
inverter interface can be controlled to provide significant versatility regarding control
characteristics given the voltage and current ratings of the internal power electronics are
not exceeded. The block diagram of the control scheme was given in Chapter 3. In
order to prevent damage to IGBTs, voltage protection is provided as well the option of
a fault current limiter which is included within the control scheme. The inverter control
scheme employs droop control and maintains an equal current magnitude and 120o phase
shift across all three phases. Maintaining the current across all three phases can induce
a significant over-voltage during unbalanced faults. The inverter and AC filter must be
designed to withstand short term over-voltages; in particular, the AC filter capacitors and
inverter IGBTs should be selected such that an over voltage can be sustained until the
voltage sequence protection isolates the IIEG.
Instances of over voltage are already possible in existing distribution networks during
single-phase to earth faults as IIEG units are coupled to the grid through a delta-wye
transformer. The voltage may rise to 173% of nominal on the grid side of the transformer
[26]. A single-phase to earth fault using the proposed control scheme connected through
a wye-wye transformer can yield a maximum theoretical voltage rise of 150% on the grid
side of the transformer; hence, the proposed microgrid design philosophy is preferable
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to contemporary IIEG unit control and transformer connection from the grid’s voltage
profile perspective. In theory, if the proposed autonomous controller was exposed to a
line-to-line fault, an even higher voltage would arise; however, the proposed autonomous
controller is incapable of providing a balanced current output when two phase voltages
are subject to a significant voltage drop. The IIEG unit’s voltages will not exceed 150%
of the nominal voltage during fault conditions. The over-rating of IIEG units and DN
infrastructure is critical to the adequacy of the autonomous controller and protection
scheme for intentional islanding operation.
The proposed control scheme of the IIEG unit ensures that the positive sequence voltage is maintained within a certain range as determined by the droop controller. Whilst
the phase-to-earth voltages may be significantly unbalanced during a single-phase to earth
fault on an HV line, the line-to-line voltages remain near balanced and provide a near nominal voltage. Hence, no extra losses attributable to zero sequence unbalance are present
in the delta-wye connected distribution transformers. Furthermore, due to all loads being interfaced to the microgrid through a delta-wye connected transformer, no significant
voltage unbalance will occur at the terminals of the load. Hence, the only important
considerations are the voltage ratings of the IIEG and the line-to-earth insulation of the
HV infrastructure within the microgrid.

7.4

Communications

A communications medium must exist between line protection devices, STSs and mediumscale IIEG. Under the proposed scheme, communications failure between devices will preclude autonomous operation of the microgrid. Intentional islanding can only be permitted
when communications are healthy, sufficient generation is present and the island is protectable. The communications protocol and medium are considered outside the scope of
this Thesis. Rather, the necessary information between devices is asserted and the transmission time of signals is assumed to be in the order of hundreds of milliseconds [110]. It
is important to note that the communications medium is not necessary for fault detection.
Rather, the communications medium is used to advise the STS of the presence and state
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of each protection device and IIEG to disseminate permission for intentional islanding of
a microgrid.
A failure in the communications medium will void permission for intentional islanding.
The microgrid will operate in grid-connected mode only commensurate with contemporary
IIEG control and protection. Anti-islanding protection will isolate each IIEG when LOM
is detected.
The transmitted data shall be sent in packets. The general format of a single packet is:

• Packet ID Number (PXXX)
• From Device ID Number (STSXXX, RECXXX or IIEGXXX)
• To Device ID Number (STSXXX, RECXXX or IIEGXXX)
• From Device Type (STS, REC or IIEG)
• From Device CB State (0=open, 1=closed)
• Trip Request (0=open, 1=close or N/A if type==IIEG or REC as these do not
dispatch trip request)
• From Device Mode (0=grid-connected, 1=autonomous or N/A if type==STS)
• Mode Shift Request (0=grid-connected, 1=autonomous or N/A if type==REC or
IIEG)
• From Device Complex Power Availability (X+jY or N/A if type==REC or IIEG)
• Last Received Packet ID Number from To Device (PXXX)

Consider the case where Device STS001 is sending a packet with ID No. P002 to Device
IIEG003 after receiving packet ID No. P001. The STS has just opened and is requesting
all IIEG units to shift to islanding mode. The packet P002 shall contain the following
information:

• Packet ID Number (P002)
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• From Device ID Number (STS001)
• To Device ID Number (IIEG003)
• From Device Type (STS)
• From Device CB State (0)
• Trip Request (0)
• From Device Mode (N/A)
• Mode Shift Request (1)
• From Device Complex Power Availability (N/A)
• Last Received Packet ID Number from To Device (P001)

Upon Device IIEG003 receiving the data, the IIEG will shift to autonomous mode and
send the following packet:

• Packet ID Number (P003)
• From Device ID Number (IIEG003)
• To Device ID Number (STS001)
• From Device Type (IIEG)
• From Device CB State (1)
• Trip Request (N/A)
• From Device Mode (1)
• Mode Shift Request (N/A)
• From Device Complex Power Availability (10000+j4000)
• Last Received Packet ID Number from To Device (P002)
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Figure 7.1: Example Island

7.5

Protection

All medium-scale EG units are to be fitted with anti-islanding protection commensurate
with AS 4777.3 [16]. In the event of communications failure or insufficient generation
within an island, IIEG protection should operate exactly as contemporary Australian
Standards require. However, anti-islanding protection shall be by-passed if an intentional
island is formed, constituting autonomous operation of IIEG units.
A common complication identified within microgrid protection research is the discrimination of high impedance single-phase to earth faults [48, 50]. Consider the intentional
island shown in Fig. 7.1.
The proposed microgrid design philosophy provides galvanic isolation of unbalanced loads
through delta-wye connected transformers. The delta connection prevents the flow of zero
sequence current through the high voltage side of a transformer irrespective of any loading
unbalance. Furthermore, each autonomously controlled IIEG unit exports only positive
sequence current; hence, ideally no zero sequence current is drawn during single phase to
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Figure 7.2: Sequence Component Circuit for Single-Phase to Earth Fault

earth faults on the high voltage line. Hence, the symmetrical component representation
of the circuit with a single-phase to earth fault can be constructed as in Fig. 7.2.
The transformer connections and IIEG unit controller ensure that no fault current flows
(If = 0). Kirchoff’s Voltage Law yields V0 + V1 + V2 = 0. V2 = If Z2 = 0 by Ohm’s
Law. Hence, V0 = −V1 . There exists a positive sequence voltage drop between the IIEG
unit’s positive sequence voltage VEG1 and V1 , but no zero sequence voltage drop between
the IIEG unit’s zero sequence voltage VEG0 and V0 . The positive sequence voltage drop
is unchanged by the faulted condition; hence, the end of line voltage magnitude will
remain within normal voltage bounds. Subsequently, the magnitude of the zero sequence
voltage measurable at the IIEG unit’s PCC must also be within normal positive sequence
voltage bounds. Therefore, single-phase to earth faults will always be detectable under
the proposed microgrid design philosophy irrespective of the fault impedance.
In practice, a small zero sequence and negative sequence current will be drawn from the
IIEG unit under fault conditions. However, the magnitudes of these undesirable sequence
components are acceptably small (as shown in Chapter 5) and will yield no discrimination
issues with the proposed protection scheme.
A block diagram of the proposed protection relay is shown in Fig. 7.3. A voltage transformer is unnecessary for low voltage applications, but may be required in some higher
voltage applications. A cosine filter is common in modern protection applications and is
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Figure 7.3: Voltage Sequence Protection

implemented to attenuate any DC components or harmonics that may be present in the
measured voltage waveform [108]. The output of the cosine filter contains three-phase
vector representations of the voltage waveforms. These vectors are transformed into sequence components by (7.1). The modulus of the sequence components is then compared
with a set of thresholds; if any threshold condition is violated for a predetermined amount
of time, a signal is sent to the trip coil instigating the isolation of the IIEG unit.
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(7.1)

The use of the island protection scheme does not preclude the necessity for rating IIEG
technology and microgrid infrastructure to sustain an over voltage. The efficacy of the
proposed island protection scheme is predicated on the presence of under/over voltages
and voltage unbalance during faults within an island.
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Figure 7.4: Logic for Intentional Islanding

7.6
7.6.1

Modes of Microgrid Operation
Grid Connected Mode

During grid connected operation, the DN should possess all control and protection features of contemporary DNs. Hence, constant power control and anti-islanding protection
commensurate with AS4777.3 is employed [16]. Throughout all modes of operation, packets of information are transmitted between devices. Hence, when in grid connected mode,
the STS is determining whether intentional islanding of the microgrid should be permitted
if an island is formed.

7.6.2

Shift from Grid Connected to Autonomous Mode

A communications medium is necessary to coordinate control and protection during autonomous operation of a microgrid. Without communications, intentional islanding is
forbidden under the proposed microgrid scheme. The shift to autonomous mode is instigated by either an advisory trip signal from an upstream protection device or detection
of LOM by the STS. Furthermore, for intentional islanding to the permissible, the STS
logic must be satisfied that sufficient supply is available in the island. The logic diagram
for intentional islanding is shown in Fig. 7.4.
The STS controller must ensure that both the real and reactive power demand of an
island is met. The Σ block adds the complex power availabilities which are part of the
communicated packets as defined in Section 7.3. The value Speak can be determined using
historical data and will be variable throughout the day. An arbitrary time step may
be imposed for the updating of power availability and demand. A significant amount of
storage must be present in the microgrid if renewable energy resources are to be employed.
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Figure 7.5: Logic for Inter-Trip or Autonomous Mode Shift

The availability value may be determined using the maximum real and reactive power
capabilities programmed into the autonomous controller if sufficient energy storage is
present for a dedicated time period. If communications to an IIEG unit are lost or if an
IIEG unit has tripped, the power availability will be set to zero.
Once the STS is open, either a shift to intentional island signal or an inter-trip signal is
dispatched to all IIEG units as shown in Fig. 7.5.
All IIEG units are equipped with anti-islanding protection. Consider the case where some
generators have lost the ability to communicate with the STS. If sufficient generation is
deemed to be present by the STS, intentional islanding is permissible. All IIEG with
failed communications will export constant power whilst the frequency, voltage and load
following requirements of the island are be met by the IIEG with a functional communications link. If insufficient generation is identified by the STS, all IIEG with healthy
communications will trip and all other generators will still be isolated via anti-islanding
protection.
Traditional reclose attempts are not employed with the proposed controller. Reconnection
to the mains is achieved through implementation of a synchronisation module once mains
supply has returned.

7.6.3

Autonomous Mode

Whilst in autonomous mode, the STS continues to monitor the available power and will
dispatch an inter-trip signal if insufficient generation is available. All IIEG with healthy
communications are operating in droop control mode. Voltage sequence protection shall
be employed by all IIEG units with healthy communications.
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Shift from Autonomous Mode to Grid Connected

When the STS has established that mains supply has been reconnected, the synchronisation module may be used to close the STS. The synchronisation module monitors the
phase shift between the voltage waveform on either side of the STS. The instant that the
STS closes should be chosen such that both voltage waveforms are approximately in-phase
and at a zero crossing. The transient response of the network upon reclosure must also be
considered before reconnection. A detailed study of reconnection to the grid is outside the
scope of this Thesis. Some proposed strategies are available in literature [44, 111, 112].
Upon reconnection to the mains, all IIEG units shall be instructed to return to constant
power control and employ anti-islanding protection by the STS.

7.7

Predicting the Fault Response of the Microgrid

The fault response of a microgrid is dependent on the state of the microgrid: gridconnected or islanded. The FAT and PAT presented in Chapters 4 and 5 are excellent
tools for predicting the fault response of a grid-connected microgrid as all IIEG devices
are constant power controlled. However, when a microgrid is operating in autonomous
mode, the fault response is governed by the droop controllers and inverter interface capabilities of the IIEG within the microgrid. Assuming that the droop controller detailed in
Chapter 3 is employed, IIEG units are incapable of providing a sinusoidal voltage waveform and sustained fault current required for fault ride-through purposes. However, fault
ride-through is not a requisite for autonomous operation of a microgrid.
Whenever a fault is detected in a microgrid, all IIEG units must detect the fault based
on voltage sequence measurements and trip. During low impedance faults, a significant
voltage drop will always be observable at all IIEG units. For high impedance single-phase
to earth faults, the positive sequence voltage deviation at many IIEG units may not exceed
the voltage range during healthy operation. However, as all loads are connected through
delta-wye transformers, the zero sequence voltage difference observable by all IIEG units
between healthy and faulted conditions is easily discernible. In order to verify that a
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microgrid is capable of identifying faults, the author proposes the Fault Analysis Tool:
Microgrid Version (FATM).

7.7.1

The Fault Analysis Tool: Microgrid Version

The key differences between the FAT and the FATM are the lack of an absolute frequency
and the implementation of droop control. The FATM assumes that the autonomous
controller defined in Chapter 3 is employed. All nomenclature used to describe the FATM’s
iterative solver is consistent with that defined in Chapter 3. Nomenclature describing the
iterative solving process of the FATM is consistent with the description of the FAT in
Chapter 5.
The FATM begins by selecting a single IIEG unit as a reference. The reference IIEG
unit provides the absolute current phase reference. Hence, the reference IIEG unit does
not require the current angle δI iterative variable. Instead, the reference IIEG unit is
allocated an iterative variable for the angular frequency of the entire island ω. All IIEG
units are treated as constant current devices within each iteration; the IIEG currents are
altered between each iteration to achieve ∆Sk = 0 as expressed in (7.2).

∆Sk = ∆Pk + j∆Qk = −(Pref −

X
ω − ωref
Vref − |Vk |
∗
+j
)Sbase +
Vkα Ikα
mP
mQ

(7.2)

α=a,b,c

Where:
√
Vk =

3 Vka + Vkb expj

Vbase

2π
3

3

+Vkc exp−j

2π
3

(7.3)

The steady-state condition of the autonomous controller defined in Chapter 3 is implemented to derive (7.2). The voltage magnitude is determined using a positive sequence
calculation as shown in (7.3).
The process for determination of partial derivatives is similar to the FAT’s method outlined
in Chapter 5. In order formulate the elements of the Jacobian matrix pertaining to the
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angular frequency of the microgrid ω, significant alteration of the constant matrix B is
necessary.
Recall the format of the characteristic, constant and parameter matrices outlined in Chapter 4 and shown in (7.4).

Ax = B

(7.4)

Where:



characteristic




A=

KCL


KVL

h
x = V1 I1 V2 I2 . . . VN

IN

i0

h
i
B = constants

When taking the partial derivative of the system expressed in (7.4) with respect to the
microgrid frequency ω, the characteristic and constant matrices of series impedances such
as lines must be modified as in (7.5).

 
h
i ∂V
h
i
∂ω 

=
−jIp Lp
−1 R + jωL

(7.5)

∂I
∂ω

For parallel connected RLC loads, the system is modified as in (7.6).


h

1
R

+

1
jωL

+ jωC −1

i



∂V
 ∂ω 
∂I
∂ω

h
= V (−jC +

1
)
jω 2 L

i

(7.6)

Transformers are also frequency dependent as must be modified accordingly as in (7.7).
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∂V1
  ∂ω 




 1
jL1
R1
1

)
−
V
(
−1/Zm 1 + Z1 /Zm 0 1/a  ∂I
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(
−
)
1 jω 2 Lm
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  ∂ω  =  1 jω2 Lm

 ∂V2 
1
−Z1
a aZ2  ∂ω 
jI1 jL1 − jI2 L2



(7.7)

∂I2
∂ω

Where Zm =

1
1
1
+ jωL
Rm
m

, Z1 = R1 + jωL1 and Z2 = R2 + jωL2 .

All sources behave as constant current sources exporting zero current as in (7.8)



h
i ∂Vp
h i
∂ω
0 1  ∂I  = 0

(7.8)

p

∂ω

After employing the aforementioned alterations, the linearised system can be solved to
yield the linearised voltage and current deviations with respect to ω. These linearised
deviations can be substituted into (7.9), (7.10), (7.11) and (7.12) to determine the final
Jacobian elements pertaining to the angular frequency of the microgrid.

Ak =

Bk =

∂Vka
∂δIka
cos (δIka ) − Vka sin (δIka )
∂ω
∂ω
∂Vkb
2π
2π ∂δIkb
cos (δIkb +
) − Vkb sin (δIkb +
)
+
∂ω
3
3 ∂ω
∂Vkc
2π
2π ∂δIkc
+
cos (δIkc −
) − Vkc sin (δIkc −
)
∂ω
3
3 ∂ω

∂Vka
∂δIka
sin (δIka ) + Vka cos (δIka )
∂ω
∂ω
∂Vkb
2π
2π ∂δIkb
+
sin (δIkb +
) + Vkb cos (δIkb +
)
∂ω
3
3 ∂ω
∂Vkc
2π
2π ∂δIkc
+
sin (δIkc −
) + Vkc cos (δIkc −
)
∂ω
3
3 ∂ω

dVk =

Re(Vk )Ak + Im(Vk )Bk
3|Vk |

(7.9)

(7.10)

(7.11)
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X
∂∆Sk
Sbase
∗ ∂Vkα (Ik )
+
Ikα
=
∂ω
mP
∂ω

(7.12)

α=a,b,c

The calculation of the partial derivative of IIEG power export with respect to angular
frequency is only required for the reference IIEG. For any further IIEG present within
the microgrid, the power export must be linearised with respect to the angular position
of the current vector

∂∆Sk
∂δIk .

The determination of

∂∆Sk
∂δIk

may be achieved using a similar

technique as in the FAT presented in Chapter 4. The constant matrix B is once again
replaced with constant matrix C which is an array of zero elements with the exception of
the elements corresponding to the relevant IIEG unit denoted k. The non-zero elements
are equal to (7.13).

Ck = jIk

(7.13)

The linearised system the becomes (7.14).

A

∂x
=C
∂δIk

The solution to the array of partial derivatives

∂x
∂δIk

(7.14)

is then inputted into (7.15), (7.16)

and (7.17) to yield the Jacobian elements shown in (7.18).

Ak =

∂δIka
∂Vka
cos (δIka ) − Vka sin (δIka )
∂δIk
∂δIk
∂Vkb
2π
2π ∂δIkb
+
cos (δIkb +
) − Vkb sin (δIkb +
)
∂δIk
3
3 ∂δIk
∂Vkc
2π
2π ∂δIkc
+
cos (δIkc −
) − Vkc sin (δIkc −
)
∂δIk
3
3 ∂δIk

(7.15)
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∂Vka
∂δIka
sin (δIka ) + Vka cos (δIka )
∂δIk
∂δIk
∂Vkb
2π
2π ∂δIkb
+
sin (δIkb +
) + Vkb cos (δIkb +
)
∂δIk
3
3 ∂δIk
∂Vkc
2π
2π ∂δIkc
+
sin (δIkc −
) + Vkc cos (δIkc −
)
∂δIk
3
3 ∂δIk

dVk =

Re(Vk )Ak + Im(Vk )Bk
3|Vk |

√
X
X
j 3Sbase dVk
∂∆Sk
∗ ∂Vkα (Ik )
∗
Vkα (Ik ) +
Ikα
=
+
−jIkα
∂δIk
mQ Vbase
∂δk

(7.16)

(7.17)

(7.18)

α=a,b,c

α=a,b,c

Finally, the partial derivatives with respect to the current magnitude may be calculated
similarly through a modification of the C matrix as shown in (7.19). The current magnitude partial derivatives are required for all IIEG units.

Ck =

Ik
|Ik |

(7.19)

The Jacobian elements can then be determined via (7.20), (7.21), (7.22) and (7.23).

Ak =

∂δIka
∂Vka
cos (δIka ) − Vka sin (δIka )
∂|Ik |
∂|Ik |
∂Vkb
2π
2π ∂δIkb
+
cos (δIkb +
) − Vkb sin (δIkb +
)
∂|Ik |
3
3 ∂|Ik |
∂Vkc
2π
2π ∂δIkc
cos (δIkc −
) − Vkc sin (δIkc −
)
+
∂|Ik |
3
3 ∂|Ik |

(7.20)
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∂Vka
∂δIka
sin (δIka ) + Vka cos (δIka )
∂|Ik |
∂|Ik |
∂Vkb
2π
2π ∂δIkb
+
sin (δIkb +
) + Vkb cos (δIkb +
)
∂|Ik |
3
3 ∂|Ik |
∂Vkc
2π
2π ∂δIkc
+
sin (δIkc −
) + Vkc cos (δIkc −
)
∂|Ik |
3
3 ∂|Ik |
dVk =

Re(Vk )Ak + Im(Vk )Bk
3|Vk |

(7.22)

√
X I∗
X
∂∆Sk
j 3Sbase dVk
∗ ∂Vkα (Ik )
kα
=
+
Vkα (Ik ) +
Ikα
∂ω
mQ Vbase
|Ikα |
∂|Ik |
α=a,b,c

(7.21)

(7.23)

α=a,b,c

The Jacobian elements may then be concatenated to form the complete Jacobian matrix
shown in (7.24) which may be implemented to linearise the system as shown in (7.25).
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(7.25)

The current export of each IIEG is updated according to (7.26). ∆δIk = 0 for the reference
IIEG unit.

Ikn = (|Ikn−1 | − ∆|Ik |) expj(δkn−1 −∆δIk )

(7.26)

The frequency of the microgrid is updated by (7.27).

ωn = ωn−1 − ∆ω

(7.27)

The process is iterated until either an arbitrarily large number of iterations has occurred,
indicating a failed convergence, or |Σ∆S| <  where  is the tolerance of the FATM.

7.7.2
7.7.2.1

Simulation
Single-Phase to Earth Fault

Consider the island as shown in Fig. 7.6 with the line parameters given in Table 7.1. An
A phase single-phase to earth fault of impedance 2 Ω is simulated at the marker A at
t=0.1 seconds.
The IIEG unit is equipped with a voltage sequence protection device. If a zero sequence
voltage of over 10% of nominal voltage is detected for two cycles (40 ms), the IIEG unit’s
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Table 7.1: Island Data

Line Data (1-4)
Resistance (Ω)
Inductance (mH)

0.1
1
Line Data (5)

Resistance (Ω)
Inductance (mH)

1
10
Transformer Data (all)

Primary Voltage l-l rms (V)
11000
Primary Winding Resistance (Ω)
0.001
Primary Winding Inductance (mH)
1
Primary Connection
Delta (except Tx1 which is Wye-earthed)
Secondary Voltage l-l rms (V)
400
Secondary Winding Resistance (Ω)
0.001
Secondary Winding Inductance (mH)
1
Secondary Connection
Wye-earthed
Load Data(1-4)
Real Power (kW)
20
Reactive Power (kVAr)
0.5
Note: The equivalent resistance and inductance are connected in parallel.
Load Data(5)
Real Power (kW)
0.1
Reactive Power (kVAr)
0
Note: The equivalent resistance and inductance are connected in parallel.
IIEG Data
DC Voltage (V)
1000
Switching Frequency (kHz)
4
Filter Inductance (mH)
1.36
Filter Capacitance (µF)
49.736
Power Rating (kVA)
150
Pref (p.u.)
1
Pmax (p.u.)
1.05
Pmin (p.u.)
0
Qmax (p.u.)
0.4
Vref (p.u.)
1
Vmax (p.u.)
1.05
ωref (rad/s)
314.159265
ωmin (rad/s)
311.017673
Low Pass Filter Cut-Off Frequency (Hz)
10
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Figure 7.6: Example Island

circuit breaker will trip. All protection settings are chosen to ensure nuisance trips do not
occur due to transient behaviour of the IIEG unit, but are otherwise arbitrary.
The small-signal voltage and current waveforms of the IIEG are given in Fig. 7.7 and
Fig. 7.8. The straight horizontal lines represent the responses predicted by the FATM.
The error between the predicted and small-signal models can be attributed to the oscillatory positive sequence waveform captured by the signal processing of the autonomous
controller; the error was also present in the grid-connected controller. In the given case,
the current magnitude error is 3.58 %, which is within the tolerances outlined in Chapter
5.
The voltage sequence component signals measured by the protection scheme are shown
in Fig. 7.9. All measurements are taken between the filter capacitors and wye-wye transformer. The voltage sequence protection scheme detected a zero sequence voltage violation
approximately 11 ms after the fault inception. The IIEG unit’s circuit breaker opened
40 ms later as expected. The protection scheme has identified the single-phase to earth
fault, satisfying the discrimination requirements of the protection scheme. The voltage
sequence protection scheme will identify a single-phase to earth fault irrespective of the
fault impedance as IIEG units do not allow the flow of zero sequence current. Hence,
protection discrimination is assured.
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Figure 7.7: Single-Phase to Earth Fault Response of IIEG 1 – Voltage Waveform
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Figure 7.8: Single-Phase to Earth Fault Response of IIEG 1 – Current Waveform
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Figure 7.9: Single-Phase to Earth Fault Response of IIEG 1 – Voltage Sequence Component Measurement

Within the simulation platform, the IIEG unit is not turned off during a circuit breaker
event, hence a voltage is still present after the fault isolation.
An excerpt from the steady state fault response generated using the FATM is shown in
Appendix D. A significant voltage drop can be observed on phase A of the IIEG and
Tx 1. However, the voltages across Tx 2 and Load 1 possess minimal unbalance. The
unbalance present is attributable to the negative sequence current drawn from the fault
which induces a negative sequence voltage at the terminals of the IIEG unit. Unlike
zero sequence voltage, negative sequence voltage is passed through a delta-wye connected
transformer. Hence, through use of delta-wye connected distribution transformers, the
voltage unbalance caused by non-symmetrical faults is largely attenuated, preventing OV
damage to customers.
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Figure 7.10: Line-to-Line Fault Voltage Response: Autonomous Control

7.7.2.2

Line-to-Line Fault

A simulation containing a line-to-line fault at the marker B using the same microgrid
as in Fig. 7.6 was conducted. A fault impedance of 1 kΩ at t=0.1 seconds was chosen
to demonstrate the effects of a high-impedance line-to-line fault. Once again, voltage
sequence protection was employed. The negative sequence voltage threshold is 10% of the
nominal voltage and the time delay is two cycles (40 ms). The resultant IIEG voltage and
current waveforms are shown in Fig. 7.10 and 7.11 respectively. The sequence component
responses are shown in Fig. 7.12.
In the event of line-to-line faults, the autonomous controller is incapable of providing the
nominal positive sequence current. The resultant IIEG response is a heavily distorted
waveform, but a clear negative sequence voltage is detectable. The negative sequence
voltage protection identifies a fault condition approximately 23.8 ms after the fault inception and trips 40 ms later as expected. IIEG units are not designed to maintain sinusoidal
waveforms during faults. Hence, the inability for the autonomous controller to provide
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Figure 7.11: Line-to-Line Fault Current Response: Autonomous Control

Figure 7.12: Line-to-Line Sequence Component Response: Autonomous Control
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fault ride-through during line-to-line-faults is an acceptable limitation of the proposed
controller.

7.7.2.3

Three-Phase Bolted Faults

Three-phase bolted faults are rare and have a very low impedance. A three-phase bolted
fault will generally draw significantly more power than is locally available and cause a
large voltage drop that will initiate an positive sequence under voltage trip. The positive
sequence protection settings consist of an under voltage threshold equal to 94% of nominal
voltage with a time delay of two cycles (40 ms). The proposed FATM may be used to
verify that the positive sequence voltage drop is significant enough for adequate protection
discrimination. The tool will provide information whether the ratings of the IIEG unit
will, in an ideal case, be exceeded. If the ratings are exceeded by a significant margin, the
IIEG will export a heavily distorted waveform and the predicted response will not match
the actual exported voltage and current waveforms of the IIEG. The FATM was designed
under the premise that a perfectly sinusoidal waveform and the ideal steady-state output
according to the droop controller is achievable.
An additional line with an large impedance of Z = 20 + j31.416 Ω was attached to the
node with marker B. A three-phase bolted fault was placed at the end of the newly added
line. The purpose of this case study is to demonstrate the response of an exaggerated end
of line three-phase bolted fault. The network was analysed using the FATM and yielded
the results shown in Fig. 7.13.
The total IIEG complex power export predicted by the FATM can be calculated by Q =
~ ≈ 22 + j265 kVA which is significantly higher than the 150 kVA rating of
ΣV I∗ is S
the IIEG unit. Furthermore, the reactive power exported by the IIEG is approximately
2.5 times the maximum reactive power deliverable by the IIEG unit. The small-signal
response of the same case study yields a heavily distorted voltage and current waveform
as shown in Fig. 7.14 and Fig. 7.15.
The sequence data measured by the voltage sequence protection is given in Fig. 7.16.
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******************
Steady State data
******************
Grid Frequency: 50.406601 Hz
Element: IIEG1
Voltage: 179.867729/_85.278049
Current: 493.480508/_0.000000
Element:
Voltage: 179.867729/_-34.721951
Current: 493.480508/_-120.000000
Element:
Voltage: 179.867729/_-154.721951
Current: 493.480508/_120.000000

Figure 7.13: Three-Phase Bolted Fault Response: Autonomous Control
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Figure 7.14: Three-Phase Bolted Fault Voltage Response: Autonomous Control
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Figure 7.15: Three-Phase Bolted Fault Current Response: Autonomous Control

Figure 7.16: Three-Phase Bolted Fault Response of IIEG 1 – Voltage Sequence Component Measurement
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The voltage sequence protection detects a positive sequence voltage below the threshold
of 0.94 p.u. at approximately 7.5 ms after the fault inception and trips 40 ms later.
A negative sequence voltage violation was also detected and may operate as a form of
secondary protection for three-phase balanced faults.
In the event of an end of line fault, the reactive power absorption of the fault is too
significant for the autonomous control scheme to maintain a smooth sinusoidal output
predicted by the FATM. However, the presented case is arbitrary and the reactive power
export from IIEG units may not necessarily exceed the rated value for all microgrid configurations when exposed to three-phase bolted faults. The line impedances of a microgrid
capable of exposure to three-phase bolted faults without exceeding the maximum allowable reactive power export will likely also incur a significant voltage drop and thermal
overload instances. Hence, whilst a minor study regarding the fault discrimination of
three-phase bolted faults in microgrids cannot be omitted, it is unlikely that three-phase
bolted fault discrimination will be an issue in the majority of microgrid cases.

7.7.2.4

Conclusion

The formation of an island precludes the voltage and frequency commutation of an effective infinite bus. IIEG units adopting the autonomous control scheme described in
Chapter 3 do not ensure that the voltage magnitude is common across all three phases.
The proposed protection scheme is predicated on the presence of voltage unbalance for
fault discrimination purposes. As described in Chapter 2, many authors have presented
fault identification techniques which are effective for low impedance faults. However, the
proposed techniques for high-impedance fault detection in an island are generally complex
and often do not take into account the connection of transformers within the DN.
The autonomous control scheme adopted in this Thesis cannot provide fault ride-through
during low impedance line-to-line or three-phase bolted faults. The local IIEG protection
will isolate an IIEG unit by detecting an abnormal positive or negative sequence voltage.
Furthermore, the autonomous control scheme is incapable of producing the sinusoidal
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voltage and current waveform magnitudes commensurate with the ideal steady-state lineto-line or three-phase bolted fault response upon which the FATM is predicated. Hence, a
meaningful comparison of small-signal modelling analysis and the FATM cannot be drawn.

7.7.3

Determining Settings for Island Protection

Three-phase balanced faults will generally draw above the aggregate rated power of IIEG
units within a microgrid. An abnormally large reactive power export shall yield a significant positive sequence voltage drop via the response of the droop controller and/or the
implementation of the FCL. Hence, an appropriate protection setting would be slightly
below the minimum voltage of the droop controller. If the minimum voltage threshold is
reached due to a peak loading condition, insufficient generation is present and the IIEG
unit should be isolated unless a load shedding scheme is implemented. However, load
shedding is the responsibility of the STS and, as such, an overloading condition identified
by an IIEG can be construed as a STS failure to ensure adequate supply is present. Ergo,
isolation of the IIEG due to positive sequence under-voltage is an acceptable protection
discrimination tool for three-phase bolted faults.
In order to verify that a significant voltage drop will occur for a three-phase bolted fault
within a microgrid, the FATM places a three-phase bolted fault at all nodes. Fig. 7.13
reveals the voltage and current data considered as an exaggerated example for a high
impedance three-phase fault. The reactive power export of the IIEG was shown to exceed
the maximum reactive power capability as programmed into the droop controller. Hence,
a significant voltage drop and total harmonic distortion is assured if such a three-phase
bolted fault is present. Note that the voltage drop will not be the same as that predicted by
the FATM as the ideal droop control steady-state condition cannot be met by the controller
during such significant disturbances; irrespective, a significant voltage drop sll occur. The
positive sequence voltage threshold should be slightly lower than the minimum voltage of
an IIEG controller as shown in (7.28). The minimum voltage of the IIEG controller is
0.95 p.u.; hence, a threshold setting of 0.94 p.u. is appropriate. All IIEG devices must
be isolated for any fault within a microgrid; no fault selectivity is required. As such, the
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time delay of a trip needs only be long enough such that no trips are instigated due to
short term transients. 40 ms or two cycles was chosen within this Thesis.

V1threshold < min(Vmin )

(7.28)

Line-to-line faults cause a voltage drop on two phases of the IIEG unit. The autonomous
controller is unable to maintain a sinusoidal voltage and current waveform as shown in
Fig. 7.10 and Fig. 7.11. However, after passing the waveforms through the cosine filter, a
clear negative sequence voltage can be observed as shown in Fig. 7.12. A negative sequence
voltage threshold should be chosen that is greater than the negative sequence voltage
unbalance caused by loading within the island, but smaller than the minimum negative
sequence voltage observed during all possible fault locations. The proposed autonomous
controller is more prone to voltage unbalance than other controllers that do not maintain
a balanced current export. The chosen negative sequence threshold is case dependent and
cannot be applied to the simulations in this Chapter which contain perfectly balanced
loading. However, the unbalance can be determined using the prefault condition FATM
analysis. The negative sequence voltage threshold can then be selected within the range
given by (7.29).

max(V2healthy ) < V2threshold < min(V2faulted )

(7.29)

Single-phase to earth faults are the only fault type which can be accurately modelled using
the FATM. The FATM was applied to the microgrid shown in Fig. 7.6. The FATM results
pertaining to single-phase to earth faults are given in Appendix E. The fault impedance
is 1000 kΩ for all cases. All single-phase to earth fault placed directly adjacent to nodes
attached to loads yield no zero sequence voltage at the IIEG due to the presence of deltawye connected transformers. For any other fault locations, the zero sequence voltage is in
the order of ≈ 220 V. The zero sequence current drawn by the fault is very small due to
the high impedance of the fault and the current balancing characteristic of the proposed
autonomous controller. Hence, there is very little zero sequence voltage drop across the
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microgrid. Subsequently, fault discrimination is very easy to achieve even in the instance
of high impedance faults as predicted earlier in this Chapter.
The zero sequence voltage at all IIEG points of connection is minimal during healthy
microgrid operation. The separation of loads from IIEG through delta-wye connected
transformers disallows zero sequence voltage at an IIEG to be present due to unbalanced
loading. Shunt impedances of the HV domain within the microgrid are generally very
high impedance and near balanced. Therefore, high impedance single-phase to earth
fault discrimination is easily achievable for the proposed microgrid design philosophy and
protection scheme. The zero sequence voltage thresholds must be chosen such that (7.30)
is satisfied.

max(V0healthy ) < V0threshold < min(V0faulted )

7.8

(7.30)

Conclusion

The proposed microgrid design philosophy and protection scheme are not compatible with
microgrid philosophies asserted by other authors [53, 55–57]. The proposed autonomous
controller ensures that a significant voltage unbalance follows any fault condition within
a microgrid. This chapter is not an exhaustive study of the feasibility of the nexus of
balanced current export, droop control and voltage sequence protection; rather, a preliminary study of the plausibility if such a nexus is proffered. Further research investigating
the stability of the control scheme, the effects of significant line impedances, negative sequence loading impedance and the robustness of the proposed protection scheme is needed.
Furthermore, increasing the modularity of the microgrid concept may eventually further
increase microgrid reliability and robustness.
One limitation of the proposed scheme is that whilst the LV segment of the microgrid is
effectively earthed, the MV segment is technically not earthed. Irrespective of the solid
earth connection of the AC filter and wye-wye connected transformer, the IIEG is not
effectively earthed because an effective infinite zero sequence impedance is present due
to the zero sequence current restriction of the IIEG controller. Whilst step and touch
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potential problem can be avoided through appropriate designing of insulators, the shunt
capacitance between the line and earth can provide a path for zero sequence current to
flow, posing a safety risk to customers and personnel [113]. The effects of zero sequence
shunt capacitance requires more research before the proposed microgrid design philosophy
could be employed.
The FATM is an integral part for protection analysis of the microgrid. The FATM provides
a high level of accuracy when predicting any healthy state of a microgrid as well as the fault
response of single-phase to earth faults. The FATM is also useful for verifying whether
the reactive power threshold of an IIEG unit is exceeded for a three-phase balanced
fault. This verification confirms an IIEG unit’s inability to maintain the voltage within
the stipulated bounds and ensures a positive sequence voltage threshold violation and
subsequent isolation of that IIEG unit.

Chapter 8

Conclusions and Future Work
The research within this Thesis proffers an academic study into a deterministic approach
towards the plausibility of continued EG proliferation in DNs. Whilst the main focus
is predicting and mitigating the impacts of large penetrations of grid-connected EG, ostensibly, the natural progression of EG proliferation is the microgrid concept. However,
the contemporary definition of the microgrid concept is very much in its infancy and,
as such, a significant academic license may be granted. The proposed microgrid philosophy does not reflect philosophies asserted by many other authors, particularly when
considering transformer connection as well as IIEG control and protection. The proposed
microgrid structure is compliant with contemporary grid-connected IIEG Australian and
International Standards during grid-connected mode and is designed to ensure fault discrimination and power quality for customers.
The major contributions of this Thesis are:

• A thorough literature review that critically analyses the effects of high EG penetration on contemporary protection strategies. Furthermore, there is a detailed review
on protection strategies proposed by various authors for future networks, including
intentionally islanded networks.
• A small-signal simulation platform capable of simulating the fault response of IIEG
units in DNs has been developed and partially verified. A further contribution
213
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is the modification of the control of IIEG units to ensure only positive sequence
current export is possible and a more consistent control operation when traversing
grid-connected and autonomous operation. The contribution of these controllers
is pivotal to the success of the voltage sequence protection scheme proposed in
this Thesis. The development of the small-signal platform is also crucial to the
verification of the FAT and FATM.
• A novel OV mitigation scheme that does not require an off-line sensitivity analysis
nor communications infrastructure. The scheme requires a simple modification of
the aforementioned grid-connected control scheme and operates in a plug-and-play
fashion. Furthermore, the scheme naturally allows a higher power export for customers connected to a point of connection with a lower short circuit impedance or in
close proximity to load. Hence, the proposed OV mitigation scheme allows the utility to bolster EG presence in DNs with a large short circuit impedance and limited
load diversity.
• The FAT developed as a means for approximating the fault response of grid-connected
IIEG units. The FAT is capable of determining the fault response of IIEG units with
FCLs for all fault types with a high success rate of convergence. The scheme, upon
verification, precludes the need for time-intensive small-signal analysis. Hence, the
impact of IIEG on fault efficacy can be determined quickly and accurately without
a significant amount of prior research, time or computational power.
• The PAT created to automate the protection analysis process by simulating fault
conditions pertinent to the determination of protection settings, taking into consideration the impact of IIEG on protection adequacy. The PAT utilises the FAT
to determine the fault data, which is subsequently compiled and analysed to generate a protection report. The report highlights the data required to understand
the impacts of high IIEG penetrations on the efficacy of a DN’s protection scheme.
The study includes the necessary CB ratings, OOZ fault current flow and pick-up
currents. Hence, the time required for a technical analysis of the effects of a large
EG installation on protection efficacy may be dramatically shortened and highly
automated.
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• A new microgrid philosophy was proposed with the intention of improving the fault
discrimination characteristics of a microgrid. Voltage sequence protection was asserted as the preferred protection type and was shown to be effective within the
small-signal simulation platform. A modification of the microgrid FAT scheme,
namely the FATM, was implemented to aid in the determination of the necessary
protection settings and protection efficacy of a microgrid with IIEG units and the
proposed microgrid structure.

The technical challenges of continued EG proliferation are generally poorly understood,
even by industry personnel. A large contribution of the work proffered in this Thesis is
the prediction tools addressing the impacts of high EG penetration on protection efficacy
without laborious small-signal modelling analyses. The FAT is currently unnecessary for
contemporary EG penetrations within Australian DNs. However, if medium-scale IIEG
proliferation occurs, applications for the FAT may arise and the efficacy of the FAT can
be verified and subsequently used in industry applications. From an industrial point
of view, the FAT and PAT represent powerful tools for protection diagnostics without
requiring a significant amount of control data and both are relatively computationally
inexpensive. Such tools could instill confidence in the utility towards the aim of the
continued connection of IIEG in DNs.
For IIEG proliferation to continue, the risk of OV in DNs must be mitigated. Reportedly,
there already exist cases of OV in Australian DNs. Hence, practical applications of the
OV mitigation scheme are already present. Implementation of the OV mitigation scheme
can represent a reduction in remuneration received by an IIEG proprietor. However, instances of OV represent a cost via the loss of power quality in the DN, which represents a
long term cost in equipment life reduction. The impacts of OV can be alleviated through
the proposed OV mitigation scheme. Many other schemes require off-line sensitivity analysis, fixed power factors or communications infrastructure. The proposed scheme does
not require a detailed study of the DN, maximises real power export within voltage limitations and utilises only locally available data for successful operation. Furthermore, the
control scheme requires only a simple modification of contemporary constant power control schemes. Future work will involve justifying (or mandating) the application of OV
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mitigation and verifying that the scheme works as expected in practice. Furthermore,
the effects of large number of OV mitigation schemes on the utility must also be studied
before a mass roll-out of the proposed scheme is conducted.
The proposed microgrid philosophy, whilst experimental in nature, offers an alternative
to other microgrid concepts that may ameliorate issues concerned with the detection of
high-impedance single-phase to earth faults, without complicated spectral energy protection schemes. Fault discrimination if networks dominated by IIEG has been a topic of
considerable research within both grid-connected and autonomous applications. The proposed philosophy does not require a significant change to current infrastructure, but does
require significant changes in transformer connections, protection philosophy, communications infrastructure and IIEG control for adequate fault discrimination.
A significant amount of future work is necessary to provide a complete verification of
the proposed models and fault analysis techniques. A limitation of this Thesis is the nonexistence of a practical application of the proposed control schemes, which are exorbitantly
expensive and logistically difficult. However, the transient responses and steady-state values of IIEG units within the small-signal simulation platform closely match the respective
theoretical responses as shown in Chapter 3. A thorough stability analysis of the proposed
schemes is necessary, especially in the case of the autonomous controller. Stability analysis is outside the scope of this Thesis; however, improvement of the control response could
minimise the steady state error of the controller during fault responses, or possibly reduce
the risk of instability when fault ride-through is required for more modular microgrids.

Appendix A

Constant Power Control Island
Response Derivation
A single phase diagram of the test circuit is given in Fig. A.1.
The power equations used to derive the voltage and frequency response of the island are
shown in (A.1)

S = V I ∗ = P + jQ =

|V |2
Z∗

Figure A.1: Equivalent Circuit for Island
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(A.1)
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The load behaves as a constant impedance with parallel connected RLC elements. The
rated voltage, angular frequency, real power, inductive reactive power and capacitive
reactive power are denoted Vrated , ωrated , Prated , Qlrated and Qcrated , respectively. The
element resistance, inductance and capacitance may be expressed as:

2
Vrated
Prated

(A.2)

L=

2
Vrated
Qlrated ωrated

(A.3)

C=

Qcrated
2
Vrated ωrated

(A.4)

R=

The IIEG unit is constant power controlled and exports power set points of Psp and Qsp .
Let ω and |V | be the steady-state angular frequency and voltage magnitude after the
island is formed.

Psp + jQsp =

|V |2
|V |2
+ j(
− |V |2 ωC)
R
ωL

(A.5)

Combining (A.2) and the real part of (A.5) yields:

|V |
=
Vrated

s

Psp
Prated

(A.6)

Combining (A.3), (A.4) and the imaginary part of (A.5) yields:

2
2
ω 2 Qcrated |V |2 + ωQsp Vrated
ωrated − ωrated
|V |2 Qlrated = 0

When applying the quadratic formula:

(A.7)
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ω
ωrated

=

2
Qsp Vrated
±

q
4
Q2sp Vrated
+ 4Qcrated |V |4 Qlrated
2Qcrated |V |2
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(A.8)

All terms are non-negative; thus, only the positive case shall be considered. If a per unit
system is employed with Vrated and ωrated used as bases, the equations can be reduced to
(A.9) and (A.10).

s
|V | =

Qsp +
ω=

Psp
Prated

q
Q2sp + 4Qcrated |V |4 Qlrated
2Qcrated |V |2

(A.9)

(A.10)

Appendix B

Control Signal Deviation during
Unbalanced Faults
B.1

Single-Line to Earth Phase

The code is shown in Fig. B.1 and the generated plot is shown in Fig. B.2.
Command Window Output:
Current Error Signal amplitude = 7.307324 %

B.2

Single-Line to Earth Phase

The code is shown in Fig. B.3 and the generated plot is shown in Fig. B.4.
Command Window Output:
Current Error Signal amplitude = 21.257014 %
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C:\Users\jtk847\...\controller_tester.m
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Ts=0.0001; % Time step
frequency=50;
t=0:Ts:2; % time range
V=8981.46; % voltage magnitude
S=50000; % power export
%I=5.1*S/V; % current magnitude l-l fault
I=1.1268*S/V; % current magnitude l-e fault
Va=0*cos(2*pi*50*t); % PCC voltages
Vb=V*cos(2*pi*50*t-2*pi/3);
Vc=V*cos(2*pi*50*t+2*pi/3);
Ia=I*cos(2*pi*50*t); % PCC currents chosen such that delta I = 0
Ib=I*cos(2*pi*50*t-2*pi/3);
Ic=I*cos(2*pi*50*t+2*pi/3);
Vp=2/3*(Va.*cos(2*pi*50*t)+Vb.*cos(2*pi*50*t-2*pi/3)+Vc.*cos(2*pi*50*t+2*pi/3)); %
conversion to direct axis
Ip=2/3*(Ia.*cos(2*pi*50*t)+Ib.*cos(2*pi*50*t-2*pi/3)+Ic.*cos(2*pi*50*t+2*pi/3));
Vf(1)=0; % wc=2pi250 rad/sec LPFs
for p=2:numel(t)
Vf(p)=(Ts*Vp(p)*2*pi*250+Vf(p-1))/(1+Ts*2*pi*250);
end
If(1)=0;% wc=2pi250 rad/sec LPFs
for p=2:numel(t)
If(p)=(Ts*Ip(p)*2*pi*250+If(p-1))/(1+Ts*2*pi*250);
end
Iref=2/3*S./Vf-If; % current error calculator
Ireff(1)=0;% wc=2pi10 rad/sec LPFs
for p=2:numel(t)
Ireff(p)=(Ts*Iref(p)*2*pi*10+Ireff(p-1))/(1+Ts*2*pi*10);
end
Vpeak=0.3; %l-e fault
%Vpeak=4; %l-l fault
Va=Vpeak*cos(2*pi*50*t); % voltage signals chosen to compare phase peaks with
oscillating current error signal
Vb=Vpeak*cos(2*pi*50*t-2*pi/3);
Vc=Vpeak*cos(2*pi*50*t+2*pi/3);
Iax=(1.1268*S/V+3/2*Ireff).*cos(2*pi*50*t); % PCC currents chosen such that delta I =
0
Ibx=(1.1268*S/V+3/2*Ireff).*cos(2*pi*50*t-2*pi/3);
Icx=(1.1268*S/V+3/2*Ireff).*cos(2*pi*50*t+2*pi/3);
figure(6); % plot signals l-e fault
plot(t,Ireff,t,Va,t,Vb,t,Vc);
legend('dI','Va','Vb','Vc');
grid on;
per_error=(((max(Ireff(5000:end))+abs(min(Ireff(5000:end)))))/2)/(2/3*I); % calculate
and plot deviation
fprintf('Current Error Signal amplitude = %f %%\n.', per_error*100);

Figure B.1: Control Signal Code Simulating Reflected Line-to-Earth Fault

Appendix B. Control Signal Deviation during Unbalanced Faults

223

0.3

dI
Va
Vb
Vc

0.2

0.1

0

-0.1

-0.2

-0.3
0.2

0.21

0.22

0.23

0.24

0.25

0.26

0.27

Figure B.2: Control Signal Plot Simulating Reflected Line-to-Earth Fault
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C:\Users\jtk847\...\controller_tester.m
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Ts=0.0001; % Time step
frequency=50;
t=0:Ts:2; % time range
V=8981.46; % voltage magnitude
S=50000; % power export
I=5.1*S/V; % current magnitude l-l fault
%I=1.1268*S/V; % current magnitude l-e fault
Va=0*cos(2*pi*50*t); % PCC voltages
Vb=0*cos(2*pi*50*t-2*pi/3);
Vc=V*cos(2*pi*50*t+2*pi/3);
Ia=I*cos(2*pi*50*t); % PCC currents chosen such that delta I = 0
Ib=I*cos(2*pi*50*t-2*pi/3);
Ic=I*cos(2*pi*50*t+2*pi/3);
Vp=2/3*(Va.*cos(2*pi*50*t)+Vb.*cos(2*pi*50*t-2*pi/3)+Vc.*cos(2*pi*50*t+2*pi/3)); %
conversion to direct axis
Ip=2/3*(Ia.*cos(2*pi*50*t)+Ib.*cos(2*pi*50*t-2*pi/3)+Ic.*cos(2*pi*50*t+2*pi/3));
Vf(1)=0; % wc=2pi250 rad/sec LPFs
for p=2:numel(t)
Vf(p)=(Ts*Vp(p)*2*pi*250+Vf(p-1))/(1+Ts*2*pi*250);
end
If(1)=0;% wc=2pi250 rad/sec LPFs
for p=2:numel(t)
If(p)=(Ts*Ip(p)*2*pi*250+If(p-1))/(1+Ts*2*pi*250);
end
Iref=2/3*S./Vf-If; % current error calculator
Ireff(1)=0;% wc=2pi10 rad/sec LPFs
for p=2:numel(t)
Ireff(p)=(Ts*Iref(p)*2*pi*10+Ireff(p-1))/(1+Ts*2*pi*10);
end
%Vpeak=0.3; %l-e fault
Vpeak=4; %l-l fault
Va=Vpeak*cos(2*pi*50*t); % voltage signals chosen to compare phase peaks with
oscillating current error signal
Vb=Vpeak*cos(2*pi*50*t-2*pi/3);
Vc=Vpeak*cos(2*pi*50*t+2*pi/3);
Iax=(1.1268*S/V+3/2*Ireff).*cos(2*pi*50*t); % PCC currents chosen such that delta I =
0
Ibx=(1.1268*S/V+3/2*Ireff).*cos(2*pi*50*t-2*pi/3);
Icx=(1.1268*S/V+3/2*Ireff).*cos(2*pi*50*t+2*pi/3);
figure(6); % plot signals l-e fault
plot(t,Ireff,t,Va,t,Vb,t,Vc);
legend('dI','Va','Vb','Vc');
grid on;
per_error=(((max(Ireff(5000:end))+abs(min(Ireff(5000:end)))))/2)/(2/3*I); % calculate
and plot deviation
fprintf('Current Error Signal amplitude = %f %%\n.', per_error*100);

Figure B.3: Control Signal Code Simulating Reflected Line-to-Line Fault
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Figure B.4: Control Signal Plot Simulating Reflected Line-to-Line Fault

Appendix C

PAT Reports
C.1

Report of PAT – no FCL or EIT

There were 22 failures of convergence noted. All were three phase faults.

Protection Report: CT1 a
Peak current: 1.312349 amps
Primary OC pick-up minimum required: 1523.413310 amps
Primary EF pick-up minimum required: 1757.914853 amps
Maximum OC current: 19483.349758 amps
Maximum EF current: 19483.778049 amps
CT Zone: CT2 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 4.958971 amps
CT Zone: CT3 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 1.557184 amps
CT Zone: CT4 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 1.418272 amps
CT Zone: CT2 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 3.934510 amps
CT Zone: CT3 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 1.444648 amps
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CT Zone: CT4 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 1.370636 amps
Protection Report: CT2 a
Peak current: 11.768138 amps
Primary OC pick-up minimum required: 1046.410518 amps
Primary EF pick-up minimum required: 1207.270502 amps
Secondary OC pick-up minimum required: 464.482902 amps
Secondary EF pick-up minimum required: 535.745830 amps
Maximum OC current: 19481.547370 amps
Maximum EF current: 19481.677596 amps
CT Zone: CT1 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 13.869333 amps
CT Zone: CT4 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 536.525732 amps
CT Zone: CT1 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 11.768162 amps
CT Zone: CT4 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 536.525338 amps
Protection Report: CT3 a
Peak current: 7.841797 amps
Primary OC pick-up minimum required: 464.684138 amps
Primary EF pick-up minimum required: 535.486960 amps
Secondary OC pick-up minimum required: 327.356335 amps
Secondary EF pick-up minimum required: 377.680716 amps
Maximum OC current: 1208.835522 amps
Maximum EF current: 1207.812071 amps
CT Zone: CT1 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 9.251499 amps
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CT Zone: CT2 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 9.253091 amps
CT Zone: CT1 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 7.843460 amps
CT Zone: CT2 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 7.843460 amps
Protection Report: CT4 a
Peak current: 3.923409 amps
Primary OC pick-up minimum required: 327.278429 amps
Primary EF pick-up minimum required: 377.451083 amps
Maximum OC current: 540.274459 amps
Maximum EF current: 536.495479 amps
CT Zone: CT1 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 4.636271 amps
CT Zone: CT2 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 4.637069 amps
CT Zone: CT3 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 4.638306 amps
CT Zone: CT1 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 3.928990 amps
CT Zone: CT2 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 3.929023 amps
CT Zone: CT3 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 3.934928 amps
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C.2

Report of PAT with EIT

There were 22 failures of convergence noted. All were three phase faults.

Protection Report: CT1 a
Peak current: 1.312349 amps
Primary OC pick-up minimum required: 1523.413310 amps
Primary EF pick-up minimum required: 1758.363435 amps
Maximum OC current: 19483.349758 amps
Maximum EF current: 19483.349758 amps
CT Zone: CT2 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 1.312079 amps
CT Zone: CT3 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 1.557184 amps
CT Zone: CT4 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 1.418272 amps
CT Zone: CT2 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 1.312079 amps
CT Zone: CT3 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 1.444648 amps
CT Zone: CT4 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 1.370636 amps
Protection Report: CT2 a
Peak current: 11.768138 amps
Primary OC pick-up minimum required: 1051.394168 amps
Primary EF pick-up minimum required: 1207.600684 amps
Secondary OC pick-up minimum required: 468.164903 amps
Secondary EF pick-up minimum required: 535.901961 amps
Maximum OC current: 19481.547370 amps
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Maximum EF current: 19481.547370 amps
CT Zone: CT1 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 11.768087 amps
CT Zone: CT4 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 536.525732 amps
CT Zone: CT1 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 11.768087 amps
CT Zone: CT4 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 536.525338 amps
Protection Report: CT3 a
Peak current: 7.841797 amps
Primary OC pick-up minimum required: 467.587530 amps
Primary EF pick-up minimum required: 535.645777 amps
Secondary OC pick-up minimum required: 331.222330 amps
Secondary EF pick-up minimum required: 378.189804 amps
Maximum OC current: 1207.144640 amps
Maximum EF current: 1207.142465 amps
CT Zone: CT1 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 7.838424 amps
CT Zone: CT2 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 7.838424 amps
CT Zone: CT1 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 7.838424 amps
CT Zone: CT2 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 7.838424 amps
Protection Report: CT4 a
Peak current: 3.923409 amps
Primary OC pick-up minimum required: 328.829569 amps
Primary EF pick-up minimum required: 377.563194 amps
Maximum OC current: 535.281557 amps
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Maximum EF current: 535.535398 amps
CT Zone: CT1 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 3.916696 amps
CT Zone: CT2 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 3.916696 amps
CT Zone: CT3 a Maximum OC out-of zone fault current: 3.916718 amps
CT Zone: CT1 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 3.916696 amps
CT Zone: CT2 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 3.916696 amps
CT Zone: CT3 a Maximum EF out-of zone fault current: 3.916717 amps
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Appendix D

FATM Excerpt
Fig. D.1 is a print out from a FATM case study. The steady-state grid frequency is given
as well as the voltage and current vectors of each element within the microgrid. The
A phase current vector of IIEG1 is used as the absolute reference for all vectors.
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******************
Steady State data
******************
Grid Frequency: 50.193201 Hz
Element: IIEG1
Voltage: 42.694002/_89.794581
Current: 135.018186/_0.000000
Element:
Voltage: 364.237327/_-140.941936
Current: 135.018186/_-120.000000
Element:
Voltage: 406.432234/_158.087645
Current: 135.018186/_120.000000
Element: Tx1_a_primary
Voltage: 42.694002/_-90.205419
Current: 135.018186/_-180.000000
Element: Tx1_b_primary
Voltage: 364.237327/_39.058064
Current: 135.018186/_60.000000
Element: Tx1_c_primary
Voltage: 406.432234/_-21.912355
Current: 135.018186/_-60.000000
Element: Tx1_a_secondary
Voltage: 1.624548/_72.391097
Current: 4.909752/_-0.000000
Element: Tx1_b_secondary
Voltage: 10489.598555/_-146.941621
Current: 4.909629/_-119.999262
Element: Tx1_c_secondary
Voltage: 10491.133264/_153.053631
Current: 4.909636/_119.999122
Element: Tx2_a_primary
Voltage: 10489.862973/_-146.950376
Current: 0.681782/_-150.097941
Element: Tx2_b_primary
Voltage: 10490.126673/_93.048885
Current: 0.681799/_89.901320
Element: Tx2_c_primary
Voltage: 10489.877693/_-26.951993
Current: 0.681783/_-30.099558
Element: Tx2_a_secondary
Voltage: 219.815942/_30.793597
Current: 27.485512/_29.367011
Element: Tx2_b_secondary
Voltage: 219.821468/_-89.207142
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Current: 27.486203/_-90.633728
Element: Tx2_c_secondary
Voltage: 219.816251/_150.791980
Current: 27.485551/_149.365394
Element: Load1_a
Voltage: 219.815942/_-149.206403
Current: 27.485512/_-150.632989
Element: Load1_b
Voltage: 219.821468/_90.792858
Current: 27.486203/_89.366272
Element: Load1_c
Voltage: 219.816251/_-29.208020
Current: 27.485551/_-30.634606
Element: Line1_a
Voltage: 1.624381/_72.406977
Current: 4.909752/_-0.000000
Element: Line1_b
Voltage: 1.624340/_-47.592285
Current: 4.909629/_-119.999262
Element: Line1_c
Voltage: 1.624342/_-167.593901
Current: 4.909636/_119.999122
Element: Fault Impedance
Voltage: 0.000481/_2.846930
Current: 0.000240/_2.846930

Figure D.1: Steady State Fault Response

Appendix E

FATM Output Data
Figs. contain an excerpt of the FATM scheme applied to the microgrid detailed in Chapter 7. The excerpt contains all single-phase to earth data. The fault data may be interpretted as follows:
Node: (location of the fault)
ef (phase on which the fault is placed) fault (IIEG phase measurement): (quantity measured at IIEG unit) (units: either volts or amperes)
The node positions corresponding to Fig. 7.6 are explained in Table E.1.
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*********************
Microgrid Protection:
*********************
DGconfig:
IIEG1 connected
Sensor: IIEG1
Prefault: 135.016127/_-0.000000 A
Prefault: 226.699012/_13.886284 V
Prefault Vp: 226.699012/_13.886284 V
Prefault Vn: 0.000000/_-31.607502 V
Prefault V0: 0.000000/_-169.441012 V
Node: 2
ef a fault a: 135.018266/_0.000000 amps
ef a fault b: 135.018266/_-120.000000 amps
ef a fault c: 135.018266/_120.000000 amps
ef b fault a: 135.018266/_0.000000 amps
ef b fault b: 135.018266/_-120.000000 amps
ef b fault c: 135.018266/_120.000000 amps
ef c fault a: 135.018266/_0.000000 amps
ef c fault b: 135.018266/_-120.000000 amps
ef c fault c: 135.018266/_120.000000 amps
ef a fault a: 6.602820/_13.689684 V
ef a fault b: 386.957215/_-135.621516 V
ef a fault c: 386.936886/_163.399195 V
ef b fault a: 386.936886/_43.399195 V
ef b fault b: 6.602820/_-106.310316 V
ef b fault c: 386.957215/_104.378484 V
ef c fault a: 386.957215/_-15.621516 V
ef c fault b: 386.936886/_-76.600805 V
ef c fault c: 6.602820/_133.689684 V
ef a fault Vp: 226.699012/_13.886062 V
ef a fault Vn: 0.003695/_-152.424033 V
ef a fault V0: 220.092641/_-166.108274 V
ef b fault Vp: 226.699012/_13.886062 V
ef b fault Vn: 0.003695/_-32.424033 V
ef b fault V0: 220.092641/_73.891726 V
ef c fault Vp: 226.699012/_13.886062 V
ef c fault Vn: 0.003695/_87.575967 V
ef c fault V0: 220.092641/_-46.108274 V
Node: 5
ef a fault a: 135.018187/_-0.000000 amps
ef a fault b: 135.018187/_-120.000000 amps
ef a fault c: 135.018187/_120.000000 amps
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ef b fault a: 135.018187/_-0.000000 amps
ef b fault b: 135.018187/_-120.000000 amps
ef b fault c: 135.018187/_120.000000 amps
ef c fault a: 135.018187/_-0.000000 amps
ef c fault b: 135.018187/_-120.000000 amps
ef c fault c: 135.018187/_120.000000 amps
ef a fault a: 42.638100/_89.806601 V
ef a fault b: 364.279631/_-140.936019 V
ef a fault c: 406.419875/_158.095433 V
ef b fault a: 406.419875/_38.095433 V
ef b fault b: 42.638100/_-30.193399 V
ef b fault c: 364.279631/_99.063981 V
ef c fault a: 364.279631/_-20.936019 V
ef c fault b: 406.419875/_-81.904567 V
ef c fault c: 42.638100/_-150.193399 V
ef a fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886409 V
ef a fault Vn: 0.003593/_-174.075419 V
ef a fault V0: 220.240461/_-176.936822 V
ef b fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886409 V
ef b fault Vn: 0.003593/_-54.075419 V
ef b fault V0: 220.240461/_63.063178 V
ef c fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886409 V
ef c fault Vn: 0.003593/_65.924581 V
ef c fault V0: 220.240461/_-56.936822 V
Node: 8
ef a fault a: 135.018186/_0.000000 amps
ef a fault b: 135.018186/_-120.000000 amps
ef a fault c: 135.018186/_120.000000 amps
ef b fault a: 135.018186/_-0.000000 amps
ef b fault b: 135.018186/_-120.000000 amps
ef b fault c: 135.018186/_120.000000 amps
ef c fault a: 135.018186/_-0.000000 amps
ef c fault b: 135.018186/_-120.000000 amps
ef c fault c: 135.018186/_120.000000 amps
ef a fault a: 42.694467/_89.782897 V
ef a fault b: 364.230292/_-140.941125 V
ef a fault c: 406.424317/_158.087130 V
ef b fault a: 406.424317/_38.087130 V
ef b fault b: 42.694467/_-30.217103 V
ef b fault c: 364.230292/_99.058875 V
ef c fault a: 364.230292/_-20.941125 V
ef c fault b: 406.424317/_-81.912870 V
ef c fault c: 42.694467/_-150.217103 V
ef a fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886410 V
ef a fault Vn: 0.003592/_-174.104177 V

Figure E.1: FATM Output Data: pp. 1
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ef a fault V0: 220.219632/_-176.951200 V
ef b fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886410 V
ef b fault Vn: 0.003592/_-54.104177 V
ef b fault V0: 220.219632/_63.048800 V
ef c fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886410 V
ef c fault Vn: 0.003592/_65.895823 V
ef c fault V0: 220.219632/_-56.951200 V
Node: 11
ef a fault a: 135.018186/_-0.000000 amps
ef a fault b: 135.018186/_-120.000000 amps
ef a fault c: 135.018186/_120.000000 amps
ef b fault a: 135.018186/_0.000000 amps
ef b fault b: 135.018186/_-120.000000 amps
ef b fault c: 135.018186/_120.000000 amps
ef c fault a: 135.018186/_-0.000000 amps
ef c fault b: 135.018186/_-120.000000 amps
ef c fault c: 135.018186/_120.000000 amps
ef a fault a: 42.737289/_89.764968 V
ef a fault b: 364.192836/_-140.945008 V
ef a fault c: 406.427721/_158.080825 V
ef b fault a: 406.427721/_38.080825 V
ef b fault b: 42.737289/_-30.235032 V
ef b fault c: 364.192836/_99.054992 V
ef c fault a: 364.192836/_-20.945008 V
ef c fault b: 406.427721/_-81.919175 V
ef c fault c: 42.737289/_-150.235032 V
ef a fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886410 V
ef a fault Vn: 0.003592/_-174.126026 V
ef a fault V0: 220.203845/_-176.962125 V
ef b fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886410 V
ef b fault Vn: 0.003592/_-54.126026 V
ef b fault V0: 220.203845/_63.037875 V
ef c fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886410 V
ef c fault Vn: 0.003592/_65.873974 V
ef c fault V0: 220.203845/_-56.962125 V
Node: 14
ef a fault a: 135.018186/_-0.000000 amps
ef a fault b: 135.018186/_-120.000000 amps
ef a fault c: 135.018186/_120.000000 amps
ef b fault a: 135.018186/_-0.000000 amps
ef b fault b: 135.018186/_-120.000000 amps
ef b fault c: 135.018186/_120.000000 amps
ef c fault a: 135.018186/_0.000000 amps
ef c fault b: 135.018186/_-120.000000 amps
ef c fault c: 135.018186/_120.000000 amps
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ef a fault a: 42.766563/_89.752782 V
ef a fault b: 364.167260/_-140.947666 V
ef a fault c: 406.430085/_158.076517 V
ef b fault a: 406.430085/_38.076517 V
ef b fault b: 42.766563/_-30.247218 V
ef b fault c: 364.167260/_99.052334 V
ef c fault a: 364.167260/_-20.947666 V
ef c fault b: 406.430085/_-81.923483 V
ef c fault c: 42.766563/_-150.247218 V
ef a fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886410 V
ef a fault Vn: 0.003591/_-174.140964 V
ef a fault V0: 220.193094/_-176.969594 V
ef b fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886410 V
ef b fault Vn: 0.003591/_-54.140964 V
ef b fault V0: 220.193094/_63.030406 V
ef c fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886410 V
ef c fault Vn: 0.003591/_65.859036 V
ef c fault V0: 220.193094/_-56.969594 V
Node: 17
ef a fault a: 135.018185/_-0.000000 amps
ef a fault b: 135.018185/_-120.000000 amps
ef a fault c: 135.018185/_120.000000 amps
ef b fault a: 135.018185/_-0.000000 amps
ef b fault b: 135.018185/_-120.000000 amps
ef b fault c: 135.018185/_120.000000 amps
ef c fault a: 135.018185/_0.000000 amps
ef c fault b: 135.018185/_-120.000000 amps
ef c fault c: 135.018185/_120.000000 amps
ef a fault a: 42.782290/_89.746317 V
ef a fault b: 364.153565/_-140.949099 V
ef a fault c: 406.431407/_158.074205 V
ef b fault a: 406.431407/_38.074205 V
ef b fault b: 42.782290/_-30.253683 V
ef b fault c: 364.153565/_99.050901 V
ef c fault a: 364.153565/_-20.949099 V
ef c fault b: 406.431407/_-81.925795 V
ef c fault c: 42.782290/_-150.253683 V
ef a fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886410 V
ef a fault Vn: 0.003591/_-174.148990 V
ef a fault V0: 220.187376/_-176.973607 V
ef b fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886410 V
ef b fault Vn: 0.003591/_-54.148990 V
ef b fault V0: 220.187376/_63.026393 V
ef c fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886410 V
ef c fault Vn: 0.003591/_65.851010 V

Figure E.2: FATM Output Data: pp. 2
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ef c fault V0: 220.187376/_-56.973607 V
Node: 20
ef a fault a: 135.083128/_0.000000 amps
ef a fault b: 135.083128/_-120.000000 amps
ef a fault c: 135.083128/_120.000000 amps
ef b fault a: 135.083128/_-0.000000 amps
ef b fault b: 135.083128/_-120.000000 amps
ef b fault c: 135.083128/_120.000000 amps
ef c fault a: 135.083128/_-0.000000 amps
ef c fault b: 135.083128/_-120.000000 amps
ef c fault c: 135.083128/_120.000000 amps
ef a fault a: 226.614755/_13.870441 V
ef a fault b: 226.658985/_-106.078581 V
ef a fault c: 226.811481/_133.886256 V
ef b fault a: 226.811481/_13.886256 V
ef b fault b: 226.614755/_-106.129559 V
ef b fault c: 226.658985/_133.921419 V
ef c fault a: 226.658985/_13.921419 V
ef c fault b: 226.811481/_-106.113744 V
ef c fault c: 226.614755/_133.870441 V
ef a fault Vp: 226.695058/_13.892705 V
ef a fault Vn: 0.119188/_-118.475510 V
ef a fault V0: 0.000000/_173.262493 V
ef b fault Vp: 226.695058/_13.892705 V
ef b fault Vn: 0.119188/_1.524490 V
ef b fault V0: 0.000000/_173.343929 V
ef c fault Vp: 226.695058/_13.892705 V
ef c fault Vn: 0.119188/_121.524490 V
ef c fault V0: 0.000000/_147.745666 V
Node: 23
ef a fault a: 135.083134/_0.000000 amps
ef a fault b: 135.083134/_-120.000000 amps
ef a fault c: 135.083134/_120.000000 amps
ef b fault a: 135.083134/_0.000000 amps
ef b fault b: 135.083134/_-120.000000 amps
ef b fault c: 135.083134/_120.000000 amps
ef c fault a: 135.083134/_-0.000000 amps
ef c fault b: 135.083134/_-120.000000 amps
ef c fault c: 135.083134/_120.000000 amps
ef a fault a: 226.614765/_13.870433 V
ef a fault b: 226.658968/_-106.078585 V
ef a fault c: 226.811492/_133.886256 V
ef b fault a: 226.811492/_13.886256 V
ef b fault b: 226.614765/_-106.129567 V
ef b fault c: 226.658968/_133.921415 V
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ef c fault a: 226.658968/_13.921415 V
ef c fault b: 226.811492/_-106.113744 V
ef c fault c: 226.614765/_133.870433 V
ef a fault Vp: 226.695059/_13.892702 V
ef a fault Vn: 0.119194/_-118.467478 V
ef a fault V0: 0.000000/_116.319546 V
ef b fault Vp: 226.695059/_13.892702 V
ef b fault Vn: 0.119194/_1.532522 V
ef b fault V0: 0.000000/_142.624951 V
ef c fault Vp: 226.695059/_13.892702 V
ef c fault Vn: 0.119194/_121.532522 V
ef c fault V0: 0.000000/_-103.706472 V
Node: 26
ef a fault a: 135.083163/_-0.000000 amps
ef a fault b: 135.083163/_-120.000000 amps
ef a fault c: 135.083163/_120.000000 amps
ef b fault a: 135.083163/_-0.000000 amps
ef b fault b: 135.083163/_-120.000000 amps
ef b fault c: 135.083163/_120.000000 amps
ef c fault a: 135.083163/_0.000000 amps
ef c fault b: 135.083163/_-120.000000 amps
ef c fault c: 135.083163/_120.000000 amps
ef a fault a: 226.614806/_13.870397 V
ef a fault b: 226.658891/_-106.078601 V
ef a fault c: 226.811541/_133.886256 V
ef b fault a: 226.811541/_13.886256 V
ef b fault b: 226.614806/_-106.129603 V
ef b fault c: 226.658891/_133.921399 V
ef c fault a: 226.658891/_13.921399 V
ef c fault b: 226.811541/_-106.113744 V
ef c fault c: 226.614806/_133.870397 V
ef a fault Vp: 226.695063/_13.892684 V
ef a fault Vn: 0.119223/_-118.430699 V
ef a fault V0: 0.000000/_123.664260 V
ef b fault Vp: 226.695063/_13.892684 V
ef b fault Vn: 0.119223/_1.569301 V
ef b fault V0: 0.000000/_146.686631 V
ef c fault Vp: 226.695063/_13.892684 V
ef c fault Vn: 0.119223/_121.569301 V
ef c fault V0: 0.000000/_-89.567029 V
Node: 29
ef a fault a: 135.083146/_0.000000 amps
ef a fault b: 135.083146/_-120.000000 amps
ef a fault c: 135.083146/_120.000000 amps
ef b fault a: 135.083146/_-0.000000 amps

Figure E.3: FATM Output Data: pp. 3
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ef b fault b: 135.083146/_-120.000000 amps
ef b fault c: 135.083146/_120.000000 amps
ef c fault a: 135.083146/_-0.000000 amps
ef c fault b: 135.083146/_-120.000000 amps
ef c fault c: 135.083146/_120.000000 amps
ef a fault a: 226.614781/_13.870419 V
ef a fault b: 226.658937/_-106.078591 V
ef a fault c: 226.811512/_133.886256 V
ef b fault a: 226.811512/_13.886256 V
ef b fault b: 226.614781/_-106.129581 V
ef b fault c: 226.658937/_133.921409 V
ef c fault a: 226.658937/_13.921409 V
ef c fault b: 226.811512/_-106.113744 V
ef c fault c: 226.614781/_133.870419 V
ef a fault Vp: 226.695061/_13.892695 V
ef a fault Vn: 0.119206/_-118.452540 V
ef a fault V0: 0.000000/_-99.776083 V
ef b fault Vp: 226.695061/_13.892695 V
ef b fault Vn: 0.119206/_1.547460 V
ef b fault V0: 0.000000/_173.176323 V
ef c fault Vp: 226.695061/_13.892695 V
ef c fault Vn: 0.119206/_121.547460 V
ef c fault V0: 0.000000/_148.107331 V
Node: 32
ef a fault a: 135.018185/_-0.000000 amps
ef a fault b: 135.018185/_-120.000000 amps
ef a fault c: 135.018185/_120.000000 amps
ef b fault a: 135.018185/_-0.000000 amps
ef b fault b: 135.018185/_-120.000000 amps
ef b fault c: 135.018185/_120.000000 amps
ef c fault a: 135.018185/_-0.000000 amps
ef c fault b: 135.018185/_-120.000000 amps
ef c fault c: 135.018185/_120.000000 amps
ef a fault a: 42.804057/_89.738773 V
ef a fault b: 364.135417/_-140.951188 V
ef a fault c: 406.434208/_158.071061 V
ef b fault a: 406.434208/_38.071061 V
ef b fault b: 42.804057/_-30.261227 V
ef b fault c: 364.135417/_99.048812 V
ef c fault a: 364.135417/_-20.951188 V
ef c fault b: 406.434208/_-81.928939 V
ef c fault c: 42.804057/_-150.261227 V
ef a fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886411 V
ef a fault Vn: 0.003591/_-174.160125 V
ef a fault V0: 220.180506/_-176.979178 V
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ef b fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886411 V
ef b fault Vn: 0.003591/_-54.160125 V
ef b fault V0: 220.180506/_63.020822 V
ef c fault Vp: 226.698912/_13.886411 V
ef c fault Vn: 0.003591/_65.839875 V
ef c fault V0: 220.180506/_-56.979178 V
Node: 35
ef a fault a: 135.084738/_-0.000000 amps
ef a fault b: 135.084738/_-120.000000 amps
ef a fault c: 135.084738/_120.000000 amps
ef b fault a: 135.084738/_-0.000000 amps
ef b fault b: 135.084738/_-120.000000 amps
ef b fault c: 135.084738/_120.000000 amps
ef c fault a: 135.084738/_0.000000 amps
ef c fault b: 135.084738/_-120.000000 amps
ef c fault c: 135.084738/_120.000000 amps
ef a fault a: 226.622228/_13.866536 V
ef a fault b: 226.650690/_-106.081576 V
ef a fault c: 226.814185/_133.886255 V
ef b fault a: 226.814185/_13.886255 V
ef b fault b: 226.622228/_-106.133464 V
ef b fault c: 226.650690/_133.918424 V
ef c fault a: 226.650690/_13.918424 V
ef c fault b: 226.814185/_-106.113745 V
ef c fault c: 226.622228/_133.866536 V
ef a fault Vp: 226.695685/_13.890405 V
ef a fault Vn: 0.119632/_-114.002620 V
ef a fault V0: 0.000000/_-150.909360 V
ef b fault Vp: 226.695685/_13.890405 V
ef b fault Vn: 0.119632/_5.997380 V
ef b fault V0: 0.000000/_127.069531 V
ef c fault Vp: 226.695685/_13.890405 V
ef c fault Vn: 0.119632/_125.997380 V
ef c fault V0: 0.000000/_141.308170 V

Figure E.4: FATM Output Data: pp. 4
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Table E.1: Island Node Data

Element
IIEG
Line 1
Line 2
Line 3
Line 4
Line 5
Tx 1
Tx 2
Tx 3
Tx 4
Tx 5
Tx 6
Load 1
Load 2
Load 3
Load 4
Load 5

Node Adjacencies
2
5,8
8,11
11,14
14,17
17,32
2,5
8,26
11,29
14,23
17,20
32,35
26
29
23
20
35
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